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ABSTRACT
Using critical discourse analysis this dissertation
examined the mainstream, dominant discourse of the
discipline of educational psychology. This analysis included
a discussion of social, political, and epistemological
issues. From a position of Foucauldian skepticism regarding
the human sciences assumptions of educational psychology
were interrogated, and the discipline as a "regime of truth"
- a nexus of power, knowledge, and social control - was
critiqued. Evidence was offered showing that the discourse
of the discipline produces the "truth" of the discipline.
Two textbooks nominated by members of Division 15
(Educational Psychology) of the American Psychological
Association as "classic" texts were utilized as sources of
the discipline's dominant discourse. These mainstream texts
are presented as social artifacts and sites of social
struggle embedded in political, historical, and economic
contexts. An intertextual reading, i.e., reading "texts
against texts", provides a way for perspectives that have
been marginalized or disqualified from the mainstream
disciplinary perspective to provide counter-discourses to
mainstream texts. The result is the disrupting of knowledge
claims and practices sanctioned by the discipline, through
viii

which students are judged and labeled by their approximation
to the "norm" established by the discipline.
The practice of intertextual reading and critical
analysis is recommended as a way for educational
psychologists and those being initiated into the discipline
to work toward a critical literacy. Through such literacy
educational psychologists may become more reflexive
regarding the discipline and their own practice.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
People know what they do; they frequently know why
they do what they do; but what they don't know is
what what they do does.
{Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p.187)
A Story
It was my first class as teacher of an educational
psychology course. 1 My enthusiasm had been growing as I
prepared for the class. I was eager to engage my students in
not only learning the content of the discipline, but also
helping students become conscious of their experience as we
"did" educational psychology. In other words, I wanted the
course to be a space where we would study educational
psychology and practice it at the same time. This seemed a
worthwhile goal to pursue, as I believed it would add to the
relevancy of the coursework for the students, most of whom
were preservice teachers.
We were reading through the syllabus with a nice amount
of discussion, checking understanding, asking questions. The
excitement I felt seemed matched by the students as we
engaged the coursework for the first time. We had come to
Several works that were very helpful to me began with
stories and I decided to appropriate the practice. See Apple
{1996), Macedo {1994), Sawicki (1991). This story has left an
enduring "mark" on me. For an interesting examination of the
place stories can hold in educational research see Carter
{1993).
1

2

the course requirements, and I was explaining how the grades
would be determined. The giving of "grades 112 was an aspect
of the class that I had really thought over seriously.
"Grades", or the "marks" we get, had meant much to me as a
student; I assumed that the grading system was equally as
important to my first set of educational psychology
students. I was eager that my students be successful, and
understanding the grading system would help them meet the
requirements of the course. It seemed fairly simple: I took
the responsibility to ensure that the material was presented
effectively, and that the marking system was clear and fair;
the student's effort would complete the equation for
success.
Then it happened. I had included a series of "pop
quizzes" that would account for fifty percent of the grade.
One student raised her hand. "Why 'pop' quizzes?" she
inquired. I welcomed the question. It was perfect really in
that it was a clear example of how we could connect the
content and process of the course. I had thought about it
and I was ready with an answer. My response included
explanations of two concepts that we would study in the
course: 1) the usefulness of a reinforcement schedule which
was of the "variable-interval" type; and, 2) the

2

My use of quotation marks here,
and frequently
throughout this work, indicates irony. Quotation marks are
also used to express a tension in using a word with shifting
meaning.

3

effectiveness of "spaced" over "massed" study. Because
students never knew when the quiz would occur they would be
"motivated" to study as the course went along. I assured the
students that the material on the quiz would be nothing
tricky or obscure as it would come from what they had read
or what we had discussed in class; there was no need for
them to become overly concerned. Actually, I explained, I
was doing them a favor as "studies show" that there is much
more long-term learning following study that is spread out
over time rather than study that is "massed" as happens when
students "cram" for tests. I didn't allow myself to
entertain the remembrance of a conversation I had with a
colleague while preparing the course. The associate had
assured me that I had to do something to make sure the
students came to class. She used pop quizzes, and I decided
to do the same.
I was satisfied (secretly very pleased) with my
response to the student's inquiry. "Okay?" I asked. It was
not okay. The student said that she felt trapped. She
described herself as a serious student, but there might be a
time when she has to miss class. What if it was on a day
when there was a pop quiz? I had stated in the syllabus that
quizzes could not be made-up, but that I would drop the
lowest mark, which could be an "F" if she had to miss a
quiz. "Did that help?" Her expression revealed that it
really didn't, but the student thanked me for my answer. The

4

rest of the students seemed to accept my rationale as there
were no further questions on the topic, and the class
continued.
Later that evening I reflected on the happenings of the
class. It seemed as though we were off to a great start. I
pictured the student who had presented me with the
opportunity to explain the "pop quiz" aspect of the grading
system. I had a degree of certainty both in that the answer
given was grounded in the discipline under study, and in the
"effectiveness" of the practice I had explained. Then
gradually, the initial pleasure that I had felt gave way to
embarrassment. The student had seen other dimensions in the
practice of "pop quizzes". In one sense the "case was
closed". I was the teacher; my decisions were well thought
out and benevolent. However, the student had resisted by
facing the unequal power relationship between teacher and
student, and by questioning the grading practice. In the
process of questioning she had exposed an example of "what
what we do does". The scientific knowledge was justifying
the use of pop quizzes to exert control over the students to
attend class and to study. Because of the student's
resistance and my reflection on practice I realized that my
answer was not nearly so important as the questions which
had arisen in the student and in myself.
Purpose of the Story
The story serves as an appropriate introduction of this

5

dissertation for several reasons. First, it highlights the
autobiographical aspect of research in general, and of this
work in particular. Foucault (1988) has said that, "Each of
my works is a part of my own biography. For one or another
reason I had the occasion to feel and live those things"
(p.11). Similarly, those who read this work do, in some
sense, read me.
The work of this dissertation began as an uneasy
reading (Apple, 1993) of mainstream educational psychology's
discourse. Through a critical reading and analysis of the
discipline I began to understand that much of what I had
accepted as "objective", "neutral", and "stable" in the
discipline was actually a product of social negotiations
(Gergen, 1985) and "reflection of conventions" (Kincheloe,
1993) imbued with political interests. This dissertation is
an opportunity for me to affirm my right, but more
importantly, my responsibility to read, understand, and
transform (Freire & Macedo, 1987; Giroux, 1987) my
experience of both teaching and learning educational
psychology.
Second, the story demonstrates the "relational" aspect
of education. Schooling is primarily and in multiple ways
relational (Apple, 1996). The relational aspects extend
beyond student-teacher and student-student relationships.
The work that I am presenting includes the interrogation of
power relationships that exist throughout the educational

6

institution as well as the dynamic relationships among
power, knowledge, and social control. I am interested in the
relationship of the mainstream theoretical perspectives of
the discipline's discourse and the everyday practices of
education that both limit and make possible student agency.
When these perspectives and processes are recognized it is
possible to resist and contest them, to support a more
emancipatory pedagogy concerned with a critical and
democratic social order. I argue that the relations of what
is said and done in the name of the discipline marks
educational psychology as a "site of struggle" (Aronwitz &
Giroux, 1991).
Third, the story highlights the significance of the act
of questioning, my own and my student's. Questioning is a
means of critical examination that aims to problematize the
discipline, i.e., to question what has been taken-forgranted (Foucault, 1984). In particular, this dissertation
questions the commonly accepted view of educational
psychology as a neutral field of study. Thus, the work that
follows is an interrogation of the very specialized
scientific and technical discipline of educational
psychology.
Fourth, the story positions this work as a postmodern 3
critique. In modernity, theory provides the foundation
supporting the logic of scientific methodology and its
3

This position is discussed in more depth in Chapter III.
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interest in prediction, explanation, and control. Yet,
theory has also been stripped of its classical interest in
ends and ethics (Giroux, 1981). Theory holds quite an
"allure" for educationalists in general (Thomas, 1997), and
educational psychologists in particular, as it is taken up
and used in the interest of technical progress. A postmodern
critique is " ... a different way of seeing and working,
rather than a fixed body of ideas, a clearly worked-out
position or a set of critical methods and techniques" (Usher

& Edwards, 1994, p.2). This dissertation is concerned with
interrogating and thinking about the discipline's
theoretical perspectives more complexly. My intention is to
theorize in a way that helps in understanding the present
predicament in education, to make the familiar strange
(Ball, 1990; Foucault, 1984), and where possible and
necessary engage in resistance that could transform it
(hooks, 1994).
A postmodern critique of the discourse does not mean
that the discourse of the discipline of educational
psychology is not taken seriously. on the contrary, Apple
(1996) insists that constructive criticism "is the mark that
[a] position is taken seriously" (p. xix). In a sense, the
discourse itself invites critical analysis because a
discourse is a "stumbling block ... a point of resistance and
a starting point for an opposing strategy (Foucault,
1978/1990, p. 10). In this sense the dominant discourse of

8

educational psychology can even be considered useful as it
provides an opportunity for interrogation and disruption.
The openings that result from this disruption provide a
space where re-imagining of educational psychology can take
place, and ethical conversations and a language of
possibilities can be engaged {Giroux, 1992; Welch, 1990).
The remainder of this chapter will present a discussion
of the discipline of educational psychology as a project of
modernity. The discourse expresses increasingly multiple
perspectives regarding its position and potential for
teacher education. The stance of this particular work as
educational research within and against the discipline is
introduced as a process concerned with critical educational
theory and a social constructionist epistemology. This work
is presented as an example of poststructuralist research
that is explained in terms of key issues: meaning, language,
and discourse; the formation of subjectivities; relations of
power and knowledge. Before closing the chapter, two
significant points regarding the researcher and APA Style
are presented. Finally, an overview of the remaining
chapters is presented.
Educational Psychology as Modern Discipline
Educational psychology is a discipline concerned with
the multifaceted issues of the teaching-learning process.
The discipline claims a history beginning at the end of the
nineteenth century and founded by pioneers from general

9

psychology (Berliner & Calfee, 1996). This is mentioned not
only as an interesting fact of the discipline's history, but
also to draw attention to the issue of the discipline as
social enterprise. Features of the history of the discipline
are often left out of introductory textbooks {Glover &
Ronning, 1987). Sprinthall & Sprinthall {1990, 5th ed.) is a
notable exception. 4

Anderson et al. {1995) offer the

explanation that historical information is unnecessary for
preservice teachers. However, ignoring history serves to
make a discipline's context invisible and denotes
unimportance. Such assumptions must be interrogated.
Throughout this dissertation issues of historical importance
are presented that have been ignored in much of the
mainstream discourse.
Today the influence of the discipline is obvious as its
practices, knowledge-base, research, and concepts pervade
educational discussions. However, educational psychologists
are currently concerned with, and embroiled in, debate over
the place of their discipline in discussions of school
crisis 5 and reform, as well as the place of educational
4

See historical descriptions in: Charles {1987); Fancher
{1979); Joncich {1962); Walberg & Haertel {1992); as well as
Berliner & Calfee {1996).
It should be noted that I am aware of the recent work of
Berliner and Biddle {1995) who make a case that issues of the
"crisis" have been "manufactured" by powerful people (e.g.,
the Christian right, members of the media) who are involved in
a myth-making activity that seeks to dismantle the ·public
school system. While I believe both that some of their points
have merit and that their general argument is flawed, it is
5

10
psychology in teacher education programs.
Many members of the educational psychology community
are optimistic regarding the status of the field and the
potential of educational psychology to help improve the
teaching and learning process. For example, it has been
noted that the field "seems to have come of age, it has
matured, it is sophisticated, it is pretty independent from
other fields and areas of psychology" (Salomon, 1995, p.
105). The authors of the newly celebrated Handbook of
Educational Psychology (Berliner & Calfee, 1996) assert
that,
It is clear that our field has been and continues to be
highly productive and remarkably influential. Its
findings, concepts, methods, and points of view are
widely adopted by scholars in other disciplines and
cross a wide range of research and evaluation
activities .... The field is alive and growing. (p. 1020)
The newsletter for members of the American Psychological
Association (APA) Division 15, Educational Psychology
(November 1996), contains some confident messages to the
U.S. President and members of the Congress as they face
legislative decisions on education:
•.. [Educational psychologists] have developed and
tested various theories, and have come to some
important decisions about what works in the
classrooms .... and what doesn't work and why ..•. We are
the backbone of education, and the basis for many other
important fields •.•. Every legislator should have an
not my purpose to engage the work directly here.
Most
educationalists agree that there is a crisis, although they
differ around arguments of cause and means of amelioration.
See Giroux & McLaren ( 1986). This topic will be addressed
later in the chapter.
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educational psychologist on staff as a consultant and
resource! (Neeley, 1996, p. 1)
Wittrock (1992) is confident that:
[Educational psychology] can become recognized as a
core field of psychology, responsible for contributing
to the creation of psychological theory, to knowledge
and research about education, and reciprocally, through
research and development, to the understanding and
improvement of education. (p. 140)
Anita Woolfolk (1995), eminent author of educational
psychology textbooks, explains to her readers who are
preservice teachers that "if you can become a more expert
learner by applying the knowledge from this text •.. then you
will be a better teacher as well" (p. 10).
Despite these waves of optimism there exists the
contrasting perception of educational psychology as a "field
marked by little definitional consensus, many theoretical
persuasions, and diversified scholarship" (Walberg &
Haertel, 1992, p.6). Furthermore, "although the diversity is
interesting •.. the field of educational psychology does not
have much of a core" (Salomon, 1995, p. 105). It has been
noted that the "closing decades of the twentieth century
have seen many challenges to the hegemony of educational
psychology as the 'master science'" (Berliner & Calfee,
1996, p. 1020). Others have expressed a sense of "growing
awareness among educational psychologists of the need to
reexamine their own discipline" (Peterson, Clark, & Dickson,
1990, p.524). It has even been asked if educational
psychology "as a discipline is on the verge of extinction"

12

(Grinder, 1989, p. 4).
Some of the discrepancy in the views presented above
may be explained by recognizing that arguments vary
according to audience. Educational psychologists are
positive and optimistic about the discipline's potential to
help ameliorate the crisis in education when policy makers
(who provide funding for projects) are addressed. When
talking to each other educational psychologists tend to be
more forthright in discussing the problematics of the
discipline's tenets, although some assume a defensive
position regarding the discipline's potential and value to
the field of education. 6
When considering curriculum issues, especially for
introductory courses, there is an escalating debate
regarding the content, process, and goals of the coursework.
For example, some recognized experts in the field (e.g.,
Woolfolk, 1995, 1996) encourage the traditional image of the
field as "foundational" emphasizing mastery of the content
of the discipline as helping preservice teachers be better
teachers. Others assert that the discipline is more of a

The optimism which sweeps through claims of the
effectiveness of the discipline of educational psychology
exemplifies the metaphor of "promissory note" ( Soyland, 1994).
This is a rhetorical device frequently used in scientific
discourse through which the "reader is persuaded of the
factual status" (Soyland, 1994, p. 37) of the text and a
proposed reward for "buying into" the particular thesis
established by the text. Preservice teachers are particularly
enthusiastic to reap the assurances connected to learning
educational psychology.
6
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"resource" (Blumenfeld & Anderson, 1996) assisting
preservice teachers in their reflections on the teachinglearning process. Regardless of this debate educational
psychology's discourse generally is presented as an
authoritarian and neutral body of knowledge that can guide
educational practice and facilitate better learning. This
discourse forms a metanarrative that seeks modernity's
transcendent principles of "rationality, linearity,
progress, and control" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 11).
Through this dissertation I join the discussion
regarding the discipline of educational psychology. The
position I will take is an oppositional stance; it is a
critique of the discourse, presenting a kind of counterdiscourse 7 • Questions are raised concerning the
discipline's mainstream "dominant discourse 118 as it is
perceived as both authoritarian and neutral. Through a
critical reading and analysis of the discourse presented in

7

Counter-discourses
are
considered
"languages
of
critique, demystification, and agency capable of contesting
dominant oppressive beliefs and practices" ( Leistyna, Woodrum,
& Sherblom, 1996, p. 297).
8

I appreciate that words and expressions like "dominant
discourse" may be considered jargon to some readers. I am
caught in a tension here as I want my writing to be accessible
to,
and
taken
seriously by,
a
variety
of
readers;
simultaneously, I need to use words that are meaningful and
important in stating my case. This is one of the challenges in
doing this kind of work, and the issue will be taken up in a
later section of this chapter.
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two textbooks nominated as "classic" 9 , I argue that the
technical rationality characteristic of the discourse
provides both an organizational resource and constraint to
the discipline.
From a perspective of technical rationality the crisis
in education is viewed as a series of technical problems,
and concerns the narrow view of better preparing children to
enter the workplace. The metaphor of teacher as "technician"
must be contrasted with the view of teacher as
transformative intellectual (Giroux & McLaren, 1986/1996)
claiming "a critical view of teacher work and authority
... one consistent with the principles and practice of
democracy" (p. 305). This more critical perspective allows
for different types of questions. Questions regarding
educational crisis and reform need to be connected to a
"wider discourse of freedom and democratic struggle" (Giroux

& McLaren, 1989, p.xviii).
I identify problematic issues around: (1) the
assurances made by the discourse; (2) the "scientific"
formulation of disciplinary principles; and,

(3) more

importantly, the everyday practices of schooling that are
authorized by the discourse.
Research Within and Against the Discipline
The work of this research is situated within a critical

An explanation of
presented in Chapter III.
9

this

category

of

textbooks

is
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educational perspective that asserts the need to question
accepted truths and assumptions about education and society
(Weiler, 1992). Implicit in this approach is a commitment to
and belief that society and its institutions, are historical
constructions; i.e., society has changed, will change, and
needs to change (Giroux, 1988/1992).
The development of a social constructionist perspective
within the educational psychology community is gaining
legitimacy with potential linkage to this critical
perspective. The social constructionist viewpoint is
espoused as the "contemporary psychological perspective" of
the educational psychology community (Anderson et al.,
1995). The acknowledgement of learning as socially
constructed is by no means a new development as many
concerned with learning have been discussing it for years
(e.g., Derry, 1992; Goodenow, 1992; Mead, 1934; Mayer, 1992;
Prawat & Floden, 1994; Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991;
Scarr, 1985). Indeed, Prawat and Floden (1994) remind us
that "[c]onstructivist learning is based on the now
commonplace idea that knowledge is actively constructed by
the learner" (emphasis added, p. 37).
Accepting this "contemporary psychological perspective"
of social constructionism has far reaching implications for
the discipline's knowledge claims. This perspective suggests
a recognition of the social, cultural, ideological and
political significance of what is said and done in the name
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of the discipline. Social constructionism demonstrates a
"disciplinary or epistemic reflexivity" (Usher & Edwards,
1994) of research. Such a focus means that
any piece of research always carries within itself an
epistemology - a theory about knowing and truth and
their relationship to the world or 'reality'. This
epistemology is never 'innocent' because it always
contains within itself a set of values - which means
there is always politics in research. (Usher & Edwards,
1994, p. 149)
Reflecting this conclusion, two perspectives, critical
educational theory and social constructionist epistemology,
come together in this work as a formulation of
poststructuralist research.
Poststructuralist Research
The particular "method 1110 of this research is a
critical discourse analysis, a form of poststructuralist
research 11 • Poststructuralism is a mode of analysis, a way
of looking at and asking questions about anything textual
both in the "narrow conventional sense of written texts and
in the much broader sense of any discourses, practices,
institutions ... any structure generally which is productive
of signification 12 "

10

(Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 18). The key

This method is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter III.

11

Poststructuralism is far from a unified field. I have
appropriated elements which are helpful in my analysis. See
Best & Kellner (1991), Cherryholms (1988), Sarup (1993), and
Weedon (1988) for helpful examinations.
"Signification" is the process through which we make
sense, how we come to make meaning or designate meaning. See
Cherryholms (1988) for a more complete analysis.
12
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aspect of poststructuralism is that it is a means of
interrogating traditional understandings of: (a) meaning,
language, discourse: (b) subjectivity; and (c) power
relationships in knowledge production.

These will be

mentioned briefly here as they are key factors throughout
the dissertation.
Meaning. language. and discourse. Traditionalists see
meanings in language and discourse as fixed. Meaning in
language reflects an objective reality: it emanates from the
interior essence of the object: language is believed to
function as "simple transmitters of information from writer
to reader" (Madigan, Johnson, & Linton, 1995, p. 433).
Poststructuralists, on the other hand, stress that
language/discourse constitutes reality. Meanings are never
fixed, they are influenced by the multiplicity of issues
which form our context. Meaning is understood as exterior to
the object: it is inscribed and contingent. Concepts can be
appreciated as "social artifacts" which acquire their
meaning not from real world referents but from the context
of their usage" (Gergen, 1985).
Meaning in a discipline's discourse is not fixed;
rather meaning is "shaped contextually within institutions
and by prevailing social practices" (Bensimon, 1995, p.
597). Gergen (1985) makes the claim that a certain
understanding is sustained and may prevail through time not
because of "the empirical validity of the perspective in
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question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes (e.g.,
communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetoric)" (p. 268).
Discourses espoused by disciplines are productive, they
constitute the "reality" which they present. Discourses are
never independent of history, power, and interests.
At the same time, counter-discourses arise and come
into a dialogic relationship with dominant discourses; they
are able to disrupt commonsense meanings and taken-forgranted assumptions, and have the potential to lead to a
limited transformation13 •
Subjectivity. Persons are traditionally understood as
autonomous, coherent individuals with certain natural and
essential characteristics. Individuals are seen as emerging
through the dynamic interaction of their biological
development and their self-contained social reality, and
within their own history. In traditional research studies,
for example, effort is exerted toward discovering some
"truth" about the subject or subjects, or the human subject
in general.
In contrast, poststructuralists have a very different
13

I use the word "limited" here for a particular reason.
Postmodernism critiques totalizing, universal narratives.
Therefore, it would be "un-postmodern" for me to suggest some
total solution. Sharon Welch {1990) talks about the appeal of
working for "final solutions", but she explains responsible
action does not mean resolving a problem (especially someone
else's problem) once and for all. Rather, responsible action
is "participation in a communal work, laying the groundwork
for the creative response of people in the present and in the
future ...• It is sustained and enabled by participation in a
community of resistance" {p. 75).
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understanding of "subject". Subjects are regarded as
constituted, and constantly reconstituted (Usher & Edwards,
1994; Weedon, 1987) by the discursive practices to which
they are subjected. "Subjectivities" are the product of
society, a human reality and social construction (Sarup,
1993). Subjectification is understood as how a subject is
made an "object". This represents so much of the work of
educational psychology with its focus on individual
differences, placement of students along the normal curve,
and ever increasing categories of differentiation. The
difference of one subject is often "parasitic" on the
"other" as is obvious in representations. In other words,
children are defined by characteristics which differentiate
them from others, for example, the "normal" versus
"exceptional" categorization of children. The goal of
poststructuralist research is not discovering a "truth"
about the subject, rather the research aims to understand
the social, historical, and political contexts in which
subjects are constructed as they are (Prado, 1994; Usher &
Edwards, 1994).
Power relations. As was stated above, schooling is
relational. Power relations pervade the schooling process
and are discernable in a multiplicity of sites. The
commonsense understanding of power is that it is a commodity
that can be possessed. One "has" power, and can exercise it
in relation to others. Power in this sense is a "power
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over"; it flows from a centralized source, and from top to
bottom (Sawicki, 1991). Power is usually considered
repressive or inhibiting.
Foucault (1980a, 1988, 1995) discusses another notion
of power that is especially characteristic of modern power,
or modern modalities of power. Foucault's notion is that
power is productive, rather than repressive. Power is not a
possession, but rather exercised in relations. Power doesn't
flow from a centralized location, but is "capillary"
operating at the "lowest extremities of the social body in
everyday social practices" (Fraser, 1989, p. 18). Foucault
(1980c) explains,
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a
force that says no, but that it traverses and produces
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces
discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive
network which runs through the whole social body, much
more than a negative instance whose function is
repression. (p. 119)
Foucault asserts (1980c) that in the period we call
"modernity" there has been a "veritable technological takeoff in the productivity of power" (p.119). This is not a
"power over" but a power to name as is found in the human
sciences 14 • Power is productive in that a discipline "makes
individuals; it is the specific technique of power that
regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of

14

Foucault's understanding of "human sciences" includes
what is usually considered the social sciences in this country
as well as the humanities.
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its exercise" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 170).
For Foucault (1980c) scientific disciplines are
"regimes of truth" in which power and knowledge are
inextricably related and implicate each other. This is the
power-knowledge nexus. The "truth" or the knowledge of a
discipline is not an assembly of facts and techniques that
have been "discovered" and accepted by the community through
which we come to know individuals (e.g., learners as
"motivated" or "gifted"). But rather, the truth of
educational psychology, for example, needs to be understood
in terms of its technologies of power, as an "ensemble of
rules (emphasis added) according to which that which is
considered true or false are separated" (p. 133). Truth is
seen as:
a system of ordered procedures for the production,
regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of
statements ••.. [and is] linked in a circular relation
with systems of power which produce and sustain
it ... induce and ••• extend it. (1980c, p. 133)
Through its discourse educational psychology operates
to provide increasingly complex categories through which
learners, and teachers, are subjected to ever-increasing
processes of hyper-differentiation and made objects of
investigation, categorization, intervention, and regulation
(Usher, 1993).
This unconventional manner of looking at how knowledge
and power implicate each other presents a shift for
educational psychologists who usually think of the
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discipline as being "scientifically" produced. It is
precisely this assurance of knowing "the world
'scientifically' and 'as it really is' which makes
[knowledge claims] powerful" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.47).
Educational psychology claims that through its everincreasing technological ability it has the power to see
students as they really are. Poststructural analysis can
subvert this understanding and expose how various categories
are the result of human construction and are never free of
history, power, and interests. Thus, what is understood as a
"will to knowledge" can mean a "will to power"; and, to
interrogate this "regime" clearly is to enter a political
struggle (Foucault, 1980c). Poststructuralism as a form of
critique and knowledge production can be helpful in
identifying areas of struggle in the discipline's discourse
and ways of developing strategies for change.
The Importance of Michel Foucault
Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) ideas are central in this
work. And, while this dissertation is not about Foucault, I
accept his invitation to use his ideas as "little toolboxes
••• [so one can] open them and make use of such and such a
sentence or idea, of one analysis or another, as they would
a screwdriver or a monkey wrench" (quoted in Eribon, 1991,
p. 237). Drawing on Foucault I am interested in the
political production of educational psychology's claims to
"truth".
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The time seems right for this kind of work as
educational psychologists are increasingly direct in their
challenge to each other to reflect on what it means to be an
educational psychologist, an educator of preservice teachers
(e.g., Anderson et al., 1995; Peterson, et al., 1990;
Shuell, 1996), and on the legacy of the discipline.
Locating Myself as Researcher
A lively debate persists regarding the position of the
researcher in reporting work. The traditional perspective
insists that "the persona of the writer [assumes] a low
profile in the text" (Madigan et al., 1995, p. 433). This
allows the focus to remain on the object of the study,
increasing the possibility of "creating the impression of
neutrality or impersonal detachment •.. that is generally
characteristic of the empirical disciplines" (Madigan et
al., 1995, p. 433). The assumption is that "the facts speak
for themselves."
This position has been challenged by many feminist and
critical researchers who criticize the stance which
separates the observer from the observed in the interest of
"objectivity". Michelle Fine (1992) contends that this
detached stance neglects "to discuss why one research
question or interpretation prevailed over others ... [this
stance renders] oblique the ways in which we, as
researchers, construct our analysis and narratives" (p.
211). Fine (1992) warns feminist researchers that if we do
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not take "critical, activist, and open stances on our own
work, then we collude in reproducing social silences through
the social sciences" (p. 206). Josselson and Lieblich (1996)
assert the importance of "allowing people to tell the real
story of their work - to consider their own role" (p. 651)
in their research projects.
Issues of location are key to this discussion. Locating
the researcher is no simple task. Location is not a mere
"listing of adjectives or labels like race, sex, and
class .... location is not self-evident" (Haraway, 1996, p.
440), although these aspects of context are important.
Location is partial and shifting and has more to do with
being for some worlds and not others (Haraway, 1996).
This work is self-consciously political, as I am for
some worlds and not others. Much of this work is driven by
the question: "Cui bona?" Who benefits? (Star, 1991). The
question of power regarding discourse "means basically to
ask whom does discourse serve" (Foucault, 1980c, p. 115). I
have to ask myself the questions: Who is it who benefits
from the work that I do, or the discourse I espouse or
interrogate? I maintain that the discourse of educational
psychology primarily supports the knowledge, beliefs,
values, positions in power relations of the status quo. Van
Dijk (1993b) reports that, while modest developments have
occurred in multiethnic societies, learning materials,
especially

u. s.

textbooks,
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still overwhelmingly show the perspective and interests
of white people .... [who are] consistently portrayed in
neutral or positive terms, whereas minority groups or
immigrants tend to be associated at least with problems
and conflicts, if not with deviance and threats. (p.
237)
The issue of any viewpoint being partial or incomplete
needs further discussion. Partiality is accepted as a way I
come to realize my view, and the view of others, as
embodied, rather than dis-stanced. I am conscious of a
particular, and shifting, location as I do this work; I have
no desire to dis-locate myself from it. In other words, I
have no interest in doing research about the world from a
position apart from the world. Recognizing the influence of
a situated view makes no promise of seeing in a neutral and
objective way or of "transcendence of all limits and
responsibility" (Haraway, 1988/1991) as is implied through
the impersonal detachment of the positivist epistemology.
Appreciation of the partial view of the researcher tends
toward the possibility of community15 • Rosaldo {1989/1993)
explains this notion:
Each viewpoint is arguably incomplete - a mix of
insight and blindness, reach and limitations, neither
omniscience nor a unified master narrative but complex
understandings of ever-changing, multifaceted social
realities. {p.128)
This multiplicity of viewpoints and voices has an important
place in educational research within a democratic society.
15

"Communi ty" is an idea with a particular humanist value.
While it is attractive, the interests of "community" .can be
used to marginalize and exclude voices from the conversation
that raise difficult questions or subaltern discourses.
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The Shifting Role of the Intellectual
In Truth and Power, Foucault (1980c) speaks of the role
of the intellectual as having shifted from understanding the
intellectual as: spokesperson for the universal; having a
certain mastery of truth and justice; being able to express
a universal conscience. The shift explained by Foucault is
toward a much more "specific" activity. Thus, the "specific
intellectual" addresses problems which are particular to her
own condition of life or work. These problems are recognized
through the intellectual's concrete awareness of her own
particular struggles and her precise location within the
order of knowledge.
When one begins to question accepted views one finds
oneself in a double bind (Hubbard, 1979). If our questions
appear "too heterodox they disqualify us •.. " (p. 208) from
endorsement of "the discipline," it is difficult to publish
and get tenure. 16

However, if we stifle our questions

"sufficiently deep and long we may stop thinking them and
emerge from our education as the monolith's true devotees"
(p. 208).
Taking a critical, oppositional stance regarding the
discipline of educational psychology clearly places me
"against" the discipline in one sense. I have asked myself

16

The example of Henry Giroux at Boston University bears
this out (Weiler, 1992). See the autobiography of Howard Zinn,
You Can't Be Neutral on A Moving Train (1995) for another
illustration.
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the question: Why can't I just do what I am supposed to do
within the accepted boundaries of educational research of
educational psychology? Why not remain within what Said
(1994) represents as the acceptable and "responsible
mainstream". The irony is that while I may be characterized
as an "outsider" in the discipline, or at least be
considered as being located in that ambiguous position of
both within and against the discipline, I feel particularly
committed to this work.
The mode of research in which I am involved does not
necessarily ingratiate me in the "profession". Said (1994)
is helpful here. I appropriate his notion of the work I do
as being amateurism, i.e., this work is "activity fueled by
care and affection, rather then by profit and narrow
specialization" (p. 82). An amateur in this sense is one who
"considers that to be a thinking and concerned member of a
society one is entitled to raise moral issues at the heart
of even the most technical and professionalized activity ... "
(Said, 1994, p. 82). I regard the work I do as an attempt at
"greater democratic participation" (Said, 1994, p. 83) in
the educational sphere. This dissertation is taken up in the
spirit of looking to "transform the merely professional
routine into something much more lively and radical" (Said,
1994, p. 82).
Gestures of Displacement
The feature of language is another issue which presents
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a particular dilemma. 17 The importance of language has been
mentioned above, and will be taken up in Chapter III, yet an
appreciation of the tensions regarding different
perspectives of language will be helpful here. 18
First, I am required to follow APA style in this
dissertation. APA style admittedly advances the core values
and epistemology of mainstream psychology; in other words,
APA style is more than a writing genre, it is a model of
paradigmatic thinking (Madigan et al., 1995). APA style
espouses a "utilitarian view of language in which words are
implicitly assumed to function as simple transmitters of
information from the writer to the reader" (Madigan et al.,
1995, p. 433). In this perspective words are "unimportant
containers" for ideas and concepts. At the same time there
are directives regarding words beyond conventions of
grammar.
The Publication Manual of the American Psychological
Association (4th ed. 1995) encourages writers to use
"[s]hort words and short sentences [which] are easier to
comprehend than long ones" (p. 26-27), although, the authors
17

I thank Murphy ( 1993) for the notion of "displacement".
In
the
following
discussion
several
indications
of
displacement are operative. For example, the privileging of
APA style serves to disparage other forms of writing in
research. By my resistance I interrogate this position and
call for other writing styles to be considered germane to
various research interests.
A complete discussion of this problem is beyond the
scope of the current work. For a thorough analysis see Giroux
(1995).
18
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of the manual appreciate that a technical term may be more
exact than "several short words, and technical terms are
inseparable from scientific reporting" (p. 27). The
epistemology advanced by APA style encourages the use of
words which are simple to signify very complex concepts
(e.g., intelligence). It is ironic that in the interest of
understanding the word, it may be robbed of complex meaning,
and the historical and social contingencies of the word are
ignored.
The APA style instructs users that unencumbered
communication requires that technical terminology used in a
paper needs to be understood by psychologists throughout the
discipline otherwise it "does not sufficiently contribute to
the literature" (p. 27). The use of "jargon" is discouraged.
Jargon is defined as "the continuous use of technical
vocabulary even in places where that vocabulary is not
relevant •••. [or] the substitution of a euphemistic phrase
for a familiar term" (p. 27). Besides ineffective
communication, jargon is also reported to grate on the
reader due to its obscurity.
According to Madigan et al. (1995), the paradigm of
mainstream psychology has a language which is understood
throughout the discipline. 19 One could argue that it is not
clarity of language or ease of communication that is really
19

The assumption of a unified language is problematic to
many and has also been refuted. See Vipond (1996) and Gergen
(1985).
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the issue, but the viability of the theoretical framework
such language constitutes and promotes (Usher & Edwards,
1994). Macedo (1994) expresses a similar conviction by
insisting that the "call for language clarity is an
ideological issue, not merely a linguistic one" (p. 7).
Aronowitz & Giroux (1991) call on educators to recognize the
role that the 'language of clarity' plays in a dominant
culture that cleverly and powerfully uses 'clear' and
'simplistic' language to systematically undermine and
prevent the conditions arising for a public culture to
engage in rudimentary forms of complex and critical
thinking. (p. 91)
The case has been made that different paradigms, in
particular oppositional paradigms, need and do provide "new
languages through which it becomes possible to deconstruct
and challenge" (Giroux, 1995, p.32) the knowledge forms,
relationships, and beliefs that are considered reasonable in
traditional paradigms. Often the expression of an
oppositional paradigm may seem unnecessarily complex to a
researcher with a more traditional perspective. Parsimony
and clarity are recognized as values and lauded as
indicators of sophisticated scholarship in a positivist
paradigm. Yet, parsimony and clarity are not valued as
universal and natural values in critical perspective. Giroux
(1995) describes the insistence on parsimony and clarity as
a "nee-colonial" imposition.
The use of "nee-colonial" provides a useful example for
this discussion. "Nee-colonial" in this instance, could be
considered "jargon" from within a positivist paradigm. At
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the same time, demands for simple expression of complex
issues may expose a particular "neo-colonial" position
within the epistemology advanced by APA style. The evidence
comes from the proponents of the APA style themselves. There
is the claim of a "standardizing force" found in journal
articles which serve as "benchmark of acceptable writing
practices for the discipline" (Madigan et al., 1995, p.
434). Failure to comply with the standard marks "writing as
the work of an outsider" (Madigan et al. 1995, p. 429).
It is regarded as particularly important that neophytes
within a discipline learn the distinctive language of the
discipline as a way of enculturation. It is stated that
perhaps newcomers may have to unlearn another language:
"These students must now learn to inhibit writing practices
that had previously won them admiration while acquiring new
techniques" (Madigan et al., 1995, p. 434). Learning to
write using APA style "is part of an initiation process [the
student] must undergo to enter a scientific community"
(Scholes, 1985, p. 132). The case could be made that this is
an instance of technical control, a "will to power" rather
than knowledge, in that the student,
seems to be learning about the subject, but what [s]he
is truly learning is to give the teacher what he wants.
He seems to be reporting about a real and solid world
in a perfectly transparent language, but actually he is
learning how to produce a specific kind of discourse,
controlled by a particular scientific paradigm, which
requires him to be constituted as the subject of that
discourse in a particular way and to speak through that
discourse of a world made visible by the same
controlling paradigm. (Scholes, 1985, pp. 131-132)
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Doyle and Carter (1996) raise this issue of tension
regarding what is really going on as "novices become members
of practitioner communities" (p. 27). Is it learning or
enculturation? The question of "enculturation" through
writing style, or correctness and acceptance of writing and
language usage, is not easily settled, nor need it be. What
is important is that the tension in these multiple
perspectives be recognized and appreciated as part of the
contested terrain of the significance of language and
epistemology.
The aim of this dissertation is to apply a critical
reading and analysis of the mainstream, dominant discourse
of educational psychology. This is significant as
educational psychology's mainstream discourse perpetuates
powerful ways of thinking about students and everyday
teaching practices; these need to be made explicit and
interrogated. The chapters that follow take up a discussion
of these complex issues.
Overview of Chapters
A brief overview of the chapters that· formulate this
dissertation is provided as the final section of this
chapter.
Chapter II
Chapter II gathers examples of counter-discursive
feminist scholarship. The selection of work highlights the
metaphors of location, vision, and voice and helps to
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situate the research that follows. Counter-discourses are
presented as a way of "talking-back" to mainstream
discourses of literature and science.
Chapter III
There are two aspects of "methods" in research that are
articulated in Chapter III. First, methodology refers to the
intellectual means utilized to conduct this research
activity. I offer an explanation of why the methodologies of
traditional educational research (particularly that of
educational psychology), and their respective
epistemologies, are inappropriate for the current research.
Second, important strategies that are used in this critical
discourse analysis are discussed.
Chapter IV
This chapter takes up a critical reading and analysis
of the discourse of educational psychology. Educational
psychology is based on the modernist ideology of technical
rationality with its potential to predict and control. This
rationality is often unexpressed, therefore it needs to be
exposed and made problematic. There are two sections in this
chapter: 1) An interrogation of disciplinary principles is
presented; and, 2) several non-discursive aspects of the
discipline are discussed.
Chapter V
Power, scientific knowledge, and control of bodies come
together in modern disciplines and give disciplines their

34

productive power. Through "technologies of power" (Foucault,
1977/1995) that emanate from and support the dominant
discourse of educational psychology subjects are formed and
"marked" by docility and utility. These technologies of
power are evident in the every-day, taken-for-granted
practices of the discourse; disciplinary technologies create
the "normalizing gaze" that is explicated and critiqued in
this chapter.
Chapter VI
Although this chapter "concludes" this dissertation it
does not provide conclusions aimed at proving a thesis or
substantiating a hypothesis. Postmodern approaches eschew
totalizing and final dictates. However, this chapter
proposes how a more critical stance toward the discipline's
discourse, a serious consideration of the social
constructionist perspective, and an intertextual reading of
the discipline's discourse make possible the discipline's
becoming more reflexive and more socially just. This model
is a call for a critical literacy regarding the discipline's
knowledge claims and practices.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE OF TRANSGRESSION
Introduction
This dissertation takes up the task of critically
analyzing the canon of educational psychology found in its
dominant discourse. In beginning this task feminist
scholarship offers a guiding framework. My work has been
influenced by a long tradition of feminist scholars involved
with philosophy, sociology, and research in the natural and
social sciences, as well as psychology. The choice of the
material I have included can be referred to as a literature
of transgression.
Texts from both science and literature are included
which may seem peculiar as writing in fields like science
and literature is thought to be widely disparate (Madigan et
al., 1995). However, the case has been made that they are
not so dissimilar as was once thought (Lyotard, 1993;
Soyland, 1994). In this instance the choice has been made
for the examples of counter-discourse that each provides.
These texts illustrate the importance of positionality,
vision, and voice in oppositional activity aimed at
interrogating mainstream paradigms.
Forms of feminist literary critique, for example, have
35
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had the expressed goal of "talking-back" to a discourse that
sought to contain or silence subaltern voices. Feminist
writers have claimed positions on the margins that inform
their perspective. The vision that results from this
distinct positionality is important to political struggles
as it enables seeing things differently.
A feminist critique of science also seeks to present a
counter-discourse to mainstream science, acknowledging the
"heteroglossia" that exists within the scientific community.
The metaphor of location is instructive as it influences
what is seen, and what may be invisible. This issue of
location is discussed in terms of "feminist standpoint"
epistemology (Harding, 1991).
Feminist Criticism
Resisting Colonizing Discourse
Resisting colonizing discourses presents a dilemma for
feminist authors. Carol Harding (1985) explains "dilemma" as
a situation that demands "a choice between conflicting
outcomes" (p. 49) by a person who has the "ability to act
with intention" (p. 44). Lashgari (1995) characterizes this
as a "contrary imperative", that is "to be honest, and to be
heard" (p. 1) while discerning that there are serious costs
involved in honestly speaking out.
The predicament is clear in that there are always those
within the dominant culture who wish to make their
perspective normative, and who are determined to silence
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and/or marginalize anyone who exposes the dominating force
of their discourse, which is a form of nee-colonialism.
Foucault (1981) states that discourse is violence, and
feminists have declared discourse that defines them as
"Other" as a particular form of discursive violence.
Feminists have resisted and contested this violence while
recognizing that there are "costs of breaking cultural
taboos against speaking out" (Lashgari, 1995, p.1). Those
who lay bare the dominant culture's blindness, contest its
universalizing "truth", or refuse its judgement, i.e., those
who speak out or "talk-back" (hooks, 1989), are perceived by
those they offend as "dangerous", as "transgressing".
Lashgari (1995) presents four concepts which can be
considered crucial in understanding such transgressive
discourse:

(a) decentering, (b) heteroglossia, (c)

dialogics, and (d) trasversia. The first, "decentering", is
a process in which those on the margins speak, contesting
their objectification and claiming the position of subject.
When this happens "those who are marginal to the dominant
power re-place the center making the margin the new center
of their own subjectivity" (p.2). In claiming this position
in which subjects speak for themselves a very different
narrative is articulated. Through the acting of "naming
ourselves and ... telling our own stories in our own words"
(Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983, p. 23) the colonizers get to hear
a voice other than their own with the possibility of
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releasing them (the colonizers) from their own particular
blindness (Lashgari, 1995).
The effects of this decentering process evoke the
second concept, "heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 1981) which
happens when a "multiplicity of voices enters the discourse,
when margins talk back to the imperial or neocolonial
center" (p.3). It is important for the dominant power to
impose a "monologic definition of truth, and then convince
its members that any deviation would risk chaos" (Lashgari,
1995, p.11). According to Lashgari, whenever this imposition
takes place "there are already numerous voices, subverting,
transgressing boundaries, working to disrupt" (p.11) its
centralized certitude.
Third, "dialogics" is a constructive discourse that
becomes possible "when polyvocal discourse interrupts the
dominant monologue" (Lashgari, 1995, p. 3). Lashgari makes a
very helpful point that because this discourse is often
confrontational and contradictory it is often perceived as a
spoiler, as though the confrontational discourse is
upsetting a peaceful territory. In actuality, the divisions
and discrepancy are always present although unspoken and
invisible.
Fourth, "travesia" is what Lashgari (1995) refers to as
a "movement toward understanding" (p.3). As we move from one
narrative to another, from center to margins creating
multiple centers and perspectives, we participate in a type
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of transgression of borders. She says that "only by
violating the boundaries of the familiar and the proper,
risking conflict, can one reach toward connection" (p.4). It
is here that coalitions can be forged.
Teaching as Transgression
Bell hooks (1994) takes up the notion of
"transgression", the other side of travesia, as the task of
teaching. Hooks calls for the celebration of the kind of
teaching that "enables transgression - a movement against
and beyond boundaries" (p. 12). In her work, hooks (1994) is
"urging all of us to open our minds and hearts so that we
can know beyond the boundaries of what is acceptable, so
that we can think, and rethink, so that we can create new
visions" (p.12). Hooks (1990) assures us that transgression
can mean "pushing against oppressive boundaries set by race,
sex, and class domination [and is a form of] oppositional
political struggle" (p.

145).~

Lashgari (1995) advises

that "[t]o write honestly may mean transgressing, violating
the literary boundaries of the expected and accepted" (p.2).
Teaching from the Margins
Hooks joins Lashgari as she positions herself on/in the
margins in relation to the central, dominant position. This

° Kate Lenzo ( 1995) refers to a researcher type who
positions herself "within and against [their] field of study"
(p. 21) as a "transgressive self." She insists that the
possibilities for this research in doing doctoral work is
limited not only by the imagination, but also by "what is
permissible, acceptable, and communicative in terms of the
purposes we have in doing our work" (p.23).
2
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place is not to be thought of solely as a "site of
deprivation ... in fact [she] is saying just the opposite,
that it is also a site of radical possibility, a space of
resistance" (hooks, 1990, p. 149). The claiming of positions
in the margins as spaces from which heteroglossia springs
makes the dialogical process possible, and makes the margins
central for feminist criticism. The margin is not a place
one wishes to move away from, "to lose - to give up or
surrender" (p. 149), rather a marginal position is a chosen
space "a site one stays in, clings to even, because it
nourishes one's capacity to resist" (p. 150). Trinh T. Minhha (1991), likewise, claims the margins as "our sites of
survival, [they] become our fighting grounds and ••. sites for
pilgrimage" ( p. 17) .
A position in the margins gives teachers a unique
viewpoint, as hooks (1991) says, a "radical perspective from
which to see and create, to imagine alternatives, new
worlds" (p. 150) with students. However, travesia can be
disconcerting as we are challenged to not only engage the
unknown ground of the Other but the "very ground under one's
own feet" (Lashgari, 1995, p, 4). This can be particularly
bewildering for those whose thinking has been developed by a
monologic discourse.
Audrey Larde (1984) claims her position on the margins
also as a position which gives her a particular and powerful
vantage point. She indicates some of the costs as well as
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the delight in the community found in this position. Lorde
encourages us to learn "how to stand alone, unpopular and
sometimes reviled, and how to make common cause with those
others identified as outside the structures in order to
define and seek a world in which we can all flourish" (p.
112). Lorde assures us that the company we will find in our
marginal experience, the community we will find, are those
who have been defined as different by the dominant society.
As Lorde says "outside the circle of this society's
definition of acceptable women ••. [are found] those of us
who have been forged in the crucibles of difference" (Lorde,
1984, p. 112) including those who are "different" by virtue
of economic status, "race", sexual orientation, age, and so
forth.
Silence Into Voice
The metaphor of voice, or finding one's voice, has been
a powerful and formative metaphor for my own work. "Voice"
here does not ref er to ordinary talk or everyday selfrevelation. In its more radical sense it is the articulation
of a perspective, an act of freedom and liberation. Bell
hooks {1989) expresses finding her own voice as a way of
"talking back" and the "moving from silence into speech" (p.
9). It is a way of moving from object to subject. Objects
are voiceless, only spoken about, in that "our beings are
defined and interpreted by others" (hooks, 1989, p. 12).
Subjects are able to speak for themselves. "Talking back"
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then is the activity of "the oppressed, the colonized, the
exploited, and those who stand and struggle side by side
[as] a gesture of defiance that heals, that makes new life
and new growth possible" (hooks, 1989, p. 9).
Adding one's voice to the dialogical process does have
its costs, as Lashgari (1995) cautions. Larde (1984) tells
us that she has been afraid at times; she says, "of course I
am afraid, because the transformation of silence into
language and action ••• always seem fraught with danger"
(p.42). Yet, she shares with us a query regarding "what if
she had been born mute or maintained an oath of silence"
during her life for safety sake. In the realization that
pain and death are inescapable she willingly accepts the
scrutiny she has undergone by the particular way she has
entered into "a process of life that is creative and
continuing, that is growth" (p.43).
These forms of feminist literary critique have had the
expressed goal of talking back to a discourse that has
sought to define and contain counter-discourses. Among the
most deeply formative of my perspective is the work of
Gloria Anzaldua (1987). Through a series of autobiographical
essays, for example, she speaks to attempts to "tame a wild
tongue" by her family, her church, and her government and
her struggle to overcome the "tradition of silence" she had
been taught so well.
Anzaldua (1987) refers to colonization, in historical
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and metaphorical terms, and to the internalization of
acceptable norms of the colonizers. Anzaldua explains,
Dominant paradigms, predefined concepts that exist as
unquestionable, unchallengeable, are transmitted to us
by the culture ..•. [many times] I heard mothers and
mothers-in-law tell their sons to beat their wives for
being hociconas (big mouths) •.. for expecting their
husbands to help with the rearing of children ..•
(p. 16)
More powerfully, her story is about resistance, a
counter-discourse which decenters and disorients a monologic
perspective of the dominant society, laying bare its
violence. Anzaldua (1987) exposes a neo-colonial propensity
in current U.S. social and political discourse. For example
her works can address the conservative politics in the
English-only movement: "Wild tongues can't be tamed, they
can only be cut out" (p.54). Anzaldua's explanation of the
connection of language and identity resists the
assimilationist perspectives exemplified in the work of
writers such as Richard Rodriquez (1983).
Critigue of Science
Sandra Harding (1991) has explained that there is a
building skepticism about the "benefits that the sciences
and their technologies can bring to society" (p. 1). Harding
(1991) is forceful in noting that these feminist critiques
are not isolated voices crying in the wilderness ... but
are linked thematically and historically to a rising
tide of critical analysis of the mental life and social
relations of the modern, androcentric, imperial,
bourgeois West, including its science and notions of
knowledge.
(p. viii)
Chris Weedon (1987) also explains that "within the official
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institutions of science and research, feminists have begun
to challenge the boundaries of existing knowledge" (p. 14).
Understandably, the critique comes from several positions
since there are multiple, and often contradictory, feminist
views. 21
I want to make the point that the feminist
perspective 22 that I espouse, is not concerned with
research which advances the cause of women only. On the
contrary, feminism, as I relate to it, "encapsulates a
distinctive value position, but these are truly human
values, not just those of a 'women's perspective'. And so
these values should be those of all people" (Stanley & Wise,
1993, p. 27). Feminists have joined this conversation not as
a special interest group (Harding, 1991) who appeal a
hearing for their benefit alone. Women join other feminists
involved with other movements "as thinkers expressing
concerns about science and society that are echoed in the
other 'countercultures' of science - in antiracist and Third
World movements, in anticapitalist movements, and in ecology
and peace movements" (p. 50).
See Alison M. Jaggar's ( 1983) Feminist Politics and
Human Nature for a discussion of what she sees as the four
major contemporary feminisms (e.g. liberal, Marxist, radical,
and socialist). Chris Weedon's (1987) Feminist practice and
poststructuralism explains her thesis using explanations of
liberal, radical, and socialist definitions of feminism.
21

I am referring here to a socialist perspective of
feminism (Weedon, 1987) which views various oppressive
structures
(e.g. ,
capitalism,
patriarchy,
racism)
as
interrelated.
22
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Finally, before moving into the three feminist models
for critiquing science, I will discuss Harding's view of the
oneness of the hard and soft sciences. Harding (1991) makes
the point that an "influential tendency in conventional
thought" (p. 15) is that there is actually one standard for
all the sciences, or what counts as science, and that is the
"hard" or natural sciences with physics ranking the highest.
Social sciences are lower on the scale and many are
considered "soft" depending on the extent to which their
methodologies are less quantitative and more qualitative.
Yet, psychology has a longstanding commitment to a
positivist, empiricist epistemology and method. The
influence of this commitment is "so pervasive as to be
unrecognized by those enmeshed in its web of meaning, [as]
it informs every aspect of psychology's undertakings" (Moke

& Bohan, 1992, p. 7). This is no less true for educational
psychology. Harding insists that the "sciences are
fundamentally 'one', and the model for that one is physics"
(p. 15). Therefore, while some of the critiques offered
below come out of the critiques of natural sciences, they
have valid applications for the discipline of educational
psychology as well.
What is needed, and what Harding (1991) attempts to do,
is provide a
critical examination of [science's] origins and
values ... to figure out just what are the regressive and
the progressive tendencies brought into play in any
particular scientific or feminist project, and how to
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advance the progressive and inhibit the regressive
ones. (pp. 10-11)
Harding (1991) affirms the progressive themes in modern
science that have yielded a high standard of living for
many, "especially if we are white and middle or upper class"
(p.2). Harding also points to regressive themes that have
yielded the atomic bombs, industrial exploitation of water,
air, land, and, more importantly whole groups of people. To
take the position that science contains both progressive and
regressive tendencies is not to maintain that science is
inherently good, bad, or "value-neutral" and used in only
progressive and regressive ways. Thus, Harding (1991) takes
a skeptical position regarding science; she acknowledges
that this is "a confusing moment" (p. 2) in the relationship
between science and feminism.
Harding (1996) takes as an additional focus, what she
refers to as a "racial economy of science" which she
explains as:
The institutions, assumptions, and practices that are
responsible for disproportionately distributing along
'racial' lines the benefits of Western sciences to the
haves, and the bad consequences to the have nots,
thereby enlarging the gap between them. (p. 2)
Harding (1996) notes the problem in using the term "racial"
in this way, realizing that issues of race cannot be
separated from other issues of class and gender. She states
that "there is no uncontroversial shorthand to use in
referring to the complicity of Western sciences in projects
of racism ... colonialism ... imperialism" (p. 20). "Elite"
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science educators are indicted as afflicted by a kind of
scientific "illiteracy" through their failure to understand
and teach others a "systematic analyses of social origins,
traditions, meanings, practices, institutions, technologies,
uses and consequences" (p. 1) of the science they practice
and teach.
Three Models of Critigue
Harding's (1991) models frame the contemporary
critiques effectively. She acknowledges three models of
critique of science, shifting from reform to revolution: (a)
critique of bad-science or feminist empiricism; (b) critique
of science as a social problem, in and of itself; (c)
critique of science-as-usual, including what she terms
feminist standpoint epistemology. The third model
constitutes the most prevalent model of critique evident in
the literature.
Critigue of bad-science. The first model of critique
maintains the general belief in the positive value of
science while taking the position that science needs to be
reformed. This perspective critiques "bad science" (Harding,
1991). The critique is directed toward that science which
results, for example, in bias or sexist conclusions. The
critique is directed toward research in science that is
flawed in that it does not "follow well-understood
principles of method and theory" (Harding, 1991, p. 57).
Those who associate with this perspective assume an
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Archimedean vantage point is possible, and "support the goal
of value-neutral objectivity and impartiality for all
scientific inquiry" (p. 57). Harding refers to the feminist
form of this conventional theory "as applied to science and
its procedures for producing knowledge, [as] 'feminist
empiricism'" (p. 58).
For example, Longino and Doell (1987) contend that it
is possible to subvert sexist and androcentric bias in
research programs through the use of "a variety of tactical
responses" (p. 186) without denouncing science as an
enterprise. They claim that the structure of science allows
for the presentation of alternative accounts that are more
ingenious and self-conscious.
Evelyn Fox Keller, historian of science, has been
offered as an exemplar of this perspective (Haraway, 1991;
Restivo, 1988). Keller is one who is interested in
"correct[ing] the gender inequalities in modern science"
(Restivo, 1988, p. 217) while remaining within the modern
science perspective.
Science as a social problem. There is another view of
science that falls outside the reconstruction of a feminist
science encouraged by Harding and others. Sal Restivo
(1988), for example, argues that science itself is a social
problem. Through his examination of the cultural roots of
modern science he claims that modern science has been used
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as a
tool of the ruling elites ... emerged and developed as
an alienating and alienated mode of inquiry ... [and
these roots] are everywhere inseparable from military,
political, and economic interests and power. (pp. 213214)
Restivo argues that "purity" and "progress" are myths which
serve only to enhance the power and privilege of modern
science. What Restivo calls for is a "sociological
imagination" developed by attention to new questions in the
sociology of science, for example: what do scientists
produce and how do they produce it; what good are the
products of science; in what social context is it valued and
who values it; what are the goals, visions, and values of
the work?
A sociological imagination is not an abstract exercise;
rather, it is a call to action which challenges prevailing
social arrangements. Restivo believes that something is
missing from current critiques, as well as some feminist
critiques of science. He seeks a specific "blend of
structural analysis, social criticism, epistemological
relevance, and an activist orientation toward social change"
(p. 208).

Science-as-usual. The third model, a critique of
"science-as-usual", includes what Harding (1991) refers to
as "feminist standpoint epistemology". This critique of
science insists that no Archimedean perspective is possible
as knowledge is socially situated, "grounded in particular,
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historical social situations" (Harding, 1991, p.59). Views
are always partial and distorted. Harding says "I always see
the world through my own culture's eyes; I think with its
assumptions" (p.59). Theorists from this perspective use as
a resource "women's situation in a gender-stratified
society" to show that research directed toward "social
values and political agendas can nevertheless produce
empirically and theoretically preferable results" (p.119).
This position is in contrast to the critique of "bad
science" which, in the interest of objectivity, seeks to rid
methodology of all subjectivity, including gender.
Harding makes special comment that the unique
perspective of feminist standpoint epistemology is not
connected to biological differences between men and women,
rather, it is the unique position of women in a stratified
society that gives a particular vantage point. Harding
(1991) insists that this vantage point designates an
"objective" location, i.e., women's lives "as the place from
which feminist research should begin" (p. 123). This is
considered a particularly trustworthy position as "members
of oppressed groups have fewer interests in ignorance about
the social order and few reasons to invest in maintaining or
justifying the status quo than do dominant groups" (p. 126).
Collins (1990) offers that situated knowledge, like
Black feminist thought, "is less likely than the specialized
knowledge produced by dominant groups to deny the connection
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between ideas and the vested interest of their creators" (p.
234). Donna Haraway (1988) has also asserted a preference
for the vantage point of members of subjugated groups saying
"there is good reason to believe vision [from this position]
is better" (p. 583). It is not that there is something
"innocent" about subjugated knowledges. Indeed, these also
need to receive a critical examination and deconstruction.
Rather, subjugated standpoints are preferred "because in
principle they are least likely to allow denial of the
critical and interpretive core of all knowledge" (Haraway
1988, p. 581).
This model of critique is both an interrogation of
"objectivity" and at the same time a call for a particular
objectivity, which seems at first contradictory. Harding and
others (e.g., Haraway, 1988; Smith, 1987) are calling for a
program of "strong objectivity". This call comes out of a
doubt that the scientific method is strong enough "to
identify and eliminate distorting social interests and
values" (Harding, 1996, p. 17) which intrude upon and
distort the results of scientific research. What is needed
is "causal analyses not just of the micro-processes in the
laboratory but also the macro tendencies in the social order
which shape scientific practices" (Harding 1991, p. 149).
so, in other words, strong objectivity calls for a more
intent focus on the values and beliefs that makes scientific
practice possible in the first place:
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Women - and men - cannot understand or explain the
world we live in or the real choices we have as long as
the sciences describe and explain the world primarily
from the perspectives of the lives of dominant groups.
(Harding, 1991, p. 307)
Required here, along with strong objectivity, is the
complementary process of a strong reflexivity whereby a
researcher examines her own cultural beliefs and values
through which she views the behaviors, values, and beliefs
of those who are being studied. Harding (1991) explains that
this strong reflexivity would require that "objects of
inquiry be conceptualized as gazing back in all their
cultural particularity" (p.163); and, the researcher,
likewise "stand behind them, gazing back at his [sic] own
socially situated research projects in all its cultural
particularity" (p. 163).
Haraway (1996) also calls for a "critical" reflexivity
as she acknowledges that "[n]othing comes without its world,
so trying to know these worlds is crucial" (p. 440). She
believes Harding's notion of strong reflexivity is akin to a
concept she calls "diffraction", "to make different patterns
in a more worldly way .••• diffraction patterns record the
passage of difference, interaction, and interference"
(Haraway, 1996, p. 429-430). Haraway instructs us that
tropes are helpful in understanding diffraction. The
etymological root of trope can be traced to the Greek
tropos: "tropes [then] are what makes us swerve, what makes
us notice what we did not already know how to see .•• a kind
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of aerobics for academics, perhaps ... " (p. 430).
This ability to "see" differently is emphasized by
Haraway {1988/1991) through the metaphor of "vision". She
uses this metaphor in order to foreground the idea that the
"gaze" of the scientist is embodied, always from somewhere,
from within someone, even as it appears in mainstream
scientific writing as a "gaze from nowhere ... [that claims]
the power to see and not be seen, to represent while
escaping representation" (p. 188). The "eye" of the one who
is looking has a growing capacity to see because of
"visualizing technologies". Through these technologies,
vision can be "endlessly enhanced .•• [until] all perspective
gives way to an infinitely mobile vision, which no longer
seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing
everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into
ordinary practice" (p. 189).
The ability to see endlessly from nowhere is an
illusion, of course. What Haraway wants to emphasize is the
potency of the vision we do have. It is the recognition that
our "only partial perspective promises objective vision" (p.
190). The "objectivity" that is possible from our particular
and partial perspective is about a "limited location and
situated knowledge, not about transcendence ••• [or]
omniscience." (Haraway, 1988/1991, p. 190).
What is at issue in this aspect of feminist critique of
science is more than her concerns regarding particular
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theories, the scientific method, scientific technologies,
and the institutions in which they are constructed. Harding
(1991) wants to clarify how deeply "we", "those most at home
in Western societies" (p.3), are embedded in a Western,
scientific world-view, so much so that it is difficult to
see how scientific rationality has infiltrated our belief
systems and our epistemologies. At the same time it is
important to realize that "the social origins of science and
the values it carries suffuse scientific projects •.. what
science becomes in any historical era depends on what we
make of it." (p.10).
Thus, feminist critique of science-as-usual brings the
study of scientific research to a very different site of
investigation as the perspective is concerned with the
process of science itself. Steve Woolgar (1988) remarks that
it is "only comparatively recently that critical attention
has been directed towards the 'internal' workings of
science" (p. 9). Although a variety of disciplines have
challenged conventional views of science "the practice of
science is itself the object of critical scrutiny" (p. 9).
Several members within the science community have taken up
the interrogation of scientific discourse in a way that
exposes a remarkable social dynamic and political agenda of
the discourse where there was thought to be only
objectivity, neutrality, truth, and progress, following from
Harding's (1991) model of a critique of science-as-usual.
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This concern for the internal workings of science,
especially as it is expressed through scientific discourse,
is central to my project as I believe it exposes some of
science's regressive proclivities. I will now give a few
examples of work exemplifying this critique of science-asusual, primarily Hubbard (1989), Hubbard and Wald (1993),
Namenwirth (1986), and Bleier (1987).
Ruth Hubbard (1989) is concerned with the "contextstripping" methodology of science whereby the scientist is
invisible and the results are represented as objective,
value-neutral, and apolitical. Hubbard explains that "the
context-stripping that worked reasonably well for the
classical physics of falling bodies has become the model for
how to do every kind of science" (p. 127) even given the
insight of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 23 • "Science
is a social process" (p. 119) Hubbard insists, and
"generating facts is a social enterprise" (p.119). Yet, even
the language of science reinforces the illusion of facts
rendered in a vacuum as it "implicitly denies the relevance
of time, place, social context, authorship, and personal
responsibility" (p. 125).
Hubbard (1989) is also concerned with the homogeneity
of those who do science (i.e., Western European, North
American, middle/upper class males) as "public

This principle states that even the act of observation
by a scientist will alter the results of an experiment.
23
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accountability is not built into the system" (p. 121). She
points out that "small groups of people with similar
personal and academic backgrounds" (p. 120) decide who gets
to be faculty, whose work gets funded, who gets published,
i.e., who gets rewarded by the system. She complains that
"science is made ... by the chosen for the chosen" (p. 120).
In Hubbard and Wald (1993) the focus remains on these social
and political implications through a description of work
performed with DNA. Hubbard and Wald's aim in writing their
book is to demystify some of the language and concepts of
genetics and biotechnology as they believe that it is
crucial that we, as citizens, not leave this process in
the hands of 'experts'. Like other people, scientists
are interested in seeing their projects flourish, and
their enthusiasm can blind them to the possible
negative effects of their work. (p. xiii)
Hubbard (1989) highlights the political content of
science and its governing role. She maintains that "Science
and technology always operate in somebody's interest and
serve someone or some group of people" (p. 128). Hubbard
asserts that "[t]o the extent that scientists are 'neutral'
that merely means that they support the existing
distribution of interests and power" (p. 128). Elizabeth Fee
puts this another way by characterizing "objectivity" as:
merely a code word for the political passivity of those
scientists who have tacitly agreed to accept a
privileged social position and freedom of inquiry
within the laboratory in return for their silence in
not questioning the social uses of science or the power
relations that determine its direction. (quoted in
Harding, 1993, p. 337)
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Marion Namenwirth (1986), coming from the perspective
of the biological sciences challenges her readers to make
personal assessments of "whether the science we practice
today has not strayed unacceptably far from the science of
which we would like to take part" (p. 18). She critiques the
illusion that scientists are able to remove themselves and
their work from cultural and political influences, and that
by "cloaking 0 their scientific projects in assertions of:
neutrality, detachment, and objectivity, scientists
augment the perceived importance of their views,
absolve themselves of social responsibility for the
applications of their work, and leave their
(unconscious) minds wide open to political and cultural
assumptions. (p. 29)
Namenwirth wants to make the point that being unconscious of
the bias or the political agenda of work does not render the
work neutral or objective. Rather, these "hidden influences
and biases are particularly insidious in science because the
cultural heritage of the practitioners is so uniform as to
make these influences difficult to detect and unlikely to be
brought to light" (p. 29).
The metaphor of "cloaking" scientific activity in
neutrality and objectivity so as to cover particular
political and social underpinnings of science is
explicitedly stated in the work of Ruth Bleier (1986).
Bleir uses the image of "lab coat" to make her point that
this covering of the scientist and the scientific activity
denotes a kind of "innocence - of a pristine and aseptic
neutrality - and gives him .•. a faceless authority that his
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audience can't challenge" (Bleier, 1986, p.67). Bleier's
point is to connect this cloaked or coated figure with that
of the "klansman," another faceless authority. Bleier does
not shrink from this comparison, rather she emphasizes that
she considers her work in science as a disruption and a
subversion to misogynist, racist, regressive tendencies in
science.
Many feminist scholars critique science from the point
of male domination (e.g., Keller, 1986; Sherif, 1987; Star,
1987; Whatley, 1986). Reasons for this domination have been
located in the "deep-seated dualisms of Western culture
[which] have encouraged and maintained a hierarchial
domination ..•• (Harding & O'Barr, 1981, p. 33). The notion
of hierarchical dualisms was articulated in ancient Greek
and Egyptian philosophies. Human persons become fragmented
through the view that "reality is segmented into spirit and
matter" (Speight, Myers, Cox, & Highlen, 1991, p. 31).
Spirit is a "transcendent principle" and is connected with
activity, autonomy, reason, the mind, the permanent, the
infinite. In contrast matter is the principle signifying
immanence which "shows itself in passivity, dependence,
emotions, the body, the physical, nature, the transitory,
the finite" (Johnson, 1993, p. 11). In the original
framework these two, matter and spirit, existed in a
"harmonious tension of opposites" (p. 11) which gradually
was separated, graded, and eventually became portrayed as
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polar opposites in which the differences were maximized.
Thus, one became valued over the other; spirit is valued
over matter in Western epistemologies.
Spirit is connected with the rational mind 24 , the
intellect, and the masculine, while matter is connected to
the earth, the body, and the feminine. The effect was a
hierarchy of mind over body, male over female. These
dualisms are social constructions, and like so many dualisms
in science, and psychology in particular, are not neutral
constructions; rather, they have political implications,
they affect power relationships. such dualisms sanctioned
women being kept out of institutions of higher learning, out
of laboratories. When they were able to surmount barriers
placed in their way their work and their contributions were
trivialized and/or

marginalized.~

One of the most widely used dualisms in psychology is
"nature vs. nurture". The distinction has been around for
centuries originally expressed as "nature vs. culture" and
expressed formally over one hundred years ago by Galton who
introduced the dualism while concerned wtth the heritability
! am grateful to my committee members, Suzette Speight
in particular, for pointing out that the connection of spirit
with the mind and the masculine is not universally accepted.
It exemplifies my own embeddedness in a Roman catholic
tradition.
24

The case of Rosalind Franklin's contribution to the
model of DNA presented by James Watson is a perfect example.
see: A. Sayer (1975), Rosalind Franklin & DNA and J. D. Watson
(1980), The Double Helix A Personal Account of the Discovery
of the structure of DNA.
25
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of "intelligence" which he was trying to measure.
Historically, nature-nurture "has been used almost without
exception, as a weapon to diminish the importance of groups
derogated by the culture - Blacks, Irish, Jews, women, gays,
the handicapped, among them" (Kessen, 1993, p. 271). Restivo
(1988) explains that the "dichotomy between 'nature' and
'culture' ••• has fostered a dominative, exploitative
orientation to nature, women, workers, and the underclass in
general" (p. 219). This dualism which is taken as a
commonsense notion in current educational psychology
discourse has been criticized as it "divides what cannot be
divided and it contrasts what cannot be contrasted" (Kessen,
1993, p.271).
Summary
Many of the counter-discourses offered by the feminist
scholarship reported in this chapter are challenging current
social arrangements. Their narrative "reveals and invents
disruptive images of what could be" (Fine, 1992, p. 221).
This dissertation joins their work by applying a
poststructural analysis to the discipline of educational
psychology so embedded in mainstream science. Like so much
feminist criticism it highlights the social, cultural, and
political implications of positionality as it constructs
what can be seen and what remains hidden in the discipline.
Research within traditional paradigms will not allow
the kind of talking back which is called for by feminist
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critique. New research paradigms are required. This is the
discussion of the following chapter.

CHAPTER III
"METHODOLOGY"
Introduction
This chapter has a dual purpose in the dissertation.
First, as I am employing a research approach that is
critical I want to emphasis how this approach is different
from traditional methodologies employed in educational
research. By "methodology" I am referring to the
"intellectual means" that focuses my research project
(Stanley & Wise, 1993). Second, I will describe the
particular methodology, critical discourse analysis, in the
sense of strategies of analysis that will be utilized in
this dissertation.
Call for Critical Educational Research
There is a growing debate regarding every aspect of
educational research within the educational community. For
example, Maxine Greene (1994) describes what she calls a
"restiveness" that accompanies a rising skepticism regarding
contemporary educational research. This uneasiness stems
from interrogations regarding the "normal course of science"
and "the best scientific research". Greene insists this
situation has resulted in:
a growing disenchantment with technicism and bland
objectivist assumptions
separation of research or
62
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positive inquiry from moral considerations or ethical
perplexities ... [as well as] the apparent uselessness of
research in overcoming 'savage inequalities' (Kozol,
1991). (1994, p. 424)
Greene purports that while many researchers do not
question the uses of science, there are increasing numbers
of researchers whose work flows from an uneasiness which is,
in fact, a kind of rebellion against mainstream science.
Educationalists are encouraged to consider "a number of
fresh perspectives" (Greene, 1994, p.426) that reject
"[p]ositivistic and depersonalized approaches to science"
(p. 437). Thus, Greene reports a shift in research practice.
This state of educational research which troubles many
educators is beyond the frequent quantitative/qualitative
debate (e.g., Eisner, 1992; Erikson, 1992; Maxwell, 1992;
Peshkin, 1993; Popkewitz, 1992; Schrag, 1992; Smith, 1983).
Much of the dissatisfaction with current educational
research is connected to the current social and political
milieu which has been referred to as a "conservative
restoration" (Apple, 1993, 1996). It is argued that the
discourse of education is dominated by conservative
tendencies regarding questions of "what education is for,
what and whose knowledge is considered legitimate, and who
has the right to answer these questions" (Apple, 1996, p.9).
Greene (1994) articulates a challenge for
educational research that, while not completely replacing
work done within the mainstream scientific model,
interrogates its methods and its results, and creates a
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space where emancipatory projects may be explicated. She
tells us that what has become "crucial in the contemporary
conversation is the contingency of language, along with the
notion that truth is made rather than found" (p. 444).
Greene desires that educators join together in a struggle
"to go in search of those intersections where deficiencies
exist, where there are calls for justice, where freedom is
being awaited" (p. 459). Greene (1994) expresses a profound
sense of hope for more meaningful and transformative kinds
of educational research. Greene is recognizing the potential
that a "critical" approach has to offer social science
research. It is this critical approach to educational
research that I espouse.
Employing a critical approach indicates a significant
shift away from the conventional models of research; it has
little to do with educational researchers utilizing
positivist or interpretivist conceptual and methodological
paradigms. This shift deserves at least a brief explanation
because it is helpful in locating work done within a
critical perspective. I will briefly explain how both the
positivist (or quantitative) and interpretivist (or
qualitative) approaches are connected to the project of
modernity, and why these perspectives are unsuitable for
many critical research interests. An explanation will be
proposed regarding why a critical, poststructuralist
perspective is more appropriate, and what this approach has
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to offer the contemporary research scene.
Educational Research and the Project of Modernity
Modernity's 26 project was to discover and deliver the
"truth" about the world. Modernity developed as a response
to a pre-modern world view in which order, emanating from
nature and God, was mediated to society through voices of
authority in the person of the sovereign and/or the
religious leader. Modernity offered the promise of releasing
people from "the bonds of ignorance associated with stagnant
traditions, narrow religions, and meager educations"
(Bloland, 1995, p. 2). Modernity was committed to the
liberation of "the world from the chains of superstition,
ignorance, and suffering" (Giroux, 1983, p. 11).
Modernity's aim was to replace pre-modern fantasy,
faith, and superstition with scientific knowledge. Usher and
Edwards (1994) remind us:
Science becomes the guarantor and route to truth and
emancipation. The emancipation of humanity thus
requires that people are given access to scientific
knowledge, since the condition of their emancipation is
that they live subject to the 'laws' uncovered by
science. (p. 172)
This emancipation would occur as "reason" became
"deified" (Kincheloe, 1993) as the authority. Reason was
"Moderni ty"
is a
term which allows
no simple,
uncontested definition. See Best and Kellner (1991); Giroux
(1992); Sarup (1993); Usher and Edwards (1994) for helpful
discussions. I appropriate Sarup's definition that modernity
is used as "a summary term, referring to that cluster of
social, economic and political systems brought into being in
the West from somewhere around the eighteenth century onwards"
(1993, p. 130).
26
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hailed as the "source of progress in knowledge and society,
as well as the privileged locus of truth and the foundation
of systematic knowledge" (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 2). For
some philosophers, modernity marks the beginning "of a
developmental process resulting from technological progress,
liberated needs and the triumph of the Spirit .... [which
makes] science, rather than God, central to society"
(Touraine, 1995, p. 9). Modernity has been identified "with
the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational
planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of
knowledge as production" (Sarup, 1996, p. 94). Order is
established through the discovery of universal, impersonal
laws; in this meaning-making system chaos seems to be the
only alternative to order (Bauman, 1991).
Positivist Educational Research
Positivism27 is the modernist method, logic, and
pathway to truth and order (Slife & Williams, 1997) and
enjoys a privileged position among other epistemologies
(Fenstermacher, 1994). Educational research has long been
conceptualized as primarily a positivistic undertaking
(Schrag, 1992) that appropriates the concepts and
methodologies of the natural sciences to arrive at
27

The etymology of this word is very complex beginning
with Comte's doctrine that only that which is accessible
through the senses is positively knowable. Contemporary
understanding of positivism links coming to know something
objectively and truthfully through the utilization of the
scientific method (Slife & Williams, 1997). See Giroux ·(1981)
for a thorough critique.
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knowledge. Giroux (1981) refers to the "positivist culture"
in which educational research is embedded. When social
sciences adopt this positivist perspective there are two
assumptions which are implied (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). The
first being that the aims, concepts, and methods employed by
the natural sciences are appropriate to social science
questions. Second, the natural science model of explanation
"provides the logical standards by which the explanations of
the social sciences can be assessed" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986,

p. 62).
Educational research from a positivist perspective
exemplifies distinct characteristics. For instance, in a
positivist perspective there exists a confidence in a
particular methodology following from a specific
epistemological orientation. A positivist perspective also
maintains certain assumptions about language. There exists a
particular relationship between researcher and researched as
well as theory and practice. These will be discussed
briefly.
Method, i.e. the hypothetico-deductive scientific
method, is of critical importance because it is understood
as the way to access an "accurate reflection or measurement
of an independently existing object" (Smith, 1983, p. 9).
Method is a pivotal aspect of any scientific undertaking as
fidelity to a series of procedures from within an
established program ensures the "journey to the factsrr
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(Smith, 1983, p. 10). To the degree that the methodology is
"sound" and allows for a neutral, objective investigation of
the variables under examination the results can be trusted.
The source of knowledge in a positivist perspective is
events in the real world. Knowledge and truth are based on a
correspondence supposition, i.e., what is true is what
corresponds to reality {Gergen, 1985; Smith, 1983). Science
is purported to be able to yield pure and objective
knowledge, a mirror image, about this world {Gergen, 1985;
smith, 1983) through empirical investigations.
concepts under study are considered existing a priori
in the real world, apart and distinct from the researcher,
and regardless of researcher interest. There is an accepted
view of language used to ref er to and describe these
concepts that is utilitarian. In this view words are
"implicitly assumed to function as simple transmitters of
information from the writer to the reader ...• [words are a]
somewhat unimportant container for information about
phenomena, data, and theories ••• " (Madigan et al., 1995, pp.
433-434). Therefore, the meanings of the words that are used
are considered transparent, unambiguous, and fixed
(Popkewitz, 1992).
The definition of concepts is determined within the
rules and relationships of the particular discourse
community which uses them. Gage and Berliner {1991), for
example, illustrate this approach in referring to the
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development of the concept of "intelligence" within the
educational psychology community:
A concept is the organized information we have
(emphasis added) about an entity .... The meaning,
boundaries, and relationships connected with a concept
are derived from everything we know (emphasis added)
about that concept .•.. What we mean (emphasis added) by
a concept is partly a matter of definition and partly a
matter of the methods of studying the concept .... for
example, the meaning of the concept of intelligence
depends in part on how we define (emphasis added)
intelligence. (emphasis original). (pp. 12-13)
It is this understanding that allows Herrnstein and Murray
(1994) in their controversial book, The Bell Curve. to make
the statement: "the word intelligence (emphasis original)
describes something real" (p. 1). This power to define
abstract concepts as actual entities is a very central
function of positivist science in its construction of order.
Abstract concepts considered to have "real" material
existence points to the linguistic problem of reif ication
(Gergen, 1985). These constructs are used as "variables" in
empirical investigations. Reification is a common occurrence
within a positivist framework. As Smith (1983) points out:
Because the subjects studied in educational research,
such as aptitude and motivation, admittedly do not have
a material existence, how can it be implied that they
are like physical objects? •••• What is important is not
the nature of the objects, but how they are treated ...
(p. 9)

The meanings of terms in this perspective, are considered
unimportant for educational researchers. However, it is the
treatment of these terms which is important, i.e., abstract
concepts are treated as though they exist.
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The position of the researcher is a significant
characteristic of this perspective. The researcher is
presented as detached from that which is under study and
insignificant, almost receding into the background as the
importance of the data takes center stage. The language of
the scientific method itself gives the "impression
of .•• impersonal detachment [of the researcher] ••.. keeping
the focus on the phenomena under study" (Madigan et al.,
1995, p. 431). The data set is allowed to "speak" for
itself.
Finally, the relationship of theory and practice has a
pivotal position within this viewpoint. Educationalists
espousing a positivist perspective assume that the schooling
process is enhanced and improved to the extent that teachers
utilized the knowledge accessed through the scientific
method. Practice based on scientific principles and laws are
believed to be able to off er certainty and rational
solutions to educational questions which are understood as
"technical" in nature. Popkewitz (1992) explains that this
vlew puts the "researcher in the position of doing the
enhancing and producing the progress, and defining the
individuals who would be affected" (p. 14). This particular,
one-way account (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) of the relation of
theory and practice indicates a metaphor of researcher as
"social engineer" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Smith, 1983).
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Educational Psychology as Expression of Positivist Science
Educational psychology has espoused a positivistic
perspective from the beginning of its becoming formalized as
a discipline. In the early part of this century Edward L.
Thorndike contended that "[t]he profession of teaching will
improve in proportion as its members direct their daily work
by the scientific method" (Quoted in Carr & Kemmis 1986, p.
56). It is important to note that this movement toward a
more science-based practice was simultaneously a movement
away from a more traditional philosophical perspective.
Professional schools began to aspire to a more prestigious
position within the university. Teacher education as a field
sought higher status by positioning itself as closely as
possible to "the rigor of science-based knowledge" (Schon,
1987, p. 9). The belief followed that as teachers utilized
an educational theory based on the methodology of the
natural sciences, their practice would take on a "more
rational basis ..•• purged of its metaphysical, ideological
and normative elements" (Carr & Kemmis, p. 62).
This is a particular irony in this situation. As
education became an increasingly "professionalized" field
educators believed that interference by "outsiders" would be
minimized through the use of the increasingly prestigious
scientific method. It seems paradoxical that "science", once
considered the means of "democratizing knowledge" (Gordon,
Miller, & Rollock, 1990) in response to the control of the
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political and religious aristocracy of premodern times,
would itself become a means of elite control of knowledge
through its positivist epistemology and technical language.
This situation has been referred to as the "paradox of the
scientific method" (Gordon et al., 1990) in that
"rationalism, positivism, and logical empiricism represent
major advances in humans' pursuit of knowledge and
understanding •... [and at the same time] carries [sic] the
potential for tyranny" (p. 15). Gergen (1994) notes the
irony as well in that "'science talk' [has become] as
totalizing as that of the demagogy that science has sought
to replace" (p. 413). This "science talk" pervades all
aspects of our lives and claims "its own monopoly on the
truth" (Rosenau, 1992, p. 9).
The confidence in the relationship between positivist
science and teaching is clearly evidenced in the
contemporary educational scene (Berliner, 1987; Gage, 1985;
Gage & Berliner, 1991; Wittrock, 1986; Woolfolk, 1995). It
certainly is not the only type of knowledge utilized in
teaching. Fenstermacher (1994) notes the "radically
disjunctive conceptions of science" (p. 35) that are coming
to the fore including the practical knowledge of teachers
themselves. Yet, the resilience of the positivist paradigm
is obvious today despite attacks leveled against it (Schrag,
1992). Although this epistemological perspective with its
approach to research is pervasive and robust, it is also
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vulnerable on several counts discussed below.
Interpretivist Educational Research
As quantitative methods and epistemology proved
unsatisfactory or inadequate for addressing particular
educational questions and issues, alternative research
methodologies began to be recognized and explored. New
epistemologies were recognized and appropriate methods
sought. The most popular approach (Carr & Kemmis, 1986),
described as a kind of countermovement (Smith, 1983), is
characterized as an interpretive model utilizing qualitative
methods.
The positivist perspective views society (or the
teaching-learning situation in education) as "an
'independent system' maintained through the relationship of
factors external to its members" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p.
84). Contrastingly, educational researchers espousing an
interpretivist or qualitative perspective view social
reality as possessing an "intrinsic meaning structure" (Carr

& Kemmis, 1986) generated by social actors. Hence the term
"new sociology" is often used to described this perspective.
The aim of research is not empirical generalizations, the
production of law-like statements, nor the establishment of
functional relationships (van Manen, 1990). Rather, what is
sought is understanding and meaning of situations, i.e.,
Verstehen. As a result the social actor is able to act more
"thoughtfully and tactfully" (van Manen, 1990). When social
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actions are understood more deeply, when the significance of
the actions are "enlightened or illuminated," practical
change is possible (Carr & Kemmis, 1986). This signifies a
dynamic relationship between theory and practice. Carr &
Kemmis (1986) express this dynamic cogently:
The account of the theory-practice relationship of
interpretive social science is thus two-way traffic of
ideas into action; of practice from theoretical
principles. The traffic is two way: practical
deliberation is informed not only by ideas but also by
the practical exigencies of situations; it also
requires critical appraisal and mediation by the
judgement of the actor. (p. 93)
In educational research the focus of this approach is
on "understanding" the dynamic nature of the culture of the
school organization or the classroom, rather than
"discovering" an a priori "objective" form of knowledge of
the positivist viewpoint.
The interpretivist perspective finds its source in a
distinct epistemological orientation just as the positivist
view espouses a particular model of knowledge. Gergen (1985)
refers to this model as the "endogenic" model of the
"origins of knowledge .... [and] depends on processes
(sometimes viewed as innate) endemic to the organism"
(Gergen, 1985, p. 269). Humans strive to make sense of their
world cognitively, and meaning is negotiated and
renegotiated (Giroux, 1983b) in social situations. The focus
has shifted from an impersonal objectivity, an "exogenic"
model (Gergen, 1985), toward a deeper understanding of the
notion that "through the use of language and thought human
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beings constantly produce meanings as well as interpret the
world in which they find themselves" (Giroux, 1983, p.184).
"Objectivity" and "reality" are designated by the social
actors themselves "in the process of interpreting their
social world, [as they] externalize and objectify it" (Carr

& Kemmis, 1986, p. 84).
Qualitative research continues to be committed to the
pursuit of "objective knowledge" in that the "investigator
claims to achieve an accurate representation of the world"
(Gergen, 1985, p. 269). Researchers continue to assume the
role of generally detached observers, investigators, and
descriptions of the groups or activity being researched. The
results are thought to be reflections or representations of
what is really there (Stanley & Wise, 1993). Thus, this
research paradigm comfortably finds a place in the project
of modernity as well because modernity is "characterized by
a hermeneutic search for an underlying and unified truth and
certainty that can render the world, experiences and
events, ... coherent and meaningful" (Usher & Edwards, 1994,
p. 12) .
There are several criticisms of this interpretivist
approach. One line comes from the positivist orientation
asserting that this approach is unable to make
generalizations or "to provide 'objective' standards for
verifying or refuting theoretical accounts" (Carr & Kemmis,
1986, p. 94). Another line of criticism asserts that "the
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core of the new sociology lacks an adequate theory of social
change and consciousness" (Giroux, 1988, p. 25). The focus
remains at the micro-level of the school or classroom, and
the social and political structures which influence what is
understood and regarded as "knowledge" and meaning are never
exposed. Knowledge is "treated as a specific social act with
its underlying social relationships" (Giroux, 1983, p. 185).
However, this epistemology is particularly problematic as it
never moves beyond a relativistic view of knowledge. The
negotiated meanings of social actors do affect the social
structure, yet there is no consideration given to how the
social structure impacts and constrains the meaning systems
of the actors (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Giroux, 1983, 1988).
The qualitative approach is gaining popularity in
educational research particularly with the rise of
ethnographic studies. However, it is not likely to gain
prevalence in educational research. This appears to be
because the positivist perspective "forms the
metatheoretical basis of science itself" (Gergen, 1985, p.
269).
A Critical Research Perspective
A critical approach to educational research begins from
the position that both the positivist and the interpretivist
models are inadequate in their view of educational practice
and their attempts at reform. The positivist aim of
technical prediction and control, and the interpretivist aim
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of practical understanding can never lead to the kind of
reform and transformation that is necessary to ameliorate
the injustice that provokes the current educational crisis.
What is needed is a way of looking at education and
educational research that allows questioning beyond the
search for objective certitudes. The postmodern critique
holds such a possibility.
Postmodern Critigue
I am using the term "postmodernism" 28 in the sense of
critique, a kind of "oppositional attitude" as employed by
Foucault (Usher & Edwards, 1994). It is a way of looking at
modernity's master narratives of science with their promise
and project of progress, universality, and neutrality of
scientific method and knowledge claims (Usher & Edwards,
1994). Postmodernist critique rejects the notion that
scientific theory can ever mirror nature; at best it is a
"partial perspective" (Best & Kellner, 1991). Its "knowledge
claims are themselves partial, local, and specific rather
than universal and ahistorical" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.
10).
Just as the authority in pre-modern times held by the
"Postmodernism" as a term defies definition; thought to
be at "once fashionable and elusive" (Sarup, 1993, p. 129), it
is marked by a wide variety of interpretations (Aronowitz &
Giroux, 1991). Usher and Edwards (1994) refer to postmodernism
as a "loose umbrella term under whose broad cover can be
encompassed at one and the same time, a condition, a set of
practices, a cultural discourse, an attitude, a mode of
analysis" (p. 7). See Best and Kellner (1991) for an
explication of postmodern theory's historical development.
28
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priest and king was displaced by reason's claim to truth and
certainty, postmodern critique and analysis interrupts power
relationships which have been so effective in establishing
the "truth" of the social sciences in the modern epoch29 •
This rejection of the scientific discourse is a
confrontation with authority.
Scientific activity has shown itself vulnerable on many
counts. Since truth is a "thing of this world" (Foucault,
1980c, p. 131) it is made in history and culture; knowledge
considered as "truth" is the result of a social activity
(Gergen, 1985). That "science" does not recognize itself as
a human project is the major flaw in science's discourse
(Rosenau, 1992; Usher & Edwards, 1994). Science claims that
its truth can be somehow separate and distant, objective,
and not "encumbered" with values and ideologies. A common
metaphor for these assertions is the idea that language can
be wrapped in the "cloak" of objectivity and neutrality
(Bleir, 1986; Namenwirth, 1986; Usher & Edwards, 1994).
Thus, postmodern analysis is a critique of "logocentrism,"
the "possibility of knowing the world in a direct and
unmediated way - as it really is" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.
19).
As the positivistic and interpretivistic research

29

Foucault actually sees a postmodern critique as not
contained in one epoch or another.
Since power is
"everywhere" so are disruptions to power-relationships.
Discourse is always an incitement to discourse.
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paradigms have a particular epistemoligical stance, so does
a critical approach. Social constructionism30 {Gergen,
1983, 1985) challenges the concept of knowledge as mental
representation. Knowledge, including scientific knowledge,
is a social construction {Scarr, 1985). In other words,
knowledge is what passes for knowledge, the result of
"negotiated intelligibility" {Gergen, 1985). The locus of
human knowing shifts from the "interior regions of the mind
(to the] processes and structures of human interaction"
(Gergen, 1985, p.271). Gergen (1995) stresses the
"negotiated" aspect of understanding which takes place among
"complex networks of writers and readers [who comprise a]
discourse community" {Madigan et al., 1995, p.429),
supporters of a particular paradigm (Kuhn, 1970), or
"epistemic community" (Usher & Edwards, 1994). The members
of these groups share a distinctive world view, beliefs, and
language.
Seen from this perspective, then, the "grand narratives
of science, truth, and progress are discourses -

'realities'

we have created by and for ourselves. Stories we tell
ourselves about the real or, more likely stories told by
'powerful' others on our behalf" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.
28). Critical postmodern traditions recognize the political
Gergen {1985) alerts readers to the interchangeable use
of social "constructivism" and social constructionism. He
points out the Piagetian origins of the former, as well as the
farmer's use in reference to twentieth century art. In order
to avoid these confusions I will use the latter form.
30
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underpinnings of knowledge production. Those concerned with
this line of research engage in visioning and revisioning
relations of power within the society (Popkewitz, 1995) so
as to be able to move toward action. Giroux (1988) explains:
Inherent in this [critical] perspective is an
intersection of theory, ideology, and social practice
.•.. The cutting edge of this perspective is its
insistence on connecting macro forces in the larger
society to micro analysis such as classroom studies.
(p.27)
For example, a critical analysis of the discourse of
educational psychology is aimed at understanding and
explicating how the discourse of this discipline, while
considered a particular discourse community's expression of
the "truth", is implicated in a larger struggle between
dominant and subordinate discourses (Giroux & Aronowitz,
1991). The texts of educational psychology are part of
larger social texts (Scholes, 1985). Critical research in
the social sciences is a political activity and value-laden
work. Research in this perspective takes as its aim not the
furthering of the discipline's discourse but, rather to make
assumptions of educational psychology explicit and subvert
their claims (Rosenau, 1992) which "give some groups or
individuals unfair advantage to the disadvantage of other"
(Thomas, 1993, p.5).
Critical Discourse Analysis and Educational Psychology
Three points will be addressed in this section: (a) the
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arrival of critical discourse 31 analysis (CDA) on the
educational research scene; {b) relevancy of critical
discourse analysis; (c) the salience of language.
Arrival of CDA in educational research. Critical
discourse analysis has had a relatively recent arrival onto
the educational research scene and has been described as a
"new wave" of research (Burman & Parker, 1993). It has been
noted that "educational researchers would have been hard
pressed to turn up many theses, research papers, and
monographs that used discourse-analytic theories and
methods" (Luke, 1995, p.7) prior to the 1980's. However, the
fact that CDA is gaining legitimacy is evidenced in the
1995-1996 edition of Review of Research in Education (Apple,
1995) in which it is reviewed in the first chapter. Apple
states that the purpose of the editorial board of this
publication is to "give a greater voice to "newer" forms of
research methodologies and theories" (p. xi); the editors
want to encourage readers to "think socially" (p. xiii).
The research reviewed in this yearbook has a common
purpose, i.e. to place educational institutions in context,
to make clear the importance of recognizing that
"[e]ducational institutions do not stand alone, somehow
distanced from the cultural, economic, and political
relations and tensions of the larger society" (p. xii).

31

Issues regarding "discourse" are discussed later in this
chapter.
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Issues regarding education, the institutions, practices, and
discourses which education employs, need to be viewed as
part of a more general, social, and complex problematic. The
section of the book on CDA, for example, expresses a deep
concern regarding "the connections between discourse and
power in education ... [and the implications with] the
cultural and socioeconomic transformations now going on in
the larger society" (p. xvi).
Relevancy of CDA. Critical discourse analysis is
particularly relevant during these times of educational
"crisis" and "reform." Luke (1995) cites two demographic and
socioeconomic transformations that have emphasized the need
for CDA as issues of language, discourse, and difference
have taken center stage on the educational agenda. One
transformation is the recognition of educational
entitlements, the "enfranchisement of cultural and
linguistic minorities into mainstream public discourses and
institutions" (p.4). Failure to address this issue and the
concomitant sociocultural changes and conflicts "could pose
serious limitations in the capacity of educators to address
what remains a political issue of access and equity" (p. 5).
The second transformation is connected to the shift
from an industrialized to a service-based and informationbased economy (Luke, 1995; Usher & Edwards, 1994) which has
given rise to "new forms of language and information based
work" (Luke, 1995, p.5). In this environment spoken and
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written language is "the principal medium of commercial
exchange. Texts, images, and representations have become
both the means and objects of processes of commodif ication"
(p. 5). It is within this context that issues of
representation and subjectivity are of paramount importance
as schools are called upon to insure access and equity to an
increasingly diverse student population. Luke (1995)
emphasizes that "different kinds of children are, in turn,
affiliated with differing kinds of power and capital in
discourse communities and economic institutions" (p. 38). In
this "educational context •.• the tensions between official
discourses and minority discourses should be principle
focuses for educational research" (p.38).
Salience of language. In research the salience of
language is increasingly recognized within various
approaches to discourse analysis (e.g., Potter & Wetherell,
1994). Luke (1995) explains three approaches frequently used
in educational research: psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic,
and poststructuralist analysis. Psycholinguistics
understands the creative, developing child as a "language
user" whose growing competence accounts for the complexity
of language development. Sociolinguistics takes as its focus
the social nature of language and language development as
connected to socialization. The third approach, and the
approach which impacts this work, is concerned with a
poststructuralist analysis where the constructing character
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of language is central. This approach comes out of the
tradition of continental philosophy and cultural analysis
especially impacted by the work of Michel Foucault.
"Method" in Critical Piscourse Analysis
There is a need to be clear when talking about critical
discourse analysis in terms of "method". The category of
method "comes from a discourse developed for quantitative,
positivist mythologies such as experiments and surveys"
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p.101). Within the positivist
framework "sound" methodology leads to a degree of
"authority" with which outcomes of the research seem
justified. Gergen (1985) insists that the "sciences have
been enchanted by the myth that the assiduous application of
rigorous method will yield sound fact" (p. 273). No such
confidence in "method" exists in a critical research
paradigm.
Discourse analysis is more of a "craft skill ... not easy
to render or describe in an explicit or codified manner"
(Potter & Wetherell, 1994, p. 55). As a person becomes more
skilled at the craft explaining exactly what discrete
procedures are used becomes more difficult. Although there
are specific "analytic considerations", the accent is on the
craft, developing a skill, cultivating a "more conscious and
theorized understanding of how to be a cultural member"
(Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p.104). The fruitfulness of CDA
is clearly on becoming a better craftsperson, or a cultural
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worker in Giroux's sense, rather than performing a
particular set of mechanical procedures (Potter & Wetherell,
1994).
In short, there is not a set mechanics for "doing"
critical discourse analysis, and this is problematic as it
may appear "as an improvisation .. [I]ndeed, from a
functionalist point of view it hardly appears to be a
methodology at all" (Gotlieb, 1987, p. 276). The critical
discourse analyst views his/her work "as an art achieved
through practice. There is no determinate method ..• in the
sense of explicit rules that are to be followed"
(Bernstein, 1983, quoted in Gotlieb, 1987, p. 278). Critical
discourse analysis is a way of looking at things and
articulating a type of "heteroglossic expression" which
brings into play "various discursive resources with which to
read, interpret, and make sense .•. " (Luke, 1995, p. 39).
Discourse
Discourse is an important element in postmodern poststructuralist analysis. An understanding of what is
meant by discourse needs to be presented. From a positivistempiricist perspective discourse might be interpreted as
that which "refers to what is said and written and passes
for more or less orderly thought and exchange of ideas"
(Cherryholms, 1988, p.2). In general, discourse means the
text and the talk (van Dijk, 1993) of a particular
community.
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Yet, discourses do not simply express or reflect ideas
and paradigms; they play an active role as well. Gotlieb
(1987) insists that discourse, rather than being a mere
"tool for transferring meaning and intention," actively
"shapes what is thought and done" (p.279). Sarup (1993)
states that discourses "are perhaps best understood as
practices that systematically form the objects of which they
speak" (p.64). Luke (1995) explains this as the constructing
character of discourse. There is a "social and ideological
'work' that language does in producing, reproducing or
transforming social structures, relations and identities"
(Fairclough, 1995, pp. 209-210). Marshall (1992) defines
discourse as "a regulated system of statements which can be
analyzed not solely in terms of its internal rules of
formation, but also as a set of practices within a social
milieu" (p.99). Woolgar (1988) tells us that the specific
discourse of science "is to be understood as [that which]
structures and sustains a particular moral order of
relationships between the agents of representation,
technologies of representation and their respective
'objects'" (p. 14).
Foucault (1972) makes the point that "discourse is not
a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a
reality and a language (langue), the intrication of a
lexicon and an experience" (p. 48). Rather, Foucault {1972)
takes as his task explicating discourse as "practices that
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systematically form the objects of which they speak"
(emphasis added, p.49). In examining discourse Foucault is
not interested in an explication of the "objective reality"
of the subject under study; rather, Foucault is interested
in "how texts are constructive of social formations,
communities, and individual's social identities" (Luke,
1995, p.9). As subjects become objectified through discourse
a type of knowledge-power relationship is formulated.
Discourse is the power/knowledge nexus. In short, discourses
and the discursive practices which give voice to them are
social constructions rather than transparent images of
reality; as such they have an active and social function.
In addition to the constructive character of discourse
Ball (1990) explains that
Discourses are about what can be said and thought, but
also about who can speak, when, and with what
authority. Discourses embody meaning and social
relationships, they constitute both subjectivity and
power relationships. (p.2)
When discourse is considered in this critical way
issues of dominance emerge. Teun van Dijk (1993) defines
dominance as "the exercise of social power by elites,
institutions or groups, that results in social inequality,
including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and
gender inequality" (p. 249-250). It is important to note
that power is not a unilateral relationship although in this
definition of dominance emphasis is on a "top-down" relation
(van Dijk, 1993b). There is also a "bottom-up" expression of
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power in the form of resistance, complicity, and compliance.
However, "our critical approach prefers to focus on the
elites and their discursive strategies for the maintenance
of inequality" (van Dijk, 1993b, p.250). Broader issues of
power will be handled in Chapters IV and

v.

categories and constructs found generally in discourse,
and those found in educational psychology's discourse in
particular, are ascribed a degree of "truth": they are
understood as a reflection of reality. Disciplines construct
and are constructed by discourses which are accepted as
"truth" by various communities. Indeed Foucault (1980)
assures us that "[e]ach society has its regime of truth, its
general politics of truth: that is the types of discourse
which it accepts and makes function as true" (p.131).
Presently, as has been the case historically, there are a
multiplicity of discourses within the field of educational
psychology (Ball, 1984: Constas & Ripple, 1987: Glover &
Ronning, 1987: Scheurman, Heeringa, Rocklin, & Lohman, 1993:
Yee, 1970) each expressing a degree of variation. Despite
this disagreement, educational psychology is considered a
coherent discipline "with its own goals, research agenda,
and infrastructure" (Glover & Ronning, 1987 p.3). It is the
dominant discourse of the discipline that is the focus of
this dissertation.
Textbooks
Since the aim of this dissertation is to apply a
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critical analysis to the mainstream, dominant discourse of
educational psychology textbooks are chosen as a valuable
area for analysis. The choice of textbooks is based on
several issues: (1) textbooks enjoy of long history of use
in the discipline and form a genre of discourse; (2) they
are considered an authoritarian source of the discipline's
content; (3) textbooks are used to "pass on" the discipline
to future generations of educational psychologists; (4) they
present particular problematics; (5) they need to be
recognized as social artifacts with multiple constraints.
Each of these reasons for focusing on textbooks will be
discussed briefly.
First, educational psychology textbooks, beginning with
the publication of Edward L. Thorndike's Educational
Psychology in 1903, are marked by a prolific history, and
are part of the discourse of educational psychology in
particular. Textbooks are "primary resources for many
educational psychology courses" (Anderson, et al., 1995).
Westbury (1990) states as "truism" the fact that "textbooks
are the central tools and the central objects of attention
in all modern forms of schooling" (p. 1). DeCastell, Luke,
and Luke (1989) point to the distinctive status of the
textbook as the "primary medium of formal education"
(p.viii). Textbooks are accepted as being "an enduring and
influential part of schooling ••. they define much of what
teachers teach and students learn" (Elliott & Woodward,
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1990, p. viii). 32 Squire and Morgan (1990) characterize
textbooks as the "bed rock" tool for instruction "since they
have demonstrated their convenience and cost effectiveness"
(p.123). In short, textbooks form a particular genre of
discourse in and of themselves.
Second, textbooks are perceived to be authoritative
sources of a discipline's content. Thomas Kuhn (1970)
explains that textbooks "address themselves to an already
articulated body of problems, data, and theory" and
explicate a particular "set of paradigms" to which a
scientific community" (p. 36) is committed at a particular
time and place. Apple and Christian-Smith (1991) advise that
textbooks are "important artifacts" in defining whose
culture is taught, whose knowledge is recognized as
legitimate and "true". Textbooks signify "particular
constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and
organizing that vast universe of possible knowledge" (p.3).
Educational psychology textbooks have been ref erred to as
"virtual cornucopias of knowledge bases" (Houtz & Lewis,
1994, p.5) and they "tend to be written from a consensus
perspective and, therefore, serve as a valid indicator of
what professionals generally regard as important for an
undergraduate survey" (Scheurman et al., 1993, p.100). Olson
(1989) explains that written texts "serve an important
What is actually taught or learned in intro~uctory
educational psychology courses is not the issue here. However,
the potential of textbooks to define the field is the issue.
32
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archival functioning in preserving what the society takes to
be 'true' and 'valid' knowledge" and when knowledge is
stored in this written form it "carries great authority
because it appears to originate in a transcendental source"
(p.241). A. Graham Down of the Council of Basic Education
(quoted in Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991) relates that
"(t]extbooks, for better or worse, dominate what students
learn. They set the curriculum and often the facts learned,
in most subjects •••• The public regards textbooks as
authoritative, accurate and necessary" (p. 5).
Third, textbooks are the principal means by which the
science is transmitted to future generations and, as such,
may be considered "pedagogic vehicles" (Kuhn, 1970, p.137).
Textbooks fulfill a need to "acquaint the student with what
the contemporary scientific community thinks it knows"
(p.140). Apple (1989) asserts that it is the textbook that
"often defines what is elite and legitimate culture to pass
on" (p. 81). Van Dijk (1993a) suggests that both textbooks
and the introductory classes in which they are used be
regarded as the initial encounter students have with the
"goals, concepts, ideas and theories of their discipline ...
therefore, textbooks not only express the scholarly views of
their authors, but obviously shape those of their studentreaders" (van Dijk, 1993a, p. 165). Thus, introductory
textbooks in education have been characterized as providing
a kind of "grammar" (Luke, 1995) for introducing preservice
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teachers into the profession of teaching.
Fourth, there is a need to investigate textbooks
because they are problematic in several areas. Textbooks are
critiqued on the level of genre for becoming "increasingly
bland, simplistic, inaccurate, and obsolete" (Webb, 1995,
p.1). They have been characterized as "slow in responding to
paradigm shifts, changes in research foci, and challenges to
time-honored theories" (Scheurman, et al., 1993 p. 100). Yet
because of their ubiquity and longevity in the American
educational system they are perceived to be a basic,
fundamental, necessary, and neutral element in the teachinglearning process. However, this view is flawed as textbooks
despite their blandness are powerful. They carry the
discourse of the discipline and, therefore, play a social
role. This social role is significant and complex. Herein
lies the deeper need to examine and interrogate the specific
sort of discourse found in textbooks, particularly
introductory educational psychology textbooks.
Fifth, the issue of constraints needs to be addressed.
While textbooks can be thought of as "collections of
statements that make authoritative knowledge claims"
(emphasis added, Cherryholms, 1988, p. 52), textbooks need
to be appreciated as not just a compilation and articulation
of "facts". Textbooks are "conceived, designed, and adhered
to by real people with real interests" (Apple, 1991, p.2)
who contend with real constraints, and who participate in
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real relations of power. Even when we appreciate the
"evolution" of textbooks as developed and adopted by members
of the educational psychology community, it is naive to
think of them in their origin, production, or use as
neutral. Cherryholms (1989) has insisted that "Foucault
shows textbooks to be political, material products that
represent a privileged way of seeing things, privileged by
means of power, position, tradition, and so forth" (p.61).
At the heart of Foucault's insight regarding truth as
"relational" are the constraints related to the production,
sale, and use of textbooks.
Constraints experienced by authors, manufacturers, and
consumers are multiple; these constraints are economical,
political, ideological, and personal. The witness of Naomi
Silverman (1991), who has worked for years as an acquiring
editor for a textbook publishing company, can assist our
understanding. Silverman states that "textbooks are products
that are manufactured and sold for the purpose of making a
profit" (p.163). While other factors play a constraining
role, such as interests of the author (Spring, 1991),
research advances (Chall & Conard, 1990), course curricula,
and trends. The "bottom line remains constant: Will the book
make a profit for the company?" (Silverman, 1991, p.163).
Silverman further argues that differences of opinion
arise between author and editor over issues impacting
marketability. This is not a new phenomenon rather it is a
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recurring dilemma. She quotes from a 1936 book Are Teachers
Free? to make her point regarding the continuing tension,
"'He [sic] wants to tell the truth, and have his authors do
the same. Yet he must sell books'" (quoted in Silverman,
1991, p. 174). Young (1990) has the same focal point
regarding economic constraints of textbooks when she asks,
"How can you trust a profit-making industry to do what is
best to create textbooks" (p. 72). Joel Spring (1991)
recounts his experience of the "political and economic
forces shaping textbooks" which he refers to as an aspect of
"ideological management" (p. 186). Profit-making is not the
only concern of textbook publishers, but it certainly is a
major driving concern.
The application of a critical analysis to the dominant
discourse of educational psychology found in its textbooks
springs not only from the fact that textbooks are important
"pedagogic vehicles," but also that textbooks supply a
succinct compilation of what the discipline considers to be
its "heart". More importantly, critical discourse analysis
must be applied because of the political, economic, and
ideological nature of textbooks. Without this analysis the
societal role of textbooks could remain invisible, and
therefore, considered normative, neutral, objective, and
"true" in the absolute sense.
Critical Literacy and Intertextual Reading
Literacy occupies a position of central importance in
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this dissertation. Literacy is connected to reading and
writing. However, there are several ways to look at these
activities. Reading is sometimes understood in the
mechanical sense of decoding sounds and words as one
develops a skill that facilitates finding meaning in the
text. The image of consumption is frequently connected with
reading (Freire & Macedo, 1987). Readers are assigned the
position of consumers of the text: readers "chew" and
"swallow" (sometimes whole) the words and ideas of the
textbooks; they struggle to digest the ideas; readers are
encouraged to internalize what they have read, to make it
part of them (Woolfolk, 1995). This is what is understood as
functional literacy. Literacy in this view "very often
becomes a matter of mastering technical skills, information
or an elite notion of high-status knowledge" (Aronowitz &
Giroux, 1991, p. 98).
Teachers, from this perspective, simply serve as guides
to students toward the proper interpretation and
implementation of the text, as Scholes (1985) says, "so that
the truth might stand revealed" (p. 13). If this is what it
means to "read" then the text is given a reverential
position as though it were "a vehicle for eternal truth"
(Scholes, 1985, p. 13).
This is a limited sense of reading and text, one that
fits easily into a transmission model or banking notion of
education (Freire, 1970/1995). This type of reading ha_s been
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implicated in educational psychology textbooks as they are
presented as authoritative texts, regarded as containing the
paradigms around which the discipline is organized. There is
a promise extended to students of the discipline that by
learning, internalizing, and utilizing the material therein,
they can become better teachers. However, Scholes insists
that the worst thing teachers can do is to foster an
attitude of reverence before texts as if the text were a
vehicle for abiding truth.
A critical discourse analysis takes up another sense of
literacy. Textbooks are understood as social artifacts
(Apple, 1991, 1993; Giroux & Aronowitz, 1991) connected to
political, historical, economic, social con-texts in which
they are located. In other words any text is involved in a
web of other texts. Scholes (1985) expresses this view as
intertextuality. There must be an examination of these other
texts, of intertextuality. If the intertextuality is ignored
or suppressed than the power of the text as a final
authority is magnified. What results is a form of
illiteracy. 33
The perspective of this dissertation is that as

Harding (1996) makes a similar point in charging that
if scientists and members of the dominant groups fail to read
even natural science intertextually, as a text within contexts
(e.g., racist and imperialist discourses) than a scientific
illiteracy will continue to pervade the social order.
Harding's (1996) volume is an example of counter-text
exposing, contesting, recasting the mainstream scientific
discourse.
33
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educational psychologists we have to change the way we
consider our work, i.e., teaching educational psychology.
What this dissertation reflects is considering the teacher's
work as analyzing and helping students to analyze the
intertextuality of educational psychology. The focus needs
to shift from the power of the text in isolation to
recognizing that the discourses contained in educational
psychology texts are connected to other texts, e.g., contexts, pre-texts. Necessarily then, the discourse presented
by the text is a site of social struggle. Texts are meant to
be engaged and criticized rather than consumed.
Therefore, I am using reading as it has been identified
as an active process (Freire, 1985, 1987; Scholes, 1985) of
textual power. It is "a productive activity, the making of
meaning, in which one is guided by the text one reads .•. but
not simply manipulated by it (Scholes, 1985, p. 8). The
position of the reader is understood as the one who makes
meaning (Freire, 1985) of the word through a critical
reading of the world.
There is a pedagogy of textual power explained by
Scholes (1985) that impacts what I learn and teach. Textual
power has three forms of process. Initially, texts have
power over students (and teachers), a power that is
palpable. In the story that opens Chapter I the text we
studied contained the discursive practice around which my
student felt such constraint; she was limited by that which
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empowered me. There is a stage of submission to the power of
the text; this is obvious in my use of the text. I located
myself within the text; I shared a semantic and syntactic
field with the text; I understood and accepted the
particular codes of the text (Scholes ,1985). These were
what I was intent on introducing my students to throughout
the course of educational psychology.
The process of interpretation follows. This entails
reading a text along with possible explanations. For
example, the student who questioned the practice of popquizzes subverted the surface power of the text by offering
another interpretation. It could be argued that she did not
know the codes; I tried to explain them to her. Another
interpretation on what was happening in the exchange is
available: i.e., she was exposing a "division of
purpose ••. the return of the repressed" (Scholes, 1985,
p.40). The "student" 34 was responding to the text from her
own context, a beginning of intertextuality. The reader's
own position forms an important context for reading.
What I was learning was that there are many texts
contained in and connected to the particular disciplinary
text I was teaching, e.g., political. economic, historical
con-texts; these produce various interpretations. They
become obvious in the codes presented by the text. And this
34

Again, the use of quotes indicates my understanding of
irony. Clear definitions of "student" and "teacher" ar~ often
blurred.
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is the point of the dissertation and my teaching, i.e., "to
study the intertextual system of relations that connects one
text to others" (Scholes, 1985, p. 31).
The third phase of textual power is criticism. Scholes
(1985) explains criticism as text against text; criticism
"provides important opportunities to break with dominant
readings and interpretations" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 158).
criticism is possible with the differentiation of "the
subjectivity of the critic from that of the author, [it is]
an assertion of another textual power against that of the
primary text" (Scholes, 1985, p. 40). Through the act of
writing criticism presents a counter-text, a talking-back
discussed in Chapter II. Scholes notes that criticism
"begins with the recognition of textual power and ends in
the attempt to exercise it" (p. 41) through writing.
Teaching students how to recognize the codes of a
particular text, to analyze them intertextually and present
criticism, seems a more appropriate task for teachers. A
more complex understanding of learning entails the ability
to break with oppressive and unjust systems, and a language
of hope and possibility becomes a critical aspect of the
learning situation. Teachers can help students access the
skills "they will need in order to define and shape the
modern world, rather than simply serve in it" (Aronwitz &
Giroux, 1991, p. 108).

100
Choice of "Classic" Textbooks
In order to perform the process of critical discourse
analysis it is important to read the dominant or mainstream
discourse of the discipline. This dominant discourse is
found in mainstream texts, those held in high regard and
used frequently by those who are involved in teaching the
discipline.
In the Spring of 1995 a survey (see Appendix A) was
sent to a random sample of 210 members of the American
Psychological Association - Division 15, Educational
Psychology. The purpose of the survey was to have members of
the educational psychology community nominate textbooks used
in introductory classes considered to contain the mainstream
discourse of the field. The intention in asking this
particular group for information was to gather an "emic"
perspective, an insider's view (Foster, 1994), of the field.
A return rate of 63% of the surveys was realized. The
two textbooks receiving the most nominations were chosen for
the critical discourse analysis. They are: Educational
Psychology (1995, 6th ed.) by Anita Woolfolk and Educational
Psychology (1991, 5th ed.) by Nathan L. Gage and David L.
Berliner. The complete survey results appear in Appendix B.

CHAPTER IV
TOWARD A POSTSTRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS
Introduction
The work of this dissertation began with a questioning
of the discipline of educational psychology as I encountered
it in teaching introductory courses to preservice teachers.
What I had accepted as "real", "stable", "true", and
"neutral" within the discipline's knowledge-base I gradually
began to read as a "reflection of conventions" (Kincheloe,
1993) imbued with political interests. As I became more
aware of the way power and knowledge implicate each other I
began to critique educational psychology's mainstream
discourse as a "regime of truth" (Foucault, 1980c).
This chapter describes a critical reading and analysis
of the mainstream discourse of the discipline of educational
psychology. Through the survey described in Chapter III two
educational psychology textbooks, Educational Psychology by
Gage and Berliner (1991, 5th edition) and Educational
Psychology by Woolfolk (1995, 6th edition), were nominated
by the educational psychology community as the "classic"
texts of the field. These texts supplied the dominant
discourse analyzed in this chapter and the next.
Two aspects of the discipline of educational psychology
101
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were examined in the course of the critical discourse
analysis: (1) the disciplinary principles that form the
internal features and particular rationality of educational
psychology's discourse; and, (2) the non-discursive aspects
of the discipline including the political and social
networks in which the discourse is embedded (Welch, 1985).
These aspects are described briefly in this introduction.
Disciplinary Principles
Disciplinary principles are apparent in the particular
rationality, i.e., technical rationality, of the discipline.
Technical rationality is evident in the rules, relations,
and regularities which lie just below the surface of the
discourse. Technical rationality provides the meaning-making
system, a kind of internal regulation (Foucault, 1972), of
the discipline of educational psychology. This internal
regulation is generally considered a resource of the
discipline as it provides a "grounding" for the discipline's
perspective. It is powerful in that it influences thought
and by extension the knowledge and practice of the
discipline itself.
However, while the internal system of the discourse may
be considered a resource from a particular standpoint, it
also presents problematics when read critically.
Problematics can remain invisible if the technical
rationality of the discipline is "taken-for-granted" and
becomes transparent or invisible, or is considered
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"natural". Usher (1993) aptly describes educational
psychologists as "enfolded (emphasis added) in an implicit
conception of disciplines as neutral bodies of knowledge"
(p. 17). It is possible that educational psychologists are
caught in our own unself-reflexive scientism. Educational
psychologists remain prisoners of the discourse unless we
gain access to its constitutive forces.
Through a critical reading and analysis disciplinary
principles and problematics can be made explicit and
interrogated. Viewed from a critical perspective the science
of the discipline in general as well as its truth claims do
not cease to exist; instead, "they become representations
that need to be problematized rather than accepted as
received truths" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, p. 75).
This section of the chapter is an appropriation of
Foucault's (1972) notion of archeology, i.e., an
investigation of the human sciences as systems of knowledge.
Archaeology has been described as a "critical investigation
of disciplinary systems of knowledge with the goal of
understanding the discursive practices that produce those
systems of knowledge" (Prado, 1995, p. 25). Dreyfus and
Rabinow (1983) emphasize that Foucault's aim was "to
rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became
possible" (p. 17). Once this is understood it is possible to
begin to think differently, and to understand "what what we
do does" (Foucault, quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p.
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187).
Non-Discursive Aspects
The non-discursive aspects of the discipline are
discussed in the second section of the chapter. Nondiscursive aspects pertain to the "background practices"
(Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983), the human activity and
institutional processes operating within the discipline
(Foucault, 1972) as well as those within which the
discipline operates. These include the social, political,
economic, and historical contexts and contingencies of the
discipline that are prior to the "truth" of the discipline
and are potent in the hegemonic 35 construction of the
discourse. For example, educational psychologists persevere
in the belief that the discourse is developed and controlled
through rigorous scientific activity (Cherryholms, 1988)
that yields a body of knowledge able to be put to
progressive use in education. Yet this commonsense
assumption can "work behind our backs in powerful and

35

This term has a complex etymology. It is used here in
the sense of Antonio Gramsci (1971) to explain the dynamic of
how some groups come to rule over other groups. static and
passive subordination is not the form of domination implied by
this term. Rather, it "presupposes an active and practical
involvement of the hegemonized groups" (Forgacis, 1988,
p.424). In other words, an important aspect of dominant groups
maintaining their control and privilege is through the consent
and support of other members of the society (Leistyna, et al.,
1996). Van Dijk (1993) defines the term thus: "If the minds of
the dominated can be influenced in such a way that they accept
dominance, and act in the interest of the powerful but of
their own free will, we use the term hegemony" (emphasis
original, p. 255).
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constraining ways" (Gitlin, 1990, p. 444). By ignoring the
various power relationships in which the discipline is
embedded, the relationships that enable and facilitate the
discipline's discourse and practices (Cherryholms, 1988), it
is possible to take as natural and necessary, as
transcendental truth, that which is actually of our own
making. As Gergen (1985) insists, "a given understanding
that prevails ... is not fundamentally dependent on the
empirical validity of the perspective in question, but on
the viscidities of social processes" (p. 268). All the
things that are said through the discipline's dominant
discourse, what metaphors and values are endorsed, what
remains unsaid, and what is marginalized are actually the
result of social negotiations and power relationships more
than rigorous scientific activity. As Thomas (1997) points
out what is considered knowledge is "what is agreed to be
correct rather than the product of compelling
justifications" (p. 92).
The analysis presented in this chapter and the next is
meant to be illustrative of a critical poststructuralist
analysis. As reflected in discussions in the preceding
chapters this analysis is facilitated by an oppositional
reading, necessarily partial, and coming from a particular
social and political location, i.e., it assumes and
acknowledges a situated knowledge (Haraway, 1991/1988;
Harding, 1991; Collins, 1990). It is by no means exhaustive.

106

It is meant as a counter-discourse, and serves to "talkback" to and.de-naturalize the dominant discourse of
educational psychology. It represents a sample, not a
synopsis of all possible critiques (Murphy, 1993).
Disciplinary Principles
What Is A "Discipline"?
"Disciplines" 36 are generally considered "neutral,
scientifically validated bodies of knowledge whose ..• effects
are enlightening and empowering and which thus enable
effective action" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 48). David
Berliner (Berliner & Rosenshine, 1987) a preeminent
educational psychologist and co-author of a "classic"
textbook 37 , expresses confidence in the discourse of the
discipline as a body of knowledge marked with an empowering
character. He asserts:
I think that in the past few years we have come closer
than ever before to providing direct scientific
underpinnings for the art of teaching. In some cases,
the need for highly inventive, creative minds has been
lessened, as research provides ideas and technology
that are almost directly applicable to classroom life.
(emphasis original, 1987, p. 3)
He continues:
We now have something that an ordinary person does not
have - a knowledge-base consisting of facts, concepts,
and technology that can transform our profession ....
Knowledge is clearly power, a kind of social power.
This is one sense of the word "discipline", another
understanding of the word is addressed in Chapter v.
36

37

Ref erence to a "classic" text indicates one of the two
texts introduced in Chapter III, Gage & Berliner, 1991 or
Woolfolk, 1995.
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(p. 31)
These quotations of Berliner represent the discipline
as producing a body of systematized knowledge which is
cumulative, is produced through the scientific practice of a
specific group of persons, and is marked by a faith that it
is able to be applied in positive ways to the practice of
teaching. These tenets are implicated throughout the classic
texts of the discipline of educational psychology.
Gage and Berliner (1991) have stated in the preface
that the purpose of the textbook is:
to give prospective and practicing educators ... an
introduction to what educational psychology can provide
by way of facts, concepts, principles, and research
methods that will be both theoretically enlightening
and practically useful. We want our students to take
what we present as theory and put it into use in their
classrooms. (p. xvii)
Woolfolk (1995) similarly tells readers that:
the major goal of this book is to provide you with the
best and the most useful theories for teaching - those
that have solid evidence behind them ...• [these
theories] are ways of understanding the challenges that
teachers face. (pp. 16-17)
Discourses As Sites of Struggle
Textbooks typically present the mainstream discourse of
disciplines (explained in Chapter III). A discourse is
important in poststructuralist research but for reasons
other than those traditionally stated. Poststructuralists
are skeptical that knowledge can be systematized as
knowledge claims are considered local, partial, and always
permeated with power and normative interests (Usher &
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Edwards, 1994); claims of neutrality are always suspect as
discourses, even scientific ones, act in the interests of
some over others. Therefore, the work of discourse analysis
is undertaken not because discourses are understood as
delivering "truth"; rather, they are engaged because their
"truth" is seen as relational, situated, and partial (Gore &
Luke, 1992), and needs to be exposed and critiqued as such.
Thus, discourses are sites of encounter and struggle.
McNay (1994) explains:
Discourses and meaning are the site of social struggle.
The process through which hegemonic social relations
are achieved and maintained often involves the
stabilization of discursive relations and the fixation
of meaning .... Similarly, resistance to hegemonic
meaning entails the contestation and disruption of
naturalized forms of discourse. (emphasis added, p. 75)
The discourse of educational psychology is recognized as a
site of social struggle; it is with this recognition that
one is able to enter the dialogue, 38 to debate, and offer
criticism which "provides important opportunities to break
with dominant readings and interpretations" (Cherryholms,
1988, p. 158).

Freire (1970/1992) insists that education that is
liberatory must also be dialogic, thus "dialogue becomes a
continuing aspect of liberating acting" (p. 134). The dialogue
he is ref erring to is very different from everyday talk or
conversation; it is "a process of learning and knowing [that]
must always involve a political project with the objective of
dismantling oppressive structures and mechanisms prevalent
both in education and society" (Freire & Macedo, 1995/1996, p.
203).
38
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Rationality of a Discipline: Ideology
Chapter III states that a hallmark of modernity is
entrusting "reason" as the way to know the "truth",
ascertaining universal laws through which order may be
maintained. Reason was/is understood as "the source of
progress in knowledge and society, as well as the privileged
locus of truth and the foundation of systematic knowledge"
(Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 2). Rationality is evident in the
particular views of knowledge, set of interests, beliefs,
expectations, meanings, and methodological forms of inquiry
that are held by a person or group (Giroux, 1983a).
Rationality is the means by which a person or group puts the
world in order. In other words, rationality is the sensemaking activity of a particular community evidenced in the
community's discursive formation. The dominant discourse of
educational psychology has a particular rationality as do
other examples of discourse 39 •
Ideology as sense-making activity. This sense-making
function of rationality is akin to a meaning of "ideology".
Yet, words like "ideology" are seldom part of the
discussions regarding disciplines in the social sciences
such as educational psychology. The assumed neutrality of
the science eschews words like ideology often considered in
a pejorative sense; it is something another group subscribes

39
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to, while "we" have, or at least search objectively for, the
truth (Burbules, 1995). The way it forms specific
perspectives, influences work and relationships, or its
usefulness is easily overlooked. As mentioned in the
introduction of this chapter, another possible reason
educational psychologists rarely consider the ideology of
the discipline is that we are so embedded in it that we take
the sense-making activity of the discipline as "natural".
The ideology to which I am ref erring is that which
permeates social life, it is something in which we all
participate (Giroux, 1983a). It is evidenced in "the
production and representation of ideas, values, and beliefs
and the manner in which they are expressed and lived out by
both individuals and groups" (McLaren, 1989, p.176). Van
Dijk (1993) explains ideologies as "the fundamental social
cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests and values
of groups" (p. 258). This "sense making" characteristic of
ideology is important as it is involved in the "production,
consumption, and representation of meaning" (Giroux, 1983b,
p.16). This is the sense of "ideology" I am concerned with
here, rather than with specific political ideologies, such
as of socialism, communism, or conservatism (Giroux, 1983b).
Ideology and struggle. There is another characteristic
of ideology that gives it significance as well; ideology's
potency only "becomes clear when it is linked to the
concepts of struggle" (Giroux, 1983b, p. 16). A critique of
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ideology, therefore, serves to present the interests of some
persons in dialectical relationship to the advantage of
others. This is why a critique is "useful and necessary ...
because it helps identify the struggles that are central"
(Sarup, 1996, p. 70).
The dynamic of the struggle to be considered along with
rationality is expressed through the "problematic" (Giroux,
1981, 1983a). The problematic represents a questioning of an
assumption or belief communicated in the discourse.
Problematics have the added dimension in that they also
raise questions regarding what is not expressed in the
discourse, or what has been silenced by the discourse. In
this way problematics reveal "the ideological source that
lies beneath the choice of what is considered important and
unimportant in a mode of thinking" (Giroux, 1981, p. 9).
That is, the way things are understood impacts the kind of
questions that seem intelligible or important, and, at the
same time, puts other questions outside the realm of
comprehension or reasonableness. These unfathomable
questions if taken seriously could transform our basic
assumptions {Giroux, 1983a); they form a counter-discourse
to the dominant ideology. Therefore, problematics are raised
and seriously considered in this dissertation.
The Rationality of Educational Psychology
A particular rationality "grounds" the dominant
discourse of the discipline of educational psychology found
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in the classic texts. This can be explained as a technical
rationality that is obvious from a close reading of the
codes found in the texts of the discourse. Technical
rationality is understood as "an epistemology of practice
derived from positivist philosophy" (Schon, 1987, p. 3). It
has been described as indicative of embeddedness in a
"culture of positivism" by Giroux (1981) as it is based
"upon the logic of scientific methodology with its interest
in explanation, prediction, and technical control •.. " (p.
42). As the natural sciences provide the model for its
theoretical development (Giroux, 1983a), it is
understandably explained as a "normal-science version of
social science" (Schon, 1995); it allows for a kind of
"scientific management" (Kincheloe, 1993) of education.
Technical rationality rests in modernist need to
control and bring order to an objective world. It operates
through interrelated assumptions expressed by Giroux
(1983a): (1) Control is the goal of technical rationality
(and therefore, educational psychology's goal), and is made
possible through the application of educational theory, or
law-like propositions, derived from empirical research; (2)
discovery of causation is possible and makes credible the
possibility of prediction and control; (3) the knowledge
derived from this inquiry is value-free and represents
neutral, objective reality; (4) since knowledge is reduced
from data that are value-free, educators using its knowledge
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act in a value-free manner.
Technical rationality is evidenced not only in the
discourse of the texts; it is built into the structures and
practices of modern educational activity, and educational
institutions themselves (Boland, 1995; Schon, 1995; Usher &
Edwards, 1994). In the following discussion: 1) evidence
will be presented to show how technical rationality pervades
the discourse of educational psychology (Giroux, 1981) as
expressed in its classic texts; and 2) the problematics
provoked by this perspective will be presented.
Control and the Possibility of Causation
The purpose of gaining control of the educational
experience is central to educational psychology's discourse
found in classic textbooks (i.e., Gage & Berliner, 1991;
Woolfolk, 1995). Gage and Berliner (1991) explain that the
"objectives of educational psychology, like those of any
science, are to explain, predict, and control the phenomena
with which it is concerned" (p. 16). Hence, educational
psychology is intent on controlling the processes of
teaching and learning. Scientific research is the means by
which control of educational settings is thought possible.
The primacy of scientific research. The fundamental
position of scientific research and theory building is clear
throughout both classic texts; several examples are
presented.
Both texts provide a defense against the position that
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educational psychology is merely an exercise in
"commonsense". This defense operates to answer the
historical critique that educational psychology is "putting
what everybody knows in language which nobody can
understand" (Welton, 1912, quoted in Grinder, 1970, p. 4).
Gage and Berliner (1991) assert that research in educational
psychology, like research in the social sciences in general,
is of high quality. Despite popular belief to the
contrary, the consistency of results compares favorably
with that of the physical sciences .••. The relationship
between variables often are even stronger than those on
which some medical practice is based. (p. 28)
In a similar manner, Woolfolk (1995) highlights the
research of educational psychology in contrast to
commonsense. She comments that "frequently the principles
set forth by educational psychologists - after spending much
thought, research, and money - sound pathetically obvious.
People are tempted to say ••• 'Everyone knows that!'" (p. 11).
She alerts readers that there is a "danger" in thinking that
"educational psychologists spend a lot of time discovering
the obvious .••. When a principle is stated in simple terms it
can sound simplistic" (p.13). Readers are warned that it is
not a case of what "sounds sensible" but "what is
demonstrated when the principle is put to the test" (Gage,
1991, quoted in Woolfolk, 1995, p. 13).
It is interesting to note that despite the attempt to
differentiate and privilege "scientific research" over
commonsense theorizing there appears a contradiction in that
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commonsense is called upon frequently to witness to a shared
understanding: e.g., "Everyone knows what intelligence is."
(Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 51); "Everyone knows what
motivation is, how it makes a difference between resentful
boredom at one extreme and ravenous interest at the other"
(p.326). Commonsense understandings are an important
characteristic of hegemony. Even as the scientific basis of
the discipline is defended, it is imperative that at some
point the knowledge claims of educational psychology appear
"so correct that to reject them would be unnatural, a
violation of commonsense" (McLaren, 1989, p.175). Hegemony
takes hold when that which appeals to commonsense is
accepted as universal truth (Giroux & Purpel, 1983).
Woolfolk (1995) notes that "research is the primary
tool" (p. 16) for understanding teaching and learning.
Toward this end
descriptive studies and experimental research can
provide valuable information to teachers. Correlations
allow you to predict events that are likely to occur in
the classroom; experimental studies can help indicate
cause-and-effect relationships and should help you to
implement useful changes. (p. 20)
This confidence in scientific method is reiterated in an
appendix titled "Research in Educational Psychology" which
is provided because students "must know how information in
the field is created" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 588).
There are limitations placed on what may be said and
not said through the discipline by privileging scientific
research over other forms of knowledge. For example, the
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possibility of a complaint by some "parents in low-income
areas, whose children often tend to do poorly on
intelligence tests" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 72) is
recognized. Gage and Berliner (1991) explain that these
parents may "believe that teachers and school systems hold
hereditarian views [regarding intelligence]. And they [the
parents] believe these views lead educators to stop trying
to help their children" (p. 72).
The perspective that parents offer as the result of
their own personal knowledge is discounted by citing a 1967
survey reporting that only "6% of American adults, and only
1 and 2 percent of students and teachers believed that
intelligence tests measure only inborn intelligence" (Gage &
Berliner, 1991, p. 72). The evidence of this 1967 research
study is used to nullify the possibility of merit in an
argument coming from personal knowledge of a group. The
issue of a twenty-five year old piece of research used to
quell contemporary dissatisfaction is but one issue of
critique and will be addressed in the problematics section.
"Neutral" Knowledge
In a discourse based on technical rationality,
knowledge is treated as value-free, representing neutral,
objective reality. This is an indispensable tenet of the
scientific method. Understandably, then it follows that
teachers using the discipline's knowledge are judged as
acting in neutral and objective ways.
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Gage and Berliner (1991) are clear in stating that the
act of teaching, in general, is not value-free as "teachers
must combine insights from educational psychology with
ethical thinking about what is good for their students and
for society" (p. 7). However, they also emphasize that
ethical discussions are not the concern of their text:
But educational psychology, and hence this book, is
most concerned with the teaching and learning processes
in classrooms. More precisely, we deal primarily with
the problems that arise in carrying out the tasks of
teaching. (p. 7)
They explain that the style of writing found in this
textbook, "like most textbooks is •.. neutral and
dispassionate" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 7).
Similarly, Woolfolk (1996) reflecting on her purpose in
writing textbooks, contends that while other educational
psychologists have course goals which include deepening
students' "social and ethical understandings •.• [or] capacity
to be planful and reflective" (p.41) she has other goals
which she considers the "heart" of the course. For Woolfolk
the "main goal •.• is to help perspective teachers understand,
value, and use the knowledge and processes of educational
psychology" (p. 41).
An assurance is expressed that better teaching can
result through learning and applying educational psychology.
Woolfolk (1995) states: "If you can become a more expert
learner by applying the knowledge from this text ..• then you
will be a better teacher as well" (p. 10). Woolfolk (1995)
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explains that expert teachers, "like expert dancers or
gymnasts, have mastered a number of moves or routines that
they can perform easily, almost without thinking (emphasis
added, p. 5). Consider Berliner's quote at the beginning of
this section, "In some cases, the need for highly inventive,
creative minds has been lessened ..• " (Berliner, 1987, p. 3).
The teacher's role is to "orchestrate (emphasis added)
materials, tasks, environments, conversations, and
explorations •.. " (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 17).
Problematics
The discussion of technical rationality has the purpose
of exposing the sense-making activity of the discourse of
the discipline, understood as its particular rationality.
Because discourses are recognized as sites of social
struggle they need to be interrogated. This interrogation is
necessary not just to argue or clarify on the level of
ideas, but because theoretical choice has implications for
practice 40 (Luke & Gore, 1992). Problematics will now be
posed regarding: (1) the relationship of theory and
practice; (2) a reductionist focus of the discipline; (3)
teachers' role; (4) the limitation of questions and
behaviorism; (5) the possibility of neutral, value-free
knowledge.

40

A direct
analysis
and
critique
of
psychology's practices is the theme of Chapter

v.

educational

119
Relationship of Theory and Practice
There is an implicit understanding that the theory
generated in the name of educational research is able to be
applied directly to the practice of education. This is
especially clear in each of the classic textbooks in that
disciplinary knowledge is placed in a foundational position
to the practice of teaching. "We have presented a view of
educational psychology as a foundation discipline that helps
to accomplish the tasks of teaching" (Gage & Berliner, 1991,
P. 47); "My goal in writing this book .... so you will have
the foundation for becoming an expert" (Wookfolk, 1995,
p.18). Thus, both the vital role that disciplinary knowledge
plays (Giroux, 1981), and the one-way relationship of
theory-to-practice (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) are highlighted in
these classic textbooks.
Many of the criticisms of the foundational
understanding of the relationship of theory and practice
regard the decontextualized learning of theories and
concepts applying them directly to practice (Anderson, et
al., 1995). The theoretical knowledge is sometimes judged to
be inaccessible and too "scientific" for practitioners. Yet,
the foundational model has proved to be resistant to
arguments leveled against it. 41 Despite criticisms it has
41
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been difficult to disassociate from the "formative power"
psychology has had on education (Usher & Edwards, 1994).
What is it that the foundational model provides that keeps
it viable in the midst of so much criticism?
The foundational metaphor is meant to convey a sense of
security in that "grounding our thinking about practice on a
simplified and scientifically accurate foundation should
make it more comprehensible and reliable" (Doyle & Carter,
1996, p. 24). The need for security is heightened as the
practice of teaching is recognized as a serious and complex
enterprise. This is the optimistic message expressed in both
classic textbooks and the dominant discourse of the
discipline in general.
The foundational way of thinking about the knowledge of
the discipline also serves to establish a certain
hierarchial order within the discipline. A foundational
approach distances those who do research from those who
teach it and from those who learn it and eventually apply it
to practice. By privileging theoretical knowledge over the
practical knowledge of teachers, students, and parents the
conventional power arrangements within the educational
process are supported (Cherryholms, 1988). Also supported
are the inequalities constructed by its knowledge claims in
a way "so powerful it is almost invisible" (Cherryholms,
1988, p. 98). These issues will be taken up in Chapter

v.
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Reductionist Focus
Technical rationality's objective to gain control
through mastery of theory is advanced when variables are
understood as being able to be manipulated in the interest
of bringing about "a certain state of affairs or to prevent
its occurrence" (Giroux, 1981, p. 43). In order to complete
experimental activities through which theories and
principles can be formulated, variables needed to be reduced
to simplest terms. Reductionism is to "simplify a particular
phenomenon so as to mask its complexity" (Leistyna et al.,
1996, p. 36). Necessarily, this directs attention toward the
"trivial - on that which can be easily measured by empirical
instruments" (Kincheloe, 1993, p. 129). The "illusion" of
certainty in practice is supported, but as Kincheloe (1993)
remarks, "[r]arely do the most significant questions of
human affairs lend themselves to empirical quantification
and the pseudocertainty that often accompanies numbers" (p.
129).
A plain example of reductionist thinking is found in
the material regarding writing objectives that are
categorized as cognitive, affective, or psychomotor. Both
texts recognize the impossibility of separating these areas
from each other: "none of these kinds of activities is
isolated from the others •••. the three types of objectives
are intertwined" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, pp. 42-43); "In
real life, of course, behaviors from these three domains

122

occur simultaneously" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 447). However,
they are separated in these texts, because "it often is
useful to focus on one at a time" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p.
43). Useful? For whom? This distinction, "devised by a group
of educational measurement experts" (Gage & Berliner, 1991,
p. 43), is a "fiction that we tell to make our lives as
educators simpler" (Apple, 1994, p. x). These distinct
categories have made their way into the realm of commonsense
understanding of educational psychology, and they are
examples of simplistic ways to understand very complex
phenomena.
An important issue in this criticism is the emphasis on
the efficiency of action, or the "means", by which the
control is produced, not on the value of the goal of the
practice itself. This implies a separation of factual
information intended to facilitate teaching from questions
of values that is indicative of technical rationality's
objective in gaining control through mastery of theory. The
concern is with how to do things, and how to do them more
efficiently, not with what should be done (Sarup, 1993) as
teachers internalize the logic of efficiency.
Teachers As Functional Problem-Solvers
Teachers-as-problem-solvers is a favorite role of
teachers expressed in classic texts:
Whatever your situation, the tasks you must accomplish
raise problems that teachers have always had to face.
And these problems arise in some form from the first
day and every day you teach •••• Educational psychology
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serves teachers ... by helping them deal with these
problems. (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p.7)
Woolfolk (1995) highlights this bias by playing off
Schon's (1983) call for a more "reflective practitioner". As
Woolfolk is discussing the "artistry" of teaching and the
need of teachers to be reflective, inventive, and creative
she suggests that her readers might find this discussion "a
bit idealistic and abstract" (p. 9). She then submits that
"[r]ight now, you may have other, more down to earth,
concerns about becoming a teacher. You are not alone!" (p.
9). The more pertinent concerns of beginning teachers
include: "maintaining classroom discipline, motivating
students, accommodating differences among students,
evaluating students' work, dealing with parents" (p. 10).
And these are the issues of educational psychology. Students
of the discipline are told that "by applying the knowledge
from this text ... you will be a better teacher" (p. 10).
Anything that keeps teachers from their task of efficiently
solving technical problems is apparently considered
superfluous.
Two important themes can be inferred from Woolfolk's
(1995) discussion. First, the "real" concerns of teachers
are defined and delimited by those who write the texts.
These are the issues in which educational psychology can be
useful to teachers; these are the problems and solutions
addressed in the text that are to be learned and
internalized by readers. Second, focus is directed away from
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the need of teachers to be reflective about the work that
they do and the ends for which teachers teach. The focus
becomes the means of problem solving.
Kincheloe (1993) refers to the "how-to" emphasis as an
example of "crude practicality" that characterizes so many
technically oriented teacher education programs. Cherryholms
(1988) alerts us to a "vulgar pragmatism" which is
"instrumentally and functionally reproducing accepted
meanings and conventional organizations, institutions, and
ways of doing things for good or ill" (p. 151). Teachers in
this perspective are seen primarily as instrumental problemsolvers (Schon, 1987) who "select technical means best
suited to a particular purpose" (p. 3). This image of
teachers constructs a specific view by which a "technical
ethos is created which eventuates in .•• a constricted view of
teacher cognition, which reduces the act of teaching to
merely a technique" (Kincheloe, 1993, p. 10).
It is ironic (outrageous) that through an enculturation
into the discipline, through internalizing the mindset of
educational psychology, teachers could become complicitous
in their own de-skilling (Apple, 1993; Giroux, 1983a;
Kincheloe, 1993; Macedo, 1994). Teachers do not have to
become so "malleable and powerless that they submit to their
own victimization" (Giroux & Purpel, 1983). People do have
and can be encouraged to develop a sense of the social,
political, and historical contexts in considering the
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mainstream discourse of this discipline. Teachers can be
self-reflexive and realize that there are multiple texts
that support and facilitate (or contest and interrogate)
particular meaning-making systems.
Limiting of Questions
Technical rationality limits the kind of questions that
may be considered legitimate within the discipline.
Questions are confined to those that have a specifically
technical solution, those that can be addressed through
scientific research. Questions about these "problems" that
teachers face have to be handled within an empiricist
tradition and, therefore, need to be reduced to variables
that are treated in isolation. This manner of thinking
"creates a form of tunnel vision in which only a small
segment of social reality is open to examination" (Giroux,
1981, p. 46). Ignoring complexities is in sync with Edward
L. Thorndike's (1910) recommendation in an early educational
psychology textbook. He stated in a discussion of laws of
learning that, "The complexities of human learning will in
the end be best understood if at first we avoid them" (p.

6).
Beside limiting questions to those that can have
technical solutions, questions are also transformed or
recast as problems with technical solutions. Thus, issues
regarding the social, cultural, and political situations
that arise in educational institutions and classroom life
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are explained through "neutral" scientific means. This
allows for a very subtle entrenchment of hegemony as
scientific justification provides for the ideal solution to
ideological problems (Apple, 1990).
Problems dealing with diversity in tracking, for
example, are managed as scientific issues. Through the use
of scientific technologies of testing of "intelligence"
the differential control of access to high status knowledge
is not seen as a power play of agents of the dominant
culture, but rather rationalized as the commonsense dealing
with the varying abilities of students. Some of these points
will be discussed later in the chapter.
Behaviorism as exemplar. Behaviorism is so effective in
advancing the empiricist perspective of technical
rationality in that it is concerned with efficiently
controlling the environment through the manipulation of
discrete (and often minute) variables. A commitment to a
behavioral perspective is presented as a commitment to
efficiency and effectiveness, but it can also express a
commitment to control, manipulation, and vulgar pragmatism
(Cherryholms, 1988).
Classic texts manifest their behavioral proclivities in
the perspective they present in several areas. Although
theories other than behavioral ones are covered to some
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extent, 42 the preponderance of space and endorsement is
afforded to the behavioral perspective. A small sampling
communicates this bias.
Gage and Berliner (1991) provide a good illustration in
their definition of "learning", "a process whereby an
organism changes behavior as a result of experience" (p.
225). They go on to state that
it is the overt behaviors of talking, writing, moving
and the like that allow us to study the cognitive
behaviors that interest us - thinking, feeling,
wanting, remembering ••.• The overt behaviors of the
organism - pigeon or school-age child, dog or teacher
are always our starting point. (p.225)
Social interactions between teacher and students are
described as "two or more people stimulating and responding
to one another" (p. 503). The handling of a category of
behavior described simply as "too much", "calls for
extinction or punishment" (p. 511); behavior of the "too
little" variety "calls for reinforcement, which strengthens
behavior" (p. 512).
Personality is described as "a concept derived from
behavior. We see only behavior. But we create names 43 for
that behavior to talk about the different kinds of behavior

42

Most textbooks prepared for introductory courses do try
to present a review of the various perspectives in the field.
The bias of the author/s is sometimes stated explicitedly,
i.e.,
Sprinthall
and
Sprinthall
(1990)
present
"a
developmental approach". Other textbooks have a more implicit
bias.
43

below.

The reif ication of social constructs will be addressed

128
we notice" (p. 147). Gage and Berliner (1991) go on to
explain that "we need to emphasize more that behavior is
controlled, to a large degree, by the way rewards and
punishments occur in the environment" (p. 148).
In the discussion of "motivation" the authors explain
that their text explores "the operant-conditioning approach
to the understanding and improvement. This approach
concentrates on the environment - particularly the
reinforcement contingencies in the environment" (p. 327).
Despite a reliance on behaviorist psychology, Skinner is
mentioned only in citations in Gage and Berliner (1991). The
knowledge claims and practices of this perspective appear
ahistorical or transhistorical with no mention of the social
or political context that influenced its popularity in the
40's and 50's in the United States. The role of teacher as
"social engineer", which characterizes Skinner's theoretical
perspective (Sprinthall & Sprinthall, 1990), might be
unpalatable to teachers yet that is the implication of the
behavioral approach. Although teachers should be able to
evaluate and question theories, this is difficult to do
because of the assumption of neutrality and objectivity, the
authoritative tenor of the text, the limiting of questions,
and the emphasis on problem-solving.
The Question of Texts as Neutral and Value-Free
Giroux (1981) comments that generally, values aredismissed as inappropriate for discussion from a perspective
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of technical rationality. Questions of value must be
eschewed within a technocratic worldview as values are
thought to weaken the scientific process. Giroux (1981)
explains:
Information or 'data' taken from the subjective world
of intuition, insight, philosophy and nonscientific
theoretical frameworks is not acknowledged as being
relevant. Values, then, appear as the nemeses of
'facts', and are viewed at best, as interesting, and at
worst, as irrational and subjective emotional
responses. (p. 44)
Although classic texts claim a stance of value-free
neutrality they can be read as expressing very clear values,
i.e., the values of the dominant culture. These values are
presented as normative and natural. Value statements appear
so frequently that their authors subvert their own claim
(Cherryholms, 1988) to neutrality. Two examples are
discussed below.
Cost-effectiveness as value. Values are revealed in
what is included and what is excluded from texts, and the
type of rhetoric connected with issues. For example, Gage
and Berliner (1991) expound on the effectiveness of small
class size and cite studies supporting this assertion. They
proceed to add another value factor, cost-effectiveness, to
the discussion. They conclude: "Knowing that smaller classes
are more effective and creating them are two different
things. A major problem is cost" (p. 502). They report that
it would cost $34.5 million to reduce class size by one,
from 30 to 29. Readers are presented with the conclusion

130
that "reducing class size at all grade levels from 30 to 15,
to obtain substantial improvement in education, would
increase the cost even more" {p. 502). The unreported
message is that this cost is more than "we" would want to
pay. This position displays a stark comparison to the
critique of the "savage inequalities" in funding educational
resources exposed by Kozel (1991). It also assigns costeffectiveness as a premier value in education, over quality
and equality. This value-laden assertion ignores the
political issues related to the fact that some school
districts can and some cannot "afford" small class size. In
accepting as a matter of course that small class size is
just not "feasible" inequality becomes "naturalized". The
issue of how discourse can naturalize situations and
qualities will be returned to later in the chapter.
Differential treatment of students. Another example of
values being very much an aspect of purportedly neutral
texts is obvious in the discourse expressing the
differential treatment of students. It is the discourse of
scientifically solving problems, so characteristic of
technical rationality, that allows discussions like the
following to be viewed as acceptable within "neutral"
discourses.
Woolfolk {1995), for example, presents a discussion of
between-class ability grouping as a way to make teaching
"more appropriate for students" (emphasis added, p. 118).
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However, the text states that there are several "problems"
with the practice of ability grouping. Problems include:
Lower ability classes seem to receive lower-quality
instruction in general. Teachers tend to focus on
lower-level objectives and routine procedures. There
are more management problems. Teacher enthusiasm and
enjoyment are less in the lower-ability classes .•..
[therefore] lower expectations are communicated to
students. student self-esteem suffers almost as soon as
the assignment to 'dummy' English or math is made.
Attendance may drop along with self-esteem. The lowertracks often have a disproportionate number of
minority-group and economically disadvantaged students,
so ability grouping, in effect, becomes resegregation
in school. (pp. 118-119)
The problems connected with ability grouping are attributed
to "difference in instruction and/or the teachers' negative
attitudes" (p. 119). These problems are attributed to
technical difficulties. Even with the listing of problems of
such a profound nature, the practice of ability grouping
itself is represented as neutral and remains unproblematic.
The real violence done to students seems invisible or
trivialized as this method of instruction is conceptualized
as more appropriate.
The importance of this issue is further minimized by
lack of attention (it takes a single paragraph to report
these negative effects) in examining the consequences of
this grouping on students' daily lived experience of
schooling. The complexities of the social struggles that
produced the current configuration of practices and how
these practices fit relations of ruling in the wider society
(Rizvi, 1993) remains obscured.
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Only if the instructor chooses to present the
information in the background section located in the margins
and printed in light blue (available only in the teacher's
edition), is the educational psychology class offered a
brief summary of a well known and important research
program, Keeping Track: How Schools structure Ineguality.
Originally published in 1985 by Jeannie Oakes 44 , this
research discusses the deleterious effects of abilitygrouping and tracking, and, more importantly, places the
issue within its historical and social context.
Gage and Berliner (1991) address the issue of ability
grouping in a section titled "Coping with Individual
Differences" (emphasis added, p. 449). The situation of
individual differences among students is reported to have
"complicated" the teacher's task (Gage & Berliner, 1991).
The discourse presents certain individual differences as a
"problem" to students of educational psychology, something
that will need coping with and an issue that will complicate
their life as a teacher.
Again, a technical solution to the "problem" of
individual differences is presented, and it is based on the

44

This work (Oakes, 1985) is itself problematic in that
it uncritically theorizes from within a social reproductionist
framework (see the discussion in Giroux & McLaren, 1988);
still, it has the potential of opening the debate regarding
tracking. The example is presented here to illustrate how
research that voices objections to mainstream perspectives can
be marginalized and/or used in unintended ways, yet at the
same time included in the text.
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assumption of innate ability: "to set each student to work
on tasks appropriate to his or her particular abilities and
interests .••. appropriate to the student's temperament .... to
move each individual ahead at his or her own rate" (pp. 449450). Ability-grouping is presented as a step toward
individualized instruction. The idea behind this method of
instruction is that "teaching is more effective with
students of similar ability" (emphasis added, p. 450); yet,
it is noted that conflicting results have been reported
regarding "achievement, self-concept, attitudes toward
others, and behavior" (p. 450) in employing this teaching
strategy.
Gage and Berliner (1991) refer to the findings of the
Oakes (1985) research (mentioned above). The text states in
reference to this study that "ability grouping has been
suspected, and often found guilty, of fostering social-class
discrimination: Lower-income students wind up in one group;
higher-income students in another" (p. 450). The assignment
to low-track is even characterized as a "life sentence"
(Gage & Berliner, 1991). Yet again, the procedure of
ability-grouping of students itself remains unproblematic;
it is characterized as a "plausible" way of coping "with
individual differences in stable characteristics •.• ([e.g.,]
scholastic abilities, interests)" (emphasis original, p.
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450). 45 How is it that the discourse can reconcile this

admission of negative effects as more effective?
Contrastingly, another group of students receives quite
a different presentation:
Gifted and talented students contribute greatly to
society and should be considered a precious human
resource. Our investment in identifying and developing
these students should at least rival - in interest,
time, and money - the investment we make in gifted
athletes. (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 217)
Woolfolk (1995), like Gage and Berliner (1991), asserts the
importance of providing for the special educational needs of
"gifted" children". The characterization of gifted
students by a former secretary of education as "our most
neglected students" is repeated. Gifted programs formulate
yet another "track" allocated for students who "contribute
greatly to society and should be considered a precious human
resource" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 217). These "remarkable
individuals" (Woolfolk, 1995) are represented as a scarce
commodity which must be developed for our national security
and well-being (Sapon-Shevin, 1991).
Through the discourse of educational psychology such
differential treatment and valuing of children is authorized
Gage and Berliner (1991) provide research studies that
they interpret as meaning: "for most people intelligence
begins to be stable by age 7. By age 12, intelligence is very
stable. The rank order of individuals in intelligence at age
12 is much the same as their rank order at any subsequent age"
45

( p. 58) •

"See Sapon-Shevin (1993) for a critical analysis of the
educational, political, and justice issues in which the
category "gifted student" is embedded.
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and perpetuated despite conflicting scientific results:
i.e., ability- grouping does not work (Slavin, 1987), is not
fair (Oakes, 1985), and is undemocratic (Giroux & McLaren,
1988). Yet, the practice of ability grouping continues to
appear reasonable and is accepted as tolerable from within
the meaning-making system of the discipline. General
acceptance of this practice as a commonsense way to organize
schooling experiences is achieved through the work of the
discourse.
The discourse must construct the situation in such a
way that the semblance of neutrality and meritocracy is
upheld. 47 This understanding is promoted by assigning
children to ability groups on the basis of the assumption of
the biological reality

48

of innate ability, i.e.,

"intelligence""· Since innate ability can be determined
through the use of "neutral" standardized tests the social
stratification that results from this differential access to
curriculums appears efficient, reasonable, and becomes
"naturalized". The historical, social, and political

47

Deevers (1995) has made the point of the necessity of
turning to an examination of the discourse in order to
understand why tracking procedures persist despite their
harmful effects to students.
See Haymes ( 1996) for a helpful discussion of how
psychology and biology are conflated so that regressive social
cognitions can be perpetuated.
48

Intelligence" as a social construct that has been
reified, and thus treated as an entity that exists a priori,
is discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter v.
4911
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contexts in which students' access to curriculums is sorted
and selected is cast as scientific and value-free.
An uncritical reading of the dominant discourse

contained in classic texts does not engage the complexity of
meaning or examine the value-laden aspects of issues that
are seen, at first glance, as "neutral" and acceptable.
In contrast to the traditional understanding of the
discipline's discourse as a neutral body of information a
critical reading presents the discourse of educational
psychology as a site of struggle. Meanings in the discourse
can be contested and struggled over, and they are. Yet, the
dominant discourse prevails. To more fully understand why
the discourse exists as it does it is necessary to look
beyond disciplinary principles to the "effects of power
[that] shape a discursive practice" (Cherryholms, 1988, p.
59). The effects of power are infused in the non-discursive
background practices, that precede the text and talk of
educational psychology. They are the human, social,
institutional activities that make the discipline possible
in the first place (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). These nondiscursive practices are presented in the remainder of the
chapter.
Non-Discursive Practices of Educational Psychology
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by
virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces
regular effects of power. Each society has its regime
of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the
types of discourse it accepts and makes function as
true ..• (Foucault, 1980c, p. 131)
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Understanding the discipline of educational psychology
as a "regime of truth" contrasts the view of the discourse
of the discipline as a neutral body of scientifically
validated knowledge. In discussing the discourse as a
"regime of truth" it is important to foreground and
interrogate those social, political, economic, and
institutional networks in which the discipline is embedded.
Discussions need to be taken up concerning: (1) the
relationship of power and knowledge; (2) the social
construction of knowledge; (3) the impossibility of
neutrality of knowledge; (4) the division of labor in
knowledge production highlighting a power hierarchy
regarding who controls knowledge production and whose
meanings are legitimated.
Power/Knowledge
Understanding that "knowledge is power" is very
different from within a traditional perspective of
educational psychology and what Foucault means in the quote
above. The traditional contention is that the development of
the knowledge of the discipline (i.e., the discipline's
"truth") has given educational psychologists power. The
relationship is understood as causal: knowledge causes
power. The "direct scientific underpinnings •••• the knowledge
base consisting of facts, concepts, and technology"
(Berliner, 1987, p. xvii) give educational psychologists
power. Power follows from the technical knowledge of the
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discipline.
For Foucault (1977/1995) the relationship of power and
knowledge is correlational:
... power and knowledge directly imply one another: ..•
there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same
time power relations. (p. 27)
Foucault, therefore, always refers to power and knowledge
together, i.e., power/knowledge, a "solidus [suggesting]
that for his purposes power and knowledge are not to be
studied separately" (Sarup, 1996, p. 72). They are "immanent
in one another, each a condition for the possibility of the
other" (Usher & Edwards 1994, p. 87).
Power relations pervade the knowledge-making activity,
affecting the one who knows, that which is known, and the
mode and practice of knowing (Foucault, 1977/1995). The
implication of this relationship of power/knowledge for the
human sciences is that the "truth" expressed by the
discipline is both produced and confined by the power
relationships of the discipline. In other words, "truth" is
what the discipline says is "truth". As Usher and Edwards
(1994) point out, knowledge "does not simply represent the
truth of what is, but, rather, constitutes what is taken to
be true ••.. it's what counts as true that is important"
(emphasis added, p. 87).
Aronowitz (1988) pushes this power/knowledge dynamic a
step farther in insisting that: "The power of science
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consists, in the first place, in its conflation of knowledge
and truth" (p. vii). 50 The truth that is being produced by
the specific scientific manipulations of the discipline is a
specialized knowledge that has been conflated with truth.
When the understanding of how power and knowledge
implicate each other is recognized a radically different
perception of knowledge follows. What counts as knowledge is
considered the "truth" of the discipline. However, this
truth is also understood as the product of social activity
imbued with power relations. There is always a political
struggle over knowledge, and it is not something that
resides solely in the realm of ideas. Rather it is a matter
of mechanisms of power which are prior to discourse and
often unspoken. These mechanisms decide who may speak, when,
and what may be said; this is a "general politics of truth"
(Foucault, 1980, p. 131) that pervades the discipline. Thus,
the knowledge of any discipline can never be received as
neutral; it is always situated, contingent, and partial and
the result of social struggle.
The Social Construction of Knowledge
The way the world is known and explained is the result
of "historically situated interchanges among people"
50

Perspectives outside the discipline do provide helpful
segues into such questions through their models of critique.
Feminist intellectuals were among the first to expose the
power dimensions in science (Gergen, 1985). Several of these
significant scholars were presented in Chapter II. Critical
educational theorists also insist that the implication of
power/knowledge be interrogated.
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(Gergen, 1985, p. 267). This pertains to scientific
knowledge. Scarr (1985) insists that "[w]e should not be
disturbed that science is constructed knowledge. Rather, the
recognition of our own role in scientific knowledge should
make more modest our claim to truth" (p. 500). Yet, those
who do science have consistently failed to examine the
social practice of producing knowledge and the historical,
economic, and political context which give it meaning in the
first place (Giroux, 1981; Usher & Edwards, 1994). It seems
as though at times educational psychologists have forgotten
that they have "invented the knowledge they apply •..• they do
not discover, they invent" (Caputo & Yount, 1993, p. 7).
The dominant discourse contained in classic texts may
not be recognize by the mainstream educational psychology
community as being socially constructed. A textual style of
narrative realism and the appearance of consensus lend the
discourse the ambience of objective knowledge.
Narrative realism. Textbooks are usually written
through a textual strategy of narrative realism (Usher &
Edwards, 1994) that accentuates the "reporting of already
existing ready-made reality" (p. 150). Using this genre the
text is understood as a "neutral medium for conveying preexisting facts about the world •••• [its] neutrality exempts
it from consideration as a species of social/cultural
activity (Woolgar, 1991, p. 28, quoted in Usher & Edwards,
1994). This strategy also allows the text to appear as an
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authoritarian source of what the discursive community
considers the truth of the discipline (Kuhn, 1970). Rizvi
(1993) describes this as a type of "rhetorical appeal that
is by its very nature uncritical" (p. 137).
Narrative realism is effected frequently by statements
made in a matter-of-fact style. Gage and Berliner (1991),
for example, state "It became possible during the twentieth
century to measure individual differences in intelligence"
(p. 50). This simple statement masks the historical and
political context and struggle in which the statement is
made (see, for example, Gould, 1981; Mensh & Mensh, 1991).
Ambience of consensus. The argument might be made that
there is some evidence in the mainstream discourse that the
knowledge of the discipline is recognized as the result of
negotiated understandings within the educational psychology
community. This is because the pronoun "we" is used
throughout both textbooks. For example, Gage and Berliner
(1991) explain that:
A concept is the organized information we have
(emphasis added) about an entity •••• The meaning,
boundaries, and relationships connected with a concept
are derived from everything we know (emphasis added)
about that concept •... What we mean (emphasis added) by
a concept is partly a matter of definition and partly a
matter of the methods of studying the concept •••• for
example, the meaning of the concept of intelligence
depends in part how we define (emphasis added)
intelligence (emphasis original). (p. 12-13)
The "we" of this discussion could be ref erring to the
educational psychology community, Gage and Berliner being
"author-ized" (Usher & Edwards, 1994) to speak in its name.
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However, it is more likely that it is the editorial "we"
that is reflected here and throughout the text. This makes
it difficult to know to whom the text is referring. Contrary
to Gage and Berliner's assertion, there is not universal
agreement among educational psychologists about a construct
as complex and politically charged as "intelligence"fil let
alone other educationalists or the general public. Yet,
their use of the pronoun "we" builds the impression that
there is universal agreement. Apple (1993) remarks "the very
use of the pronoun 'we' simplifies matters all too much" (p.
49).
The continual use of "we" serves to create the
illusion of consensus around an "objective" discourse of
educational psychology. There is an attempt to build what
Rizvi (1993) calls a "collective phenomenon". Van Dijk
(1993b) points out that consensus building is a major
function of any dominant discourse. In a climate of
consensus acceptance and legitimacy of knowledge allows a
particular discourse to dominate and achieve hegemonic
control.
51

A complete
critique
of
how
the
construct
of
"intelligence" is developed in the mainstream discourse is
important yet beyond the scope of this dissertation. Many of
the arguments regarding intelligence (i.e., able to be
expressed as a single trait or "g", highly heritable, fixed,
individuals can be ranked numerically) support the material in
The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994), including a
defense of the fraudulent research practices of Cyril Burt.
For a critique applicable to both texts see Fraser, · 1995;
Gould, 1981, 1995; Kincheloe, Steinberg, and Gresson, 1996;
and Mensh & Mensh, 1991.
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Textbooks and the discourse they support need to be
understood as important artifacts of culture (Gergen, 1985)
that "signify through their content and form, particular
constructions of reality, particular ways of selecting and
organizing the vast universe of possible knowledge"
(emphasis added, Apple, 1993, p. 49). At any time there are
competing discourses, competing paradigms (Kuhn, 1970), and
their respective proponents can be imagined as "practic[ing]
their trades in different worlds ••.. [they] see different
things when they look at the same point in the same
direction" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 150).
Gage and Berliner (1991), for example, recognize that
deliberations related to the construct of intelligence are
connected with "different social and political ideologies"
(p. 51). They are clear in presenting the definition that
they support, characterized as "traditional", i.e.,
"Intelligence= what tests measure" (p. 51). Readers are
told that this definition stems from "the intellectual
tradition of the developed nations" (p. 53). Gage and
Berliner (1991) explain that this tradition is
only one approach to human learning and instruction namely, that appropriate to a middle-class segment of
an industrialized society in which learning takes place
in a certain kind of classroom in an institution called
school. If our society were different .•• we would
probably have to redefine intelligence. (emphasis
added, p. 53)
Even while both texts acknowledge that there is no agreement
on what intelligence really is (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p.
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52; Woolfolk, 1995, p. 114), their perspective on
intelligence is utilized as the standard perspective. 52
This traditional psychometric perspective is privileged as
it is presented as neutral, normative, and unproblematic.
There seems to be no recognition of the psychometric
perspective's alignment with any social and political
ideology through which students are included, excluded, or
marginalized in schools and in society on the basis of such
measurements.
In summary, although there is a growing acceptance of
knowledge as a social construction (e.g., Gergen 1985;
Kincheloe, 1993; Scarr, 1985) it is questionable whether
traditionally educational psychologists have recognized the
knowledge claims of the discipline as socially constructed.
The genre of narrative realism generates the appearance of
consensus and neutrality in textbooks. These can be
considered a "pre-text" (Usher & Edwards, 1994) that needs
to be interrogated and subverted as there is a "hidden
politics of neutrality" (Kincheloe, 1993, p. 42). It is the
impossibility of neutrality of knowledge that is discussed
next.
The Impossibility of the Neutrality of Knowledge
The claim of neutrality of knowledge needs to be

52

For example, both texts present
"multiple intelligences" and Sternberg's
theory.

Gardner's ,( 1983)
{1990) "triarchic
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problematized. 53 Neutrality can be used as a "cloak"
(Bleier, 1986; Namewirth, 1986) covering scientific
research. As long as knowledge is considered neutral it can
claim a place separate from human interests, biases, and
power.
That knowledge can never be neutral is an assertion
that crosses disciplinary lines and epistemological stances.
Those who offer a feminist critique of science (e.g.,
Bleier, 1987; Harding, 1991; Hubbard, 1989; Namenwirth,
1986) join critical educational theorists (e.g., Apple,
1993; Freire, 1970; Giroux, 1981, 1983; Kincheloe, 1993;
McLaren, 1989), and feminist poststructuralists (Luke &
Gore, 1992) in this assertion. McLaren (1989), for example,
challenges traditional ideas regarding the neutrality of
knowledge:
Knowledge acquired in school - or anywhere, for that
matter - is never neutral or objective but is ordered
and structured in particular ways; its emphasis and
exclusions partake of a silent logic. Knowledge is a
social construction (emphasis original) deeply rooted
in a nexus of power relations. (p. 169)
Yet, the claim of "neutrality" is a strong and
important condition for the human sciences. It is the
representation of the knowledge of a discipline as neutral
and objective that facilitates an assumption of certainty
and generalizability. In this way the knowledge of

53

Caputo and Yount (1993) reminds us of Foucault's notion
of the problematic, i.e., developing something that is
accepted, a "given", into a question.
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educational psychology is able to function as a foundation
on which to base practice or as a resource which informs
practice. But, as Giroux (1981) explains, that view of
knowledge
not only undermines reflective thinking, it does this
and more. It is also a form of legitimation that
obscures the relationship between "valued" knowledge
and the constellation of economic, political, and
social interests that such knowledge supports. (p. 53)
When the acceptance of the neutrality of knowledge is
subverted a whole new discernment is required. If knowledge
cannot be accepted as neutral a demand follows to know more
about the political implications that permeate it. New
questions surf ace concerning whose interests does the
knowledge serve? Whose experience is legitimated or
marginalized? Who profits through this knowledge?
Many critical educational theorists have written
persuasively on this subject. Banks (1993) has explained
that "knowledge that people create is heavily influenced by
their interpretations of their experiences and their
positions within particular social, economic, and political
systems and structures of a society" (p. 5). Apple (1993)
asserts that "what counts as legitimate knowledge is the
result of complex power struggles among class, race, gender,
religious groups" (p. 46). It is not of question of what
knowledge is of most worth, rather it is whose knowledge
(Apple, 1993, 1996) is privileged and made to appear
"natural", "normal".
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The question of "whose" knowledge is normative is
addressed by Alison Dewar (1987). She explains succinctly:
The knowledge we teach in our educational system has a
white, middle class, androcentric bias. More
importantly, this bias is not presented as one possible
version of reality, but more often is taught as the
only, legitimate and therefore, representative version
of reality. (p. 265, quoted in Lewis, 1992, p. 42)
This white, middle class, androcentric knowledge is the
knowledge that counts (Sleeter & Grant, 1994), and this is
the knowledge that "provides formal justification for and
legitimation of prevailing institutional arrangements"
(Anyon, 1978, p.40, quoted in Giroux, 1981, p. 53).
Generally this is the knowledge found in textbooks 54
(Banks, 1993; Van Dijk, 1993a).
It is possible to discern whose knowledge gets
privileged in the dominant discourse of educational
psychology. There are a plethora of examples in educational
psychology's mainstream discourse. One example is obvious,
again using the psychometric understanding of intelligence.
Gage and Berliner (1991) admit that
A society will always have a problem testing the
intelligence of minority-group members because, by
definition, they do not belong in important ways to the
majority culture that usually develops the tests. (p.
54)
In the very next sentence these authors state simply: "We
measure intelligence with tests" (Gage & Berliner, 1991, p.
55). Later in the chapter Gage and Berliner (1991) state
54

Poli tical, social, economic constraints
production are discussed in Chapter III.

of

textbook

148
that "Because minority-group and poor children less often do
well on these tests, their parents have a right to worry
about how the information from the tests are used" (p. 74).
Indeed, assignment to a "slow group early on can be like a
life sentence with no likelihood of parole (emphasis added)"
(p. 74). Children who belong to minority groups and the poor
are essentialized in these groups and seem almost alien
(Rizvi, 1993). This kind of representation also presents the
dominant group as homogenized. There is a clear admission
that this normative practice of the discipline (i.e.,
psychometric testing) benefits those in the dominant
culture.
This situation is naturalized by being represented as
"the way things are", (note Gage and Berliner's (1991)
assertion: "A society will always have a problem testing
certain groups of children"). The assumption is that it
could not be otherwise (Rizvi, 1993). Thus, this purportedly
neutral discourse functions to sustain the power relations
of the status quo. More importantly, it trivializes the
violence done to children (e.g., calling it a life
sentence). What Sharon Welch (1985) says of traditional
theology applies to mainstream educational psychology, i.e.,
"it has tended to leave the concrete reality of oppression
and destruction unchallenged" (p.

28).~

~r do not want to give the impression that there is a
lack of resistance to the dominance of mainstream ideology.
There is great resistance. There are regular interrogations by
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The Division of Labor in Knowledge Production
Implied in the above discussion is the existence of a
hierarchy of power (Van Dijk, 1993b) in the production of
the knowledge of the discipline. There are some who speak
with authority; they are "author-ized" to speak, while
others must listen (Usher & Edwards. 1994). Van Dijk (1993b)
refers to the former group as the "power elites" who have
"special access to discourse; they are literally the ones
who have the most to say" (p. 255). The elites of the
discourse have a particular social power.
Social power could be understood as involving control
of one group over others regarding acts (limiting freedom)
or cognition (how people think) (Van Dijk, 1993). The social
power referred to here is primarily concerned with the
cognitive aspects of power that involves knowledge
production, or "managing the minds of others ••• a function of
text and talk" (Van Dijk, 1993b, p. 254). Although the idea
of "managing minds" may be startling it is the latent
purpose of the dominant discourse of educational psychology.
The dominant discourse is aimed at initiating novices into a
particular meaning system, i.e., "facts, concepts,
principles, and research methods that will be both
theoretically enlightening and practically useful" (Gage &
Berliner, 1991, p. xvii).

critical educational theorists and local resistances as well.
The mainstream discourse, however is unyielding to change.
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"Meanings" and hegemonic discourses. Those who are
considered authorities purport to clarify meaning. Meanings
that are accepted generally are understood as social
cognitions (Van Dijk, 1993). These social cognitions
influence "beliefs, understandings, attitudes, ideologies,
norms and values" (Van Dijk, 1993, p 257). Clearly, classic
textbooks take this as a goal, i.e., reproducing social
cognitions by supplying meanings and definitions for various
concepts.
Teachers of educational psychology may accept their
task as "transmitting" (Freire, 1970/1992; Macedo, 1994) the
meaning of the discourse to students. students are, in a
sense, positioned as receivers of knowledge, "consumers" of
the dominant discourse presented in textbooks. Of course,
the teaching-learning process is more complex than simply
determined by the reproductive metaphor. On the one hand,
students of educational psychology are active participants
in their own learning, and their learning could never be
determined by these texts. However, on the other hand, the
rationality of the dominant discourse does steer them in the
direction of particular interpretations.
As the discussion on narrative realism pointed out
meanings in textbooks often appear to be fixed; they are
presented as objective and static. "Textual" features are
used to reinforce these meanings. The Gage and Berliner
(1991) text supplies a glossary "providing brief definitions
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of key terms appears at the end of the text" (p. xx) and
marginal notes "highlighting important points .•. in the
margins of each page •.. quick guides to key ideas and

.
issues
... " (p. xix). Woolfolk (1995) furnishes readers with
a margin glossary that "defines terms of the text to provide
easy access (emphasis added) to the terms and their relevant
examples as the student studies" (p. IS-ix).
A poststructuralist analysis makes the idea of meanings
as fixed problematic. What is necessary is recognizing how
power infiltrates language (Cherryholms, 1988) constructing
social cognitions. Cherryholms insists
Culturally sanctioned, positive, and authoritative
knowledge is incomplete, interest-bound, tied up with
existing power arrangements, and cloaked in certainty.
As the illusion of certainty is dispelled, it becomes
possible to uncover the origins and commitments of our
structures and the effects of power that led to their
production. (p. 70)
Modern textbooks bear the effects of power and
represent a privileged view of the material they present.
The school knowledge they contain "reveals which groups have
power •••• [and] which groups are not empowered by the
economic and social patterns in the society" (Anyon, 1983,
p. 49). These become obvious in omissions, stereotypes, and
distortions that are found even in updated versions of
textbooks (Anyon, 1983). Consider the following examples of
stereotypes regarding American Indian cultures:
Some place high value on the skills required in
weaving. Some of them depend on spearfishing for much
of their food. If industrial society valued these
skills in the same way, our educational system would
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focus on them and our definition of intelligence would
give them greater importance. (Gage & Berliner, 1991,
p. 53-54)
At least two assumptions in this statement are problematic;
one is that all members of given groups "share the same
cultural and behavioral patterns" (Sleeter & Grant, 1993, p.
76). This refers not only to the minority groups, but the
assumption pertains to the dominant groups as well. Another
implication is that the minority group is deficient in
comparison to the dominant culture. Both assumptions though
erroneous serve to reinforce stereotypes, perpetuate social
cognitions, and disguise oppression or power relations.
Meanings attributed to "race" are especially noxious
and significant. Gage and Berliner (1991) note that "race"
"typically should refer solely to such psychologically
unimportant characteristics as skin color, eye shape, and
facial configurations" (p. 79). Woolfolk (1995) defines
"race" as: "A group of people who share common biological
traits that are seen as self-defining by the people of the
group" (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 165).
The essentializing of race as a stable and biological
characteristic persists in both texts although this
representation is generally considered anachronistic within
the scientific community (Harding, 1996). It continues to be
used in some discourse communities despite the fact that all
scientific attempts to show any biological definition have
been exposed as untenable (Hall, 1996). The reason this
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representation persists is because it serves a discursive
function as it codes race as fixed (Harding, 1996; Hall,
1996). This has a naturalizing effect as it constitutes
social, cultural, political differences among people as if
they function according to the logic of nature (Hall, 1996).
Through a professed "disinterest" in "race" the
understanding of meritocracy that is based on individual
merit, hard work, and achievement (Haymes, 1996) can be
preserved.
How is it that stereotypes and incorrect information
continue to be presented in current textbooks? The
possibility of the effects of power relations must be
considered. Some individuals may dominate a field, not
because of their arguments but "because of their positional
authority" (Cherryholms, 1988, p. 89). What is important to
recognize is that often those considered the "elites" of the
discourse (van Dijk, 1993b} may "enact, sustain, legitimate,
condone, or ignore social inequality or injustice" (van
Dijk, 1993, p. 252) supported by the official knowledge of
the discipline. Thus, knowledge in a dominant discourse
needs to be interrogated as the "property of an elite
establishment working to maintain its power" (Usher &
Edwards, 1994, p. 198). When this is understood it
facilitates a critical position in both teachers and
students.
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Summary
The work of this chapter focused on beginning an
interrogation of the dominant discourse of the discipline of
educational psychology using two classic textbooks. The
first part of the chapter discussed disciplinary principles
understood in terms of technical rationality. These
principles, although supplying a grounding of the
discipline, are rarely examined. In addition to providing a
resource, they constrain the discipline and, therefore, are
problematic and need to be interrogated. The remaining
portion of the chapter considered the non-discursive aspects
of the discipline that include the social and political
contingencies in which the discipline is embedded.
This discussion is important not solely on the level of
ideas. The meaning-making system and power relations of the
discipline are important because they affect the everyday
discursive practices of schooling and the material
conditions of children's lives. These practices are the
focus of Chapter V.

CHAPTER V
DISCIPLINING THE DISCIPLINE
Introduction
This chapter 56 takes as its focus an examination of
the practices sanctioned by educational psychology's
dominant discourse and the effects of these practices. The
discussion of Chapter IV regarding the disciplinary
principles and the non-discursive power/knowledge
relationships of the discipline facilitates the turn to this
focus. This turn is imperative as the ideas generated by the
meaning-making structure evident in the discursive
principles of educational psychology "gain strength and are
a form of power [because] ••• they take concrete shape in the
actions of our daily lives" (Freire & Faundez, 1992, p. 26).
The argument presented in this chapter is that the
mainstream discourse of the discipline relies on and
perpetuates a static and mechanistic view of the world
(Freire, 1970/1992). Through a process of education, often
well-intentioned, students are "socialized" so as to adapt
to this world. Students are judged, labeled, sorted, and
~The sense of the word "disciplining" in the chapter
title was inspired by the title of Jana Sawicki's (1991) book,
Disciplining Foucault. It is used here to highlight a major
focus of the chapter, that is, to subject the discipline to
scrutiny.
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selected according to how well they adapt. They are
frequently viewed as "abstract, isolated, independent, and
unattached to the world" (Freire, 1970/1992, p. 69), thus,
made "objects" of a system of domination. Through its
knowledge base and practices the discipline claims to
explain characteristics of the student and the teacher; the
assertion of the discipline is "to know those objects
truthfully ..•• [by their] 'natural characteristics" (Usher,
1993, p. 18).
Using the perspective of Foucault a different view is
proposed. Foucault is skeptical regarding modern disciplines
especially those connected with education (Ball, 1990).
Foucault's contention is that knowledge of the modern
disciplines is organized around the power to define and name
others (Sarup, 1993); especially to define persons as normal
and as abnormal. Human beings are formed and made subjects
of the society through the process of normalization. 57 The
knowledge and the practices of the human sciences are
central to this process because through their specific
knowledge-claims and practices human beings are formed and
constituted. These specialized knowledges produce a new

57

Foucault wants to disrupt the commonsense positive idea
usually attributed to socialization. His explanation of
normalization is akin to Freire's idea of education's naming
and positioning learners as "object".
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subject, a subject 58 of a particular kind (Marshall, 1990),
i.e., subjects who are docile and useful. Foucault's
contention is that every modern discipline is "a general
formula of domination" (1995, p. 137). Thus, the knowledge
of modern discipline "ceases to be a liberation and becomes
a mode of surveillance, regulation, discipline" (Sarup,
1993, p. 67). The specific disciplinary practices derived
from the knowledge claims of educational psychology are
implicated and inter-related in the processes whereby
societies control and discipline their populations (Philip,
1985).
I begin this chapter by taking up Foucault's idea of
the meaning of the human sciences as "disciplines". The
contemporary understanding is tied to the former meaning of
discipline, i.e., it is concerned with the control of
bodies. The understanding of "trope" helps illuminate this
connection. Next, the formation of the discipline is
presented. The discussion begins with Foucault's concept of
genealogy through which he explicates how every historical
era has sought control over populations; changing only the
strategies through which control is achieved. The human
sciences are the current means through which control is
gained. Next, three disciplinary technologies are presented

While Freire ( 1972) refers to "objects" Foucault _( 1995)
refers to "subjects" of a "particular kind", i.e., docile and
useful. There is irony here in that both words can convey
similar meaning.
58
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that Foucault suggests form the basis of the disciplinary
practice, i.e., hierarchical observation, normalizing
judgement, and examination. These disciplinary practices are
utilized by disciplines to normalize students and are
located in the everyday activities of school life. Finally,
I use these disciplinary technologies to inform my critical
reading of the dominant discourse of educational psychology
expressed in two classic textbooks.
A thorough examination of these various points is
important in order to render visible what has been takenf or-granted, i.e., to make the familiar strange (Foucault,
1977/1995). The presentation of the everyday practices can
and must be looked at differently because "as soon as one
can no longer think things as one formerly thought them,
transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and
quite possible" (Foucault, 1988, quoted in Dales, 1992, p.
83) •

Discipline: Control of Bodies
"Discipline" as Trope
One meaning of "discipline" was taken up in Chapter IV.
"Disciplines" were discussed as they are usually considered,
i.e., "neutral, scientifically validated bodies of knowledge
whose only effects are enlightening and empowering and which
thus enable effective action" (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p.
48). However, this chapter takes up a different meaning of
discipline. The word "discipline" can be understood more
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fully through a consideration of "trope". Tropes are words
where new meanings contain residues of former uses of the
word; new meanings are understandable in connection to the
original sense of the word (Briscoe, 1993). Tropes help us
notice what could have been missed without their
recognition; they make us swerve (Haraway, 1996) and see
things differently.
In thinking about "discipline" as a trope it is helpful
to consider its various lexical meanings:
1. Training expected to produce a specific pattern of
behavior •... 2. Controlled behavior resulting from
disciplinary training. 3. A systematic method to obtain
obedience. 4. A state of order based on submission to
rules and authority. 5. Punishment intended to train or
correct. 6. A set of methods or rules [that regulate]
practice .••• 7. A branch of knowledge or of teaching.
(Soukhanov, 1984, p. 383)
It is not until the sixth and seventh meanings that a match
is found for our commonsense understanding of the word
"discipline" used in the context of a body of knowledge.
Educational psychology, for example, as a discipline and
branch of psychology includes laws and principles, theory,
and practice aimed at improving teaching and learning.
However, recognizing discipline as trope helps one to
appreciate Foucault's meaning of disciplinary power; it is
important to see the connection with the other meanings
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listed for the word

"discipline".~

The discipline, the

human science of educational psychology, is connected with
managing and controlling the bodies of students, i.e.,
behavior. The recognition of the dynamic relationship among
power, knowledge of the discipline, and the control of
bodies is necessary to understanding the practices of the
discipline.
Disciplines and Bio-Power
In Discipline and Punish Foucault {1977/1995) connects
the control of the body and the growth of the scientific
knowledge of disciplines since the seventeenth century.
Foucault studies the spread of "disciplinary mechanisms ..•
[as] techniques through which modern societies train and
regulate individuals" {Sarup, 1996, p. 72). In modernity, as
the "objective" science developed so did "a radically new
regime of power/knowledge" {Fraser, 1989, p.22) through the
discipline's discourse. This shift in regimes of power from
the classical age through modern times will be discussed
later in the chapter, however, it is important to emphasize
here that the aim of the disciplinary technologies remains
the same, the control of the bodies of human persons.
Foucault explains two manifestations of power over the
59

Shumway {1989) notes that this double meaning of
"discipline" is sometimes considered as nothing more than an
elaborate pun. However, Dreyfus and Rabinow {1983) explain
that it is far from a "rhetorical convergence" as Foucault
asserts that "the very self definition of the human science as
scholarly 'disciplines' ••. is closely linked to the spread of
disciplinary technologies" (p. 160).
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body. One manifestation is "bio-power", a "modern form of
power ... characterized by increasing organization of
population and welfare for the sake of increased force and
productivity" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 7-8). Dreyfus and
Rabinow explain that bio-power is so ubiquitous that it
appears as a "strategy, with no one directing it and
everyone increasingly enmeshed in it, whose only end is the
increase of power and order itself" (p. xxvi). This modern
form of power is a control and regulation of the masses, a
kind of macro-politics. However, it did not emerge as a
coherent management process. It was preceded by Foucault's
other manifestation of power, micropolitics.
Micropolitics developed as administrators in various
institutions were faced with the daily government of large
numbers of people. The historical process of growing and
shifting populations, for example, was connected to the
formation of the disciplines (Smart, 1985). In order to
manage and control the growing number of those in their
charge "a variety of 'microtechniques' were perfected by
obscure doctors, wardens, and schoolmasters in obscure
hospitals, prisons, and schools ••.• only later were these
techniques and practices taken up and integrated" (Fraser,
1989, p. 22). In other words, specific tactics were
"invented and organized from the starting points of local
conditions and particular needs .•.• in piecemeal fashion"
(Foucault, 1980b, p.159). Only later were these procedures
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gathered to form a coherent discourse.
An example of the development of the local conditions
generating specific practices can be found in writings about
the history of educational psychology. Hilgard (1996), for
example, notes that in the later part of the 19th century
before educational theory and teacher education became
"centered in the universities, most of the adaptions of
education ••• were made by .•• school administrators" (p. 992).
To make his point Hilgard recounts the work of William
Torrey Harris (1835-1909). Harris was superintendent of the
st. Louis, Missouri school district as the Civil War was
ending, a time of increased industrialization and
immigration to the area. Hilgard (1996) explains the need
for specific procedures to manage the burgeoning numbers of
children in the schools of st. Louis:
The problems of school buildings, school management,
and teacher training loomed large as the heterogeneous
population expanded, and Harris took seriously his
efforts to provide universal education on an efficient
and effective basis. He did this by adopting the graded
school so that the curriculum could be planned
according to the movement of pupils through school,
with careful records of attendance, of ages at leaving
school, and of the progress of learning. (Hilgard,
1996, p. 992)
The specific procedures, or micropolitics, utilized by
Harris (i.e., graded classes, records of attendance and
progress of students) imposed an "order" or governmentality
on the schooling of children in a particular time and
locale. Only later would these practices and others would be
gathered and generalized into a discourse.
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Another notable example of the development of a tactic
of micropolitics is the development of the first so called
"intelligence" tests by Alfred Binet (1857-1911) and his
student Theodore Simon (1873-1961). Universal education
mandated in France in the nineteenth century meant that all
French children be given several years of public education
(Fancher, 1985). It is noted that for the first time
"retarded [sic] children [were included], who in earlier
years would have dropped out early or never attended school
at all" (Fancher, 1985, p. 69). A diagnostic tool was
thought to be needed to identify children who "could not
profit from instruction in the regular public schools in
Paris" (Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984/1996).
In 1904 Binet and Simon responded to this local need
and formulated an intelligence scale. Binet's original
intention was to "construct an instrument for classifying
unsuccessful school performers" (Mensh & Mensh, 1990, p. 23)
into different groups: idiots, imbeciles, and "debiles" or
"weak ones" (translated to "moron" in America, see Fancher,
1985). Sorting students and bringing "order" to the
educational system of the time was a function of the tests
that were developed. Gage and Berliner (1991) report that
these terms are no longer adequate or acceptable. However,
three categories are still used: "Although definitions vary
by state, many federally funded programs are designed with
three levels of mental retardation in mind ••.• severely and
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profoundly mentally retarded ••• trainable mentally
retarded .•• educable mentally retarded" (p. 209-210).
Later, the scales of Binet and Simon were appropriated
for a variety of uses in the United States. For example, the
army used variations of the test during World War I "not
primarily for the exclusion of intellectual defectives ... but
rather for the classification of men in order that they may
be properly placed in the military service" (Yerkes, quoted
in Fancher, 1985, pp. 117-118). Post-war analysis of the
results helped frame the rationale of the Immigration Act of
1924 defining immigrant groups thought suitable to become

u.

S. citizens. The testing movement is also linked to the
passage of a series of sterilization laws beginning in 1907
and declared constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1927
(Lewontin, et al., 1984/1996).
Not long after these applications educational
institutions adopted these tests as a tool for studying
individual differences in order to make "formal schooling a
successful and rewarding experience for the whole school-age
population" (emphasis added, Jensen, 1987, p. 61). According
to students' "ranking" in tests they could be sorted into
"appropriated instructional programs .•• [that] can make it
possible for the vast majority of children to attain at
least the basic scholastic skills during their years in
school" (Jensen, 1987, p. 86.). The intelligence test,
designed for specific locations, has gradually grown into a
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still burgeoning market-driven industry (Sternberg, 1992).
The point that needs to be clear is that the discourse
of the discipline of educational psychology did not emerge
self-contained and coherent. The shift in demographics led
to the need to govern growing student populations.
Gradually, the implementation of the practices of management
were established. Of particular importance were the
practices of sorting students; this was deemed necessary to
bring order to local school situations. This demographic
shift was accompanied by the shift toward industrialization
and growth of capitalism and formed a particular historical
conjuncture with an emphasis on increased production and
efficiency.
There is another historical process occurring at the
same time, referred to as a juridico-political process
(Smart, 1985). The juridico-political historical process
refers to the formal and legal structures of societies that
were established around the existing power relations of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century simultaneous to the
demographic shifts that were occurring. This process of
modern law-making took over the power of the sovereign of
pre-modern times. The juridico-political process that
developed guarded the status of the group wielding political
power. An example of this historical process can be found in
the contradiction of the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
At the same time that freedom was guaranteed to all,
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provisions recognizing and protecting slavery were also
included (Bell, 1997). Myriad examples are found in the
history of United States. 60
This is the milieu in which the growth of scientific
knowledge gains importance. The scientific historical
process refers to the increasing complex relationship
between the formation of knowledge and the exercise of
power.
The Formation of Disciplinary Practices
Genealogy
••. the goal of my work over the past twenty years ... has
been to create a history of the different modes by
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.
(Foucault, quoted in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983 p. 208)

Foucault is skeptical about the ability of human
sciences, or any totalizing discourse, to create a utopian
dream of progress. He bases his skepticism on the
"historical evidence •.. that what looks like a change for the
better may have undesirable consequences ••. " (Sawicki, 1991,
p. 27). Foucault offers the genealogy as a way to critique
totalizing discourses (Sarup, 1993; Smart, 1985). The
genealogist "is a diagnostician who concentrates on the
relations of power, knowledge, and the body in modern

6

°Foucault explains that it is possible to see how power
operates by looking at where there is resistance. To see how
power operates in a juridico-political process in U.S. history
we can look at the civil rights movement. Brown vs. the Board
of Education is a pertinent example.
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society" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 105). The genealogy
that Foucault presents is a particular history, clearly not
"history" in the usual sense. Foucault (1980c) asks us to
see a genealogy as a
kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledge from
that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of
opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a
theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse.
(p. 85)
Sawicki (1991) explains genealogy as "resistance"
which "involves the use of history to give voice to the
marginal and submerged voices that lie 'a little beneath
history' - the voices of the mad, the delinquent, the
abnormal, the disempowered" (p. 28). The purpose of
highlighting these subjugated and disqualified knowledges is
both "modest and profound .•. to disrupt commonly held
conceptions about events and social practices rather than to
proffer, from on high, proposals for reform" (p. 62).n
Genealogy of the Prison
The genealogy of the prison presented by Foucault
(1995) in Discipline and Punish 62 has influenced the way I
look at the discipline of educational psychology. Foucault
believes that the prison is the "most characteristic of
61

Michelle Fine (1991) presents a helpful example in her
work Framing Dropouts. The voices of "dropouts" speak for
themselves about their educational experiences. Their critical
voices are juxtaposed against the bureaucratic discourse that
both silences them and excludes them from the educational
system.
62

This book is considered
masterpiece (Sarup, 1993).

by

some

to

be

Foucault's
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disciplinary institutions, one which schools, factories, and
hospitals all come to resemble" (Shumway, 1989, p. 133). It
is Foucault's intention that his "history" of "the birth of
the prison" can, or "must serve as a historical background
to various studies of the power of normalization and the
formation of knowledge in modern society" (p. 308).
Normalization and a particular knowledge of each student are
key aspects around which educational psychology is
organized.
Foucault (1995) explains that every society had its
means of control of the body. He describes this control
within the historical recounting of the "birth of the
prisons" beginning with the classical age, through the
reform era, and arriving at the formation of the modern
penal system. It is beneficial to present a sketch here.
In the classical age Foucault recounts the torture of
Robert Francois Damiens, accused of trying to assassinate
Louis XV, in 1757. The story delineates torture as a means
whereby the sovereign is able to reinstate his authority;
public torture being a kind of political ritual (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1983). The brutality of the torture is fierce. The
punishment leaves its marks, literally, on the body of the
condemned, the subject of the sovereign. The retelling of
this torment, however, is meant as an exercise in
defamiliarization (Shumway, 1989); the cruel torture is
obviously of another era. One finds oneself thinking, "We've
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come a long way from such barbarism!"
Foucault continues with a review of the eighteenth
century reforms for the punishment of crimes and criminals.
In this era of reform torture decreases, but the person of
the wrongdoer continues to be visible to the public. The
accent in this system is on restoring the social contract,
with penalties meted out according to the crime committed
(i.e., the punishment for murder was death; arrogance was
punished by humiliation; the lazy person was sentenced to
hard labor). The "corrections" notion was put in place as
each "punishment would function as a deterrent, a recompense
to society, and a lesson, all immediately intelligible to
criminal and society" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 148). The
body in this era was marked, but marked differently than in
the classical age. The body bears the representation of the
evil of the crime (Shumway, 1989). 63
Describing the crime accurately was of utmost
importance in this era of reform. Only in knowing the crime
exactly could the proper punishment be given, and the
correct ordering/reordering of social life made possible.
Precise knowledge of the crime and the criminal allowed for
"reformers ••. to construct a comprehensive table of knowledge
in which each crime and its appropriate punishment would
find its exact place" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 149).
The wearing of the scarlet letter by Hester Prynn, a
character in Hawthorne's novel The Scarlet Letter. provides a
helpful example.
63
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Foucault reports that the model for this kind of
individualization was taking place in natural history of the
late eighteenth century. He refers to the prison reforms as
a "Linnaeus 1164 of crimes and punishments, so that each
particular offense and each punishable individual might
come, without slightest risk of any arbitrary action, within
the provision of a general law" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p.
99). Knowing the crime and the criminal exactly emphasized
the importance of the practice of representation. The marks
on the body of the classical model are replaced by "signs,
coded sets of representation" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 130)
in the reform period.
The third development within the penal system, the
modern model, was referred to as "the gentle way" (Foucault,
1977/1995) where "power must act while concealing itself
beneath the gentle force of nature" (p. 106). This
development is characterized by the appearance of the
physical building, the prison, where economy and morality
were combined (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983) in the methodical
use of time (e.g., timetables were enforced and strict
horaria were kept) and space (e.g., isolation in cells).
Prisoners were isolated from the rest of society as
they were to be feared by society and more easily controlled

A reference to Carolus Linnaeus (1707-1778) the Swedish
botanist who originated binomial taxonomic classification. A
statue in his tribute graces the entrance to the visitors
center at the Chicago Botanical Gardens.
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behind the prison walls. Solitary confinement within the
prison was added to the confinement as well, so as to
facilitate meditation by the prisoner of his transgression.
All activities of the prisoners' day, including the work
which was required for economic purposes, were under strict
surveillance. The acquiring of exact knowledge of the
prisoner was very important and made possible through
"dividing practices": separating prisoners from society, and
often, from each other; separating the person of the
prisoner into segments, i.e., the crime, intention,
psychological state of the prisoner. In this way reform was
sought to effect the "soul" of the prisoner in the resocializing effort.
Distinct breaks appear with the reforms of the previous
era in this third model of punishment. The focus is on the
modification of the prisoner's behavior, rather than public
representation of a violation and punishment. The primary
aim becomes the reform the soul. The body in this era is
like a machine (Shumway, 1989), and the success of the
incarceration depended on the training and production of a
"docile" and useful body (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). But, it
was really the soul that was being formed and re-formed.
Instead of the commonsense understanding of the soul as the
prisoner of the body, what Foucault wants to emphasize is
that the body is actually the prisoner of the soul. The
control of bodies remains the primary goal of state control;
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the means is the "gentle way", through forming the soul.
Summary. In Discipline and Punish Foucault explains how
in modern times the focus has shifted from the overt control
of the body, exemplified by monarchial power (Sarup, 1993).
The shift to a modern form of control is of a different
order (Smart, 1985) although still focused on the control of
the body. This shift is characterized by an exercise of
power over the body which is covert; it is constant,
regular, efficient, and unseen. It is characterized by
Foucault (1995) as the "gentle way" of control, yet it is
every bit as potent as the control of former eras.
Disciplinary Technologies
Foucault's major concern is the way modern forms of
power constitute individuals (Ball, 1990). The normalizing
power of institutions, often characterized as a socializing
effort, is key in this process and is produced through the
disciplines of the human sciences. Foucault (1980)
understands disciplines as systems of power with particular
"structures and hierarchies .•• inspections, exercises and
methods of training and conditioning" (p. 158) that have
been "developed, refined, and used to shape individuals"
(Marshall, 1990, p. 15). Disciplines of educational
institutions, not unlike the prisons described by Foucault,
exercise a kind of bio-power, a modern form of power. This
is accomplished in the "increasing ordering of all realms
under the guise of improving the welfare of the individual
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and the population ••.• a strategy, with no one directing it
and everyone increasingly enmeshed in it" (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1983, p. xxvi).
Foucault's "gentle way" is an apt description of this
control through a discipline's normalization of students as
they are rendered docile and useful. The dominant discourse
of educational psychology, although using other words, seems
to concur with normalization as the goal of the discipline
as it is stated:
Because education is aimed at causing (emphasis
original) wanted changes in people - in their
knowledge, skills, and attitudes - the discovery of
ways to cause these changes has great practical
importance. {Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 14)
This perspective of causing "wanted" change echoes what
Thorndike (1910) asserted as the discipline was developing
in the beginning of the twentieth century:
The aim of education is .... changing [the student] for
the better - to produce in him the information, habits,
powers, interests and ideas which are desirable. 65
( p. 4)
The "way" to cause these "changes" is the stuff of
educational psychology, its knowledge-claims and practices.
The normalizing practices of the discipline are utilized to
render bodies "docile" as the individual is "subjected to
habits, rules, orders, an authority that is exercised
continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow
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This quote takes on added meaning when it is connected
to Thorndike's leadership in the eugenics movement {Fancher,
1985; Karier, 1972).
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to function automatically in him" (Foucault, 1977/1995, pp.
128-129). This also describes what Freire (1992) means by
"banking" education:
••• the educated man is the adapted man, because he is
better 'fit' for the world •.•. the purposes of the
oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well men fit
the world the oppressors have created, and how little
they question it. (p. 63)
Foucault (1995) specifies disciplinary practices as the
technologies of: hierarchial observation; normalizing
judgement; and, the examination. These major disciplinary
"technologies" are understood as the "methods which made
possible the meticulous control of the operations of the
body that assured the constant subjection of its forces and
imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility" (Foucault,
1977/1995, p. 137). Yet they are very simple instruments,
perhaps that is the reason they are so effective (Foucault,
1977/1995).
Each of the three disciplinary technologies will be
presented next. A discussion of the way these disciplinary
technologies pervade the discipline of educational
psychology follows.
Hierarchial Observation
Hierarchial observation is the disciplinary technology
understood as a kind of "optics of power" (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1983). It signifies the alliance between visibility
and power (Smart, 1985). It is both a literal and a
figurative observation. The purpose of requiring that
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individuals be visible is to make it possible to know them;
when people are known they can be changed, thus controlled
and rendered docile. First in importance is determining the
"nature" of the person, or seeing the individual as s/he
really is.
Foucault· (1995) explains the importance of
understanding the significance of architecture to this
optics of power. The palace, for example, was built to be
seen, a symbol of the sovereign ruler; the fortress was
built to observe the space external to it. However, the
school (as well as the prison) was constructed "to render
visible those who are inside it •..• to act on those it
shelters •••. to make it possible to know them, to alter them"
(p. 172). The schoolhouse, then, became figuratively and
literally an apparatus of observation, a kind of "microscope
of conduct" (Foucault, 1977/1995). Through observation,
knowing, and training the normalization of students can take
place.
The ideal situation is a single eye of authority seeing
everything constantly (Smart, 1985). However, as numbers
grew it became increasingly difficult for a "single eye" to
supervise all students. A division of the work of the optics
of power, or a system of "supervision", developed as a
"disciplinary gaze" that took the form of a hierarchy of
continuous and functional surveillance (Smart, 1985). The
example discussed earlier of William Torrey Harris
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initiating the graded schoolhouse is a useful reference for
this system of supervision. As the one room schoolhouse was
no longer practical because of growing numbers, students
were separated into the graded school.
The disciplinary gaze developed as an analytic of
observation (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983) that separates
individuals into categories and distinguishes them "by an
almost infinite number of means" (Shumway, 1989, p. 127).
Hierarchical observation in schooling aims to see students
(figuratively and literally) more clearly and thus know them
more correctly, and aimed at eventually being able to alter
and control students. Foucault (1995) refers to hierarchical
observation as the "uninterrupted play of calculated gazes".
Surveillance is an important aspect of hierarchical
observation. Foucault (1977/1995) introduces the image of
the panopticon to demonstrate the potency of surveillance
used in prisons. The panopticon of Jeremy Bentham66 was
meant to produce the effect of "the state of consciousness
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power" (p. 201). Bentham's model called for a
central watch-tower surrounded by tiered rows of cells.
Light from windows in each cell and a open space facing the
center tower allowed for prisoners to be in the constant
view of the "super-visor".

66

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the English philosopher and
reformer.
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The economy of this mechanism is a major feature of the
panopticon's usefulness. It allowed for the constant
surveillance of each prisoner and, at the same time, did not
require constant surveillance of each prisoner. Although
prisoners knew that they could be watched at any time they
never could be sure when they were being watched. The
economy and effectiveness of this model was exacerbated as
the prisoners began to internalize the gaze of the
supervisor; that is, they watched themselves.
Foucault (1995) tells us that this mechanism, a form of
hierarchal observation sets up a
network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a
certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this
network 'holds' the whole together and traverses it in
its entirety with effects of power that derive from one
another: supervisors, perpetually supervised .••
(pp. 176-177)
The internalization of the gaze of the supervisor is
extremely significant in the formation of the subject. This
internalization has implications for teachers as well as
students. Teachers know that they are under the watchful eye
of administrators as well as the public. Teachers, too,
internalize the gaze of those in authority and of the
dominant culture; they learn to watch themselves. To be
effective and economical the complicity of those who are
watched must be enlisted.
Normalizing Judgement
Hierarchical observation allows for judgement and
evaluation, and the basis of judgement is the norm (Jones,
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1990). The technology of normalizing judgement is said to be
at the heart of any system of disciplinary power (Foucault,
1977/1995; Smart, 1985). Disciplinary practices need
standards around which its operations can be organized so
individuals and groups are assessed by "comparisons with a
favored paradigm real or imagined" (Prado, 1995, p. 61).
Normalizing judgement has the simultaneous action which
marks its power, that is, it assumes and imposes homogeneity
and introduces individuality:
The power of normalization imposes homogeneity, but it
individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps,
to determine levels, fix specialties and to render
differences useful by fitting them into one another. It
is easy to understand how the power of the norm
functions within a system of formal equality, since
within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm
introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of
measurement, all the shading of individual differences.
(Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 184)
Any behavior can be quantified and ranked as it falls
on a field between two poles, good and bad (e.g., grades on
tests, effective and ineffective teachers). Foucault tells
us that it has become possible through the modern sciences
to "quantify this field and work out an arithmetic economy
based on it" (1995, p, 180). That is, "an objective
hierarchy can be established by which the distribution of
individuals is justified, legitimated and made more
efficient" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 158).
A system of penalties and rewards is effective in
establishing and supporting normalization. Punishments· are
exacted for the slightest deviation from the norm, referred
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to as micro-penalties. Micro-penalties grew to include more
and more areas of life (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983). Examples
of micro-penalties include issues around the following: time
(e.g., lateness, absence), activity (e.g., inattention, lack
of zeal), behavior (e.g., impoliteness, disobedience),
speech (e.g., idle chatter, insolence), body (incorrect
gestures, attitudes, cleanliness), sexuality (e.g.,
impurity, indecency) (Foucault, 1977/1995). An important
issue regarding this system is that rewards are dispensed as
well as punishments. This emphasizes that the intention of
the system is normalization, not repression.
The established norm is the assumption of homogeneity;
in reference to the norm finer and finer differentiation and
individualization is possible. Through this differentiation
then it is possible to "objectively" separate and rank
individuals.
Examination
The examination is at the "heart of the procedures of
discipline ••• " (Foucault, 19771995, p. 184). It combines the
other two disciplinary instruments, hierarchical observation
and normalizing judgement, into what Foucault (1995) calls
the "normalizing gaze". This is the disciplinary technique
in which can be found "a whole domain of knowledge, a whole
type of power" (p. 185) which allows for differentiation,
classification, and judgement of its subjects. Foucault
(1995) considers this technology as a kind of tiny, slender,
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widespread "ceremony of objectification" (p. 187). As such
it marks "an explicit instance of the connection between
power and knowledge" (Shumway, 1989, p. 131).
Increased visibility is a key effect of the
examination. Foucault reminds us that in feudal times the
most visible people were the most important people, e.g.,
the king, the epic hero. With the rise of modern sciences
the common folk are the ones who become visible as they are
subjected to the mechanisms of objectification through the
examination. This disciplinary technique of examination has
the power to bring the individual into view, able to be seen
in multiple ways and with finer and finer differentiation.
What needs to be highlighted, though, is that the
examination is the "gaze" of the one with more power upon
the one with less or no power (Shumway, 1989). The
visibility of the subject, or student, is heightened as more
and more features of the person are tested and a gathered
into a

file.~

Individuals become "cases" through the

gathering of common occurring attributes and differences
(Smart, 1985), a case that can be described and analyzed,
known, categorized, and re-formed.
The way Haraway (1988/1996) highlights the metaphor of
vision is helpful here. She insists that the visualizing
technologies, exemplified in the examination, "are without
See Hanson (1993) for a comprehensive discussion of the
number and variety of tests available and used in the U.S., in
school settings and beyond.
67
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apparent limit; the eye of any ordinary primate like us can
be endlessly enhanced .•.. Vision in this technological feast
becomes unregulated gluttony" (pp. 188-189). Haraway
insists, however, that vision is always embodied. The eyes
that see belong to some-body. This understanding exposes the
impossibility of a "gaze from nowhere". The image of the
eyes of the knower as always embodied renders problematic
the claim of modern scientific methods that profess to
"factor-out" or "control-for" the person of the scientist as
the results or findings are understood to speak for
themselves. On the contrary, the only possibility is vision
from somewhere, from some-body, i.e., situated knowledge
(Haraway, 1988/1996).
The effectiveness of this disciplinary technique of the
examination is intensified through an inversion of
visibility; as the individual becomes more visible the
disciplinary power itself becomes invisible. Foucault (1995)
explains:
Disciplinary power ••• is exercised through its
invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom
it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In
discipline it is the subjects that have to be seen.
Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is
exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly
seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his
subjection. And the examination is the technique by
which power, instead of emitting signs of its potency,
instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds
them in a mechanism of objectification. (p. 187)
Thus, despite its potency, the technology of power that
facilitates the rendering of subjects as objects is itself
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invisible, i.e., the productive character of the examination
is itself invisible even as it renders its subject visible.
In its ubiquity the normalizing activity of the examination
is not questioned. The necessity of the examination in its
multiple forms is a commonsense practice; it is taken-forgranted, considered natural or normal, as though things
could not be otherwise. And this is also what renders it
unquestioned and invisible.
Through the technology of the examination
classifications and comparisons of persons become possible
along increasingly finer gradations. Individual differences
become significant. Foucault highlights the point that the
modern individual is a historical achievement. Subjects are
the product of the disciplinary power by which subjects are
objectified, analyzed, and fixed (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).
Modern sciences have yielded the individual who is both the
effect of power and the effect of knowledge, an example of
questionable progress, from a dubious science (Foucault,
1977/1995). This is a key example of what Foucault calls the
productive aspect of power:
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects
of power in negative terms: it 'excludes', it
'represses', it 'censors', it abstracts, it 'masks', it
'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it produces
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of
truth. The individual and the knowledge gained of him
belong to this production. (p. 194)
In other words, professionals in the discipline produce the
knowledge they apply (Caputo & Yount, 1993), "they create
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the knowledge they require in order to fashion functioning,
well-formed individuals" (p. 7). Through this normalizing
technology students become objectified; they become their
"scores" as they receive their "marks".
This is an inversion of a modernist understanding that
knowledge of the subject emerges through the technologies of
the discipline. Subjects are in-scribed by the technologies
of the discipline rather than de-scribed by them.
Disciplinary Technologies in Educational Psychology
The disciplinary technologies (i.e., hierarchical
observation, normalizing judgement, examination) described
by Foucault (1995) are obvious and operative in the
discipline of educational psychology's discursive practices.
The illustration of these technologies provides a way to
interrogate how educational psychology uses power and
knowledge to normalize students, i.e., to render students
docile, neutral, and appropriate subjects. This
interrogation highlights practices of the dominant discourse
given expression in "classic" texts with the hope of "making
the familiar strange" (Foucault, 1977/1995). When practices
seem strange they are more open to critique and more readily
able to be changed.
The technologies of the discipline come together in
various practices generated and perpetuated by the
discipline of educational psychology. The specific areas to
be discussed are: 1) the surveillance practices that pervade
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educational settings; 2) classroom management practices; 3)
the practice of testing, especially standardized testing. In
using these practices teachers step into the web of power
relations through which students are normalized. Through an
uncritical use of these practices teachers participate in
their own normalization as well, i.e., they become docile
and useful.
Surveillance Practices
In today's educational settings developing the capacity
to see students clearly is represented as key to teacher
effectiveness. Bentham's panopticon (discussed above) is a
metaphor for a characteristic teachers are encouraged to
develop, namely, "withitness". The effect of the panopticon
was meant to effect "the state of consciousness and
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning
of power" (Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 201). Gage and Berliner
(1991) describe a similar effect of withitness:
the knack of seeming to know what is going on all over
the room, of having 'eyes in the back of your head'. A
teacher's awareness, and the students' awareness of it,
make a difference. Teachers with high withitness make
few mistakes in identifying which student is
misbehaving, in determining which of two behaviors is
the more serious, or in timing an effort to stop a
misbehavior. (p. 512)
Woolfolk (1995) also highlights the importance of
"withitness" as a characteristic of effective classroom
managers whose classes are "relatively free of problems".
These are contrasted with ineffective managers whose
classrooms are "continually plagued by chaos and disruption"
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(p. 416). Woolfolk states that withitness "means
communicating to students that you are aware of everything
that is happening in the classroom, that you aren't missing
anything" (p. 416). Woolfolk repeats the optic power image
of "eyes in the back of your head" and adds that "with-it"
teachers
avoid becoming absorbed or interacting with only a few
students, since this encourages the rest of the class
to wander. They [with-it teachers] are always scanning
the room, making eye contact with individual students,
so the students know they are being monitored •••• These
teachers prevent minor disruptions from becoming major.
They also know who instigated the problem, and they
make sure the right people are dealt with. In other
words, they do not make ••• timing errors (waiting too
long before intervening) or target errors (blaming the
wrong student and letting the real perpetrators escape
responsibility for their behavior). (pp. 417-419)
"With-it" teachers convey to students that they can be seen
and are being monitored continuously. An important effect of
the proper development of this quality in teachers is so
they will be able to "catch" and correct misbehaving
students. Students know they will be punished for a
transgression. Since normalization is the goal and not
repression, students will also be rewarded for compliant
behavior.
The economy of this surveillance technique is also a
key factor in its utility. Since students know that there is
always the possibility that they are being watched they are
encouraged to internalize the gaze of their super-visor
learning to monitor themselves and each other. The direction
is clear, "Teach students to monitor themselves" (Woolfolk,
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1995, p. 420). Thus, the power relations in the classroom
are diffused as teachers watch students, students watch
teachers, themselves, and each other, and so forth. There is
a web of relations of surveillance being weaved as Foucault
(1995) insists "from top to bottom .•. bottom to top .•• and
laterally" (pp. 176-177).
Classroom Management
Despite the promised effectiveness of surveillance, or
because of teachers' ineffective use of this technique (Gage

& Berliner, 1991), children do "misbehave". Classroom
management programs and practices are recommended by the
mainstream discourse as explicitedly aimed at maintaining an
atmosphere conducive to learning, yet there is another side
to these practices. Management practices are powerful tools
(i.e., technologies) used in the normalization of students
as they effect increasingly finer differential categories of
what it means to "mis-behave". The discursive practices of
classroom management attend to "the specification of the
most detailed aspects of everyday behavior, almost anything
could become potentially punishable" (Dreyfus & Rabinow,
1982, p. 158).
Classroom management is a topic of special and
seemingly growing import in educational psychology. There
has been a marked increased in discussion of this topic in
the past few decades, and it has been characterized as the
number one concern of classroom teachers (Randolf &
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Evertsen, 1994). According to a report of content analysis
of educational psychology textbooks (Ash & Love-Clark, 1985)
classroom management increased in amount of actual text
space by 75% from 1954-64 to 1965-75. There was reported a
100% increase from 1965-1975 to 1976-83 in text space. The
authors of this analysis speculated that the increased
discussion may reflect the movement of textbooks toward the
more pragmatic concerns of teachers and away from the
'softer' side of educational psychology (Ash & Love-Clark,
1985). 68 Despite the lack of ability to draw definitive
conclusions from this descriptive report the authors state
that there have been changes in textbooks used in
educational psychology "away from theory and toward the
classroom" (p. 54).
The Woolfolk (1995) text, then, appropriately is
attentive to the importance of issues related to classroom
management. Woolfolk (1995) notes that classroom management
is "one of the main concerns of teachers, particularly
beginning teachers, as well as administrators and parents
(p. 401). Woolfolk (1995) cites a Gallop Poll of the
public's attitude toward public schools to substantiate this
claim. Sixteen of the first seventeen polls list "lack of

Emotional and social development, and personality theory
are offered as examples of "softer" areas (Ash & Love-Clark,
1985).
68
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discipline 1169 as the "number one problem facing schools"
(p. 402). Since the late SO's only "drug use" and "funding"
issues have seized first place.
Gage and Berliner (1991), likewise, relate that all
classroom needs fall into a "rough order of priority .•• the
first [being] the establishment of classroom discipline,
control, and management" (p. 509). It is claimed that
"without it [classroom discipline, control, and management]
nothing much of educational value can be done" (p. 509).
Gage and Berliner (1991) also state that the issue of
classroom management and discipline is considered by many
administrators and teachers to be the "most important cause
of teacher failure ..•. [and the] leading cause for dismissal"
(p. 510). If teachers are judged as being ineffective in
their management of classrooms they are dismissed. This
indicates that the web of power relations in classroom
management practice affects teachers and students alike.
There are many points that could be made in critique of
the discourse and practices of educational psychology
regarding classroom management. I discuss three areas that
are particularly problematic: 1) the practices of classroom
management are based on a preemptory perspective; 2)
"empowerment" through management practices; 3) a shift in
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Emmer ( 1987) explains that classroom management and
discipline are related because "management is chiefly directed
at establishing conditions for good discipline" (p. 233). The
terms are often used interchangeably.
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emphasis from management as a way to access the curriculum
to curriculum as a way to ensure good management.
Practices based on a preemptory perspective. The
discursive practices of traditional classroom management
come out of a modernist view that the social world is locked
into irrationality, where chaos will reign if order is not
established and controlled (Ball, 1990). Practices are
directed to the "problems" that arise in classrooms. As
discussed in Chapter IV, these problems are viewed through
the perspective of a rationality that looks for technical
solutions that can be applied to restore or maintain order.
Teachers and educational psychologists define, interpret,
and judge both the students who resist the management
practices and student's action from a hierarchical position
in ways that limit the meanings that the behavior may have.
These judgements are based on an "assumption that
there is a proper, correct, standard, or agreed manner of
carrying oneself" (Berry, 1995). The teacher and educational
psychologist know what that proper deportment looks like,
and they can easily spot improper behavior. The judgement of
proper/improper behavior is based on a "norm" and
increasingly fine deviations from the "norm". In this
atmosphere the "non-conformist, even the temporary one,
[becomes] the object of disciplinary attention" (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1982, p. 158). Although the judgements of both
students and their actions are always historically,
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socially, and politically contingent they are seldom
problematized as such.
For example, Woolfolk (1995) recognizes difference in
behavior may have cultural links. The critique that American
schools "typically reflect the white, Anglo-Saxon,
Protestant, middle-class, male-dominated values that have
characterized mainstream America" (p. 155) is accepted as a
valid appraisal. Readers are told that schooling formerly
was thought to be "the fire under the melting pot" (p. 154).
The importance of moving away from this assimilationist
perspective, which takes this mainstream perspective as
normative, is espoused; a new image of "mosaic" (p. 157)
that "celebrates" and values diverse cultural behavior is
introduced. 70
Yet, the deficit orientation model that judges nonmainstream behaviors as inferior resists displacement in the
meaning-making basis of the text. Readers are instructed to:
••• teach students directly about how to be students. In
the early grades this could mean directly teaching the
courtesies and conventions of the classroom: how to get
a turn to speak, how and when to interrupt the teacher,
how to whisper •.•• You can ask students to learn "how we
do it in school" without violating [the] principle
••• respect your students •••• (Woolfolk, 1995, p. 189)
What needs to be highlighted is that while "how we do it in
school" is recognized as exhibiting the values of the
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See Sleeter and Grant (1991) for a comprehensive
examination and analysis of various models of multicultural
education. The "mosaic" metaphor, as well as "melting pot" is
problematic.
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dominant culture, and is regarded as problematic, it is
never disrupted or displaced. standards of the Anglo, male,
middle-class culture remain the favored paradigm and retain
the privileged position. These "standards" become the
universal norm that is used to judge behavior as proper or
not, and children are judged for their compliance to these
norms.
Earlier in the chapter normalizing judgement was
discussed as both imposing homogeneity and constructing
individuals simultaneously. This dual effect is obvious in
classroom management practices as conformity to the
homogeneous universal standard is assumed as normative. Once
this is established finer differentiation from the norm can
be perceived and measured; eventually individuals can be
ranked in relation to each other.
Other examples from Gage and Berliner (1991), explicate
the privileged and uninterrogated view of teachers judging
the behavior of students from a universalized norm.
Activities of students' "misbehavior" are placed in two
simple categories: 1) too many unwanted behaviors; and 2)
too few wanted behaviors. Unwanted behaviors are listed as:
physical aggression, moving around the room at
inappropriate times, making too much noise, challenging
authority at the wrong time or in the wrong way, and
making unjust or destructive criticism and complaints.
(p. 511)
Wanted behaviors that need to be increased include:
volunteering to recite, standing up for his or her own
opinion, paying attention to what is being explained or
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discussed in class, being involved and active in
individual or group projects. (p. 516}
What these actions mean to the students themselves is
ignored or marginalized as unimportant. Behaviors are simply
assigned to one category or another, and the ambiguous
nature of students' behavior is eschewed. For instance, a
student may view his/her own behavior as "standing up for
his or her opinion", while the teacher judges the same
action as "challenging authority in the wrong way" or making
"unjust criticism". Deeper meanings of student behavior seem
unimportant as the focus is on maintaining order and
control. More frequently, that which is labeled misbehavior
is lack of compliance to the preferred norm. What is ignored
is that students are the ones producing the behavior that
needs to be managed in the first place (Everhart, 1983). 71
Everhart (1983} explains that student behavior has
social and political contingencies, and these extend beyond
the classroom experience. Students, for example, understand
their assignment to roles within the classroom and in the
broader social context. Their activity forms a subculture as
they struggle with the social and political aspects of
schooling. As Everhart (1983} explains:
Classroom management must be understood as a social
system, but also as an interface between the state
Everhart' s article is most helpful in showing the active
construction of a subculture of student opposition to
practices of classroom management. One of my students of
educational psychology said in response to reading the
article, "I never saw myself in print before".
71
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educational system and students. Classroom management
mediates social life as students attempt to "make"
themselves in a world in which political consciousness,
class interests, and cultural regularities enter into
the calculus of appropriateness and certitude by which
students define themselves. (p. 170)
Students, from a socio-political perspective, are viewed as
active agents who devise various strategies through which
they contest and resist the management practices of teachers
as well as their assignment to low status positions. 72
Oppositional behavior of students may well be an appropriate
response to an oppressive education (Kohl, 1994) that is
preparing and directing them for life in subordinate
positions in society. Their minimal involvement in school
activities, boredom, or oppositional behavior may signify
their own feelings of alienation from the process and
product of their work. Through their own (sometimes
oppositional) activities students act to reappropriate
control of their labor process (Everhart, 1983). In
recognizing the socio-political aspects of classroom
relations much may be learned by teachers and students
alike. Much needs to be learned as frequently oppositional
activities, while a mark of student agency, have negative
results in students' lives. Woolfolk (1995) notes, for
example, that in high school years teachers can focus on
academics more than procedures and rules because "By this
72

All of students' behaviors may not appear disruptive
(e.g., use of humor, avoidance, and various communication
practices). Students learn both how to work the system and
beat the system (Everhart, 1983).
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time, unfortunately, many students with overwhelming
behavioral problems have dropped out" (p. 405). This is the
only mention of the issue of "dropping out" I was able to
find in the text. This lack of attention supports Fine's
(1991) critique that the exodus of students, especially lowincome students of color, from high schools "is represented
as if it were all quite natural" (p. 8).
Classroom management as empowerment. Classroom
management is generally represented as a way to promote the
betterment of students. Yet, both texts advance models that
focus on the empowerment of the teacher-manager (Ball,
1990). students are not considered in terms of their own
learning, agency, desires, and fears as discussed above. In
the models presented in the discourse of the classic texts
the focus is on what teachers do to maintain control and
compliance; the activity of the teacher is central.
Gage and Berliner (1991), for example, present
classroom teaching practices in terms of how the teacher
gains power in contrast to the students who have none:
From the teacher's point of view you'll be looking at
classroom teaching as an activity in which you have the
power to shape the process. You probably had little of
that power when you were in the student's role. Then
you did pretty much what your teacher wanted you to do.
Now, as the teacher, you have the determining role and
the responsibility that goes with it .••• we will
introduce you to a diverse set of teaching behaviors
that can help you plan and actually be more effective
whatever the subject or grade. (p. 494)
In discussing issues of classroom management the
perspective of Gage and Berliner (1991) is clearly based in
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behavioristic psychology. Power is gained by the teacher,
and order is maintained through this system set in a
discourse of control; management is a case of extinguishing
unwanted behavior and increasing wanted behavior. Strategies
are suggested:
One way of stopping misbehavior is to extinguish it, to
withhold reinforcement. This usually means not paying
attention to it ... Where it is feasible, simply ignore
the [misbehaving] student. Turn your back, pay
attention to a student who is behaving properly, walk
away ...• Extinction takes time. It may be a while before
a child's misbehavior begins to decrease. But be
careful. Even an occasional reinforcement on your part
can undo the whole process. (p. 513)
This is a traditional prescriptive approach to classroom
management in that the focus is directed toward the
activities of the teacher needed to keep students on task
and attentive (Everhart, 1983). Educational psychology is
aimed at equipping the teacher with techniques through which
s/he is more able to control classroom agendas.
Gage and Berliner (1991) recognize the perspective
presented in this text as traditional in that it "centers
more on the teacher than the student" (p. 492). This
perspective is represented as having an advantage over other
perspectives of classroom management and teaching (e.g.,
open education, humanistic education). The advantage is that
traditional, teacher-centered educational practices are
viable: "it has one important advantage - viability. It is
the kind of teaching toward which teachers gravitate and to
which they return" (p. 492).
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However, it is noted that this perspective and its
practices are not entirely in the best interest of students.
The comment of Cuban {1984) is reported that this model "has
been extremely viable, for better or worse" {emphasis added,
Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 492). This method of classroom
management is accepted as normative and unproblematic
despite the expressed possibility that it may not be in the
best interest of students. 73
The practices encouraged in the text manifest a vulgar
pragmatism {Cherryholms, 1988), as the emphasis is focused
on what works, regardless of effects. What Gage and Berliner
{1991) leave out in reference to Cuban's work, and the
discussion of classroom management in general, is the reason
teacher-centered styles of classroom management persists.
Cuban {1984) theorizes that "Schools are a form of social
control and sorting" {p. 9) echoing the social reproduction
and correspondence theory of Bowles and Gintis {1976). Cuban
{1985) argues:
The ways schools are organized, the curriculum, and
teaching practices mirror the norms of the
socioeconomic system •••• teacher practices become
functional to achieve those ends ••. [i.e.,] reinforcing
the teacher's authority to control the behavior of the
class •.•. the practices encouraged by student-centered
instruction ill-fit the character of the society
children will enter and classrooms became inhospitable
arenas for small group instruction, expression, student
Gage and Berliner { 1991) repeat the idea that the
traditional, teacher-centered model of classroom teaching "for
better or worse, is part of the American, indeed,- the
worldwide experience" (p. 531). It is a taken-for-granted,
unproblematic practice.
73
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decision making, etc. Teacher-centered instruction,
however, endured because it produces student behaviors
expected by the larger society. (emphasis added, p. 9)
Cuban (1984) has connected the micro-practices of schooling
with the macro-values of the larger society. These issues
are left unquestioned, even obscured, in the classic
educational psychology texts. Through the traditional
practices of classroom management students can be
normalized, made proper citizens of the state, i.e., docile
and useful.
The use of behavioristic psychology, so typical of
traditional teacher-centered classroom management practices,
exemplifies clearly the "shaping" of students to conform to
norms that have become naturalized. What needs to be noted
as well is that humanistic psychologies also are useful in
the normalization of students, albeit their role in
governmentality is more subtle.
In student-centered classrooms that espouse humanist
psychology the emphasis is on the empowerment of the
student. The student is understood as an active meaningmaker striving to know herself or himself and become selfactualized. This is evidenced in the content and process of
schooling. Gage and Berliner (1991) explain self-actualized
students as:
•.. people who come to accept themselves, their
feelings, and others more fully. These people are selfdirected, confident, mature, realistic about their
goals, and flexible. They've gotten rid of maladjustive
behaviors. They become like the people they want to be.
(p. 479)
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This student-centered perspective seems to be an improvement
on the teacher-centered, traditional model. However, while
the student is perceived as the center of the meaning-making
system, he or she is considered self-contained, separate and
isolated from the social and the political contingencies
that generate the categories into which they place
themselves. Getting rid of "maladjustive behaviors"
mentioned in the quote above can be indicative of a even
more subtle interiorization of a dominate and oppressive
discourse. 74
Usher and Edwards (1994) state that humanistic
discourses can be more powerful than the objectifying
discourses generated by behavioristic psychology. In
"subjectifying discourses, within which humanistic
psychology has been strongly implicated ••. [d]iscipline is
not something externally imposed by teachers since students
discipline themselves" (p. 51). It is possible to argue that
"regulation works by empowerment" (p. 50). Humanistic
psychology, too, provides the "justification and the means
for intervention and "shaping'" (p. 53) students under the
illusion of self-governance.
Curriculum as instrumental in control. There has been a
subtle shift toward the control of students through the use
74

This discourse appears uncomfortably close to a message
in The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994): "The broadest
goal is a society in which people throughout the functional
range of intelligence can find, and feel they have found, a
valued place for themselves" (p. 535).
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of the curriculum. McNeil (1983) asks readers to picture a
one room schoolhouse of the last century. The students sit
on hard benches or at desks in rows facing front; students
stand to recite; for much of the day they are silent and
still. The teacher or schoolmaster is stern, perhaps
wielding a hickory stick. There the purpose for the
discipline is to help the students access the curriculum.
Classroom management and discipline is viewed as
instrumental to the learning of the curriculum.
To a major extent classroom management procedures of
the current day are much different although they purportedly
are intended for the same purpose, i.e., to help students
access the curriculum. Woolfolk (1995) lists more time for
learning and greater access to learning as reasons for
management practices. Gage and Berliner (1991) insist
nothing educational happens without good management
practices. However, there is also indication of an obvious
shift in the idea of management practices of educational
psychology. While classroom management practices are
instrumental in helping students access the curriculum,
there is also evidence that there is an inversion, i.e., the
curriculum is a means of classroom management. For example,
Gage and Berliner (1991) connect "mis-behavior" of students
with the way schools are organized. They note:
... behavioral problems ••• [can] stem from the way·
schools are organized. Sometimes school structure
forces students to take courses that are inappropriate
for them, that do not allow for their individual needs
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or level of achievement. (p. 510)
They continue to explain that schools that do not allow for
students' "individual needs or levels of achievement" (as
well as a variety of other issues that are "outside the
teachers control") contribute to the "crime, delinquency,
and problem behavior that exist in [the schools]" (p. 511).
The assumption is: the needs of students are met when they
are correctly placed in appropriate learning groups and
given the appropriate information. When and where this
situation exists students will not "misbehave". Thus, there
is signaled an inversion of means and ends. Where the
practices of classroom management were intended as means
toward the end of accessing knowledge there is a shift
toward accessing of the curriculum as a means by which
control is exercised.
Testing and the Production of Students
Following Foucault's (1995) position that normalization
is a major aspect of the role of schooling the formation of
the "norm" is a key consideration. As presented above, there
may be a tacit endorsement by educationalists of what is
"normal" or normative based in the commonsense acceptance of
certain values, beliefs, and behaviors. These norms are
reflective of the preference of the dominant groups and
adopted as universal norms by social institutions, schools
in particular. Norms grow in power through hegemonic
control, i.e., they are validated by meaning-making systems
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and granted consent by members of subaltern as well as
dominant groups. They need to be continually exposed and
critiqued. However, there is another area that needs to be
highlighted regarding the establishment of norms.
Foucault (1995) has noted the increasingly complex
nature of the normalization process in that it has become
"possible", through the human sciences, to measure or
quantify what is judged to be "normal". The technologies of
hierarchical observation and normalizing judgement come
together in the quantifying of an evaluative judgement. This
is so much of the work of educational psychology and is the
focus of the following discussion.
That "testing of students is ubiquitous" is a truism.
Woolfolk (1995) remarks that "if you have seen the
cumulative folders that include testing records for
individual students over several years, then you know the
many ways students are tested in this country" (p. 528).
Hanson (1993) asserts that the testing associated with
schooling can begin with examinations toddlers take to enter
nursery school, and "that is just the beginning of an
endless torrent of tests that will probe every corner of
their nature and behavior for the rest of their lives" (p.
1). Gage and Berliner (1991) report that a "reasonable

estimate" of teacher time devoted to the testing process is
20 to 30%.
Woolfolk (1995) states: "Measurement is evaluation put
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in quantitative terms - the numeric description of an event
or characteristic" (emphasis added, p. 514). Educational
psychology advances the understanding that through testing
practices that produce these measurements the "truth" about
an individual is able to be known. In other words, testing
increases the visibility and describability of students. It
is necessary to make this familiar notion strange (Foucault,
19). It is argued in the following discussion that testing
processes, i.e., forms of examination (especially the normreferenced variety), are technologies of differentiation and
individualization that inscribe rather than describe
students. Examinations are also technologies of power that
work to establish hierarchies among students 75 , that are a
means of control and a method of domination (Foucault,
1977/1995).
An important issue in the understanding of testing
practices is the notion of validity, particularly construct
validity. Validity is defined by Woolfolk (1995) as the
"degree to which a test measures what it is intended to
measure" (p. 525). What is generally avoided in mainstream
discussions of construct validity is the social construction
of these abstract characteristics. Social constructs are
considered and treated "as if" they are "real". This
exemplifies the problem of reification. However, reification
Lewontin ( 1976) quotes Thorndike as saying that "the
actual race of life ••• is not to get ahead, but to get ahead of
somebody ••• " (p. 107).
75
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of abstract concepts is imperative in testing practices
because only "real" things are able to be measured. Within
the ideology of meritocracy, these "real" characteristics
need to be understood as: innate properties of individuals;
stable over time; and, varying in measurement in
individuals.
Another important issue regarding testing is that it
yields objective measurements according to a scale that is
metric. The "normal distribution" of students along the
bell-shaped curve assists with this process. Although the
social construction of this arrangement has been presented
and critiqued76 the discursive practice continues to be
advanced unproblematically in classic texts of educational
psychology. It is presented as "natural" as well as
"normal".
For example, Woolfolk (1995) states that the "bellshaped curve, [is] the most famous frequency distribution
because it describes many naturally occurring physical and
social phenomena" (p. 519)." Gage and Berliner (1991) make
the connection as well between physical and social
characteristics in stating that "both measures of

See for example Layzer, 1975; Lewontin, 1984/1996; Mensh
and Mensh, 1991).
76

77

It is added that the normal distribution "has been
thoroughly analyzed by statisticians" (Woolfolk, 1995, p.
519). In light of the history of the development of this
"normal" distribution it seems more correct to say that it has
been thoroughly constructed by statisticians.
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intelligence and height are normally distributed within any
specific age, ethnic, and gender group •.• " (p. 57). The
argument is

th~t

a "naturally occurring" physical phenomenon

(e.g., height) and "naturally occurring" social phenomenon
(e.g., intelligence) are normally distributed within a
specific population.
There is constructed an illusion that there is a metric
scale used to measure both phenomena. However, while there
is a standard of measure for height (e.g., feet, inches,
meters) only an ordinal system can measure "naturally
occurring social phenomena" (see Lewontin et al.,
1984/1996). It is more than an illusion that is created
though, as Gage and Berliner (1991) state:
One reason for the popularity of tests is that they
give us a quantitative estimate of ability or
achievement; they tell us how much. In education the
attributes that interest us emphasize the abilities and
achievements of students - such things as intelligence,
creativity, spelling ability, science knowledge, and
interest in art. (p. 570)
Mensh and Mensh (1991) refer to the bell-shaped curve
as a "particularly mystifying aspect of IQ" (p. 75).
Although normal distribution may occur regarding the "metric
characteristics of animals such as birth weight in
cattle ...• IQ tests do not possess the characteristics for
creating a normal curve" (Mensh & Mensh, 1991, p. 172). 78
And yet, educational psychologists continue to insist that

78

Even biology's conforming to normal distribution has
been disputed (See Layzer, 1975; Lewontin et al, 1984/1996).
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IQ does possess these characteristics.
The bell-shape curve is an arbitrary and social
artifact (Lewontin et al., 1984/1996). Testers create tests
so that a bell-shaped curve will appear. This preserves the
illusion that the "tests measure a real characteristic"
(Mensh & Mensh, 1991, p. 76). Intelligence and ability tests
have been composed of items selected after trial for
observed conformity with the normal distribution. Items
that showed little correlation with the overall
expectations, or with the previous tests of the kind,
have been systematically excluded. (Morrison, 1977,
quoted in Mensh and Mensh, 1991, p. 76)
This is the process Woolfolk (1995) is referring to in
the following explanation of basic concepts in standardized
test making: "The test items and instructions have been
tried out to make sure they work and then rewritten and
retested as necessary" (emphasis added, p. 517). What is
meant by making sure "they work" is that the tests
successfully correlate intelligence or ability scores of
students taking the test with the placement of students in
the social order (Mensh & Mensh, 1991). That "they work" is
an indication of their power to differentiate (Gage &
Berliner, 1991).
Gage and Berliner (1991) assert that developers of
tests use "the tests' differentiating power as their guide"
(p. 51). This differentiating power is further explained:
Partly because of the way the tests were made, and
partly because of the way human intelligence functions,
the resulting IQ scores ..• fell into a normal
distribution (emphasis original) which has the bell
shape ...• Why do IQ tests tend to be normally
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distributed? Is it simply because the test is rigged?
Not entirely (emphasis added). Remember that the tests
consist of many items, each designed to differentiate
among individuals. That is, the items are written so
that on some items only about half of a given age group
responds correctly, while on other items a higher or
lower percentage of that group responds correctly. (p.
56)

The standard on which the tests' differentiating power
is based is middle-class knowledge. Gage and Berliner (1991)
recognize this and give many examples of this bias, and then
they excuse it; bias is renamed "relevance":
Middle-class bias has proved much more difficult to
eliminate than was anticipated. For tests of
intellectual abilities useful in modern American
society, a "middle-class" and "urban" orientation may
constitute not bias but relevance .••. so we may not
want to change the tests so much as we might want to
change the environments that promote low test
performance. (p. 90)
The suggestion of changing environments as a way to
ameliorate low-test scores is contradictory and seems
disingenuous. It is contradictory in that "intelligence" is
repeatedly represented in the same text as an innate,
stable, and inherited characteristic (Gage & Berliner,
1991). It seems disingenuous in that standardized test are
constructed to rank a certain percentage of students below
the normal range. Effective standardized tests are
guaranteed, or, to use Gage and Berliner's term, "rigged",
to separate and sort children. This is the differentiating
power that guides the development of the tests in the first
place. This is how they work, why they were developed, and
why questions have to be written and rewritten (Woolfolk,
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1995).
The "differentiating power" of tests is central to
their use in educational institutions. The particular "norm"
around which they are organized is never made problematic.
On the contrary, the middle-class "relevance" is accepted as
normative. Award or violence is distributed to students
according to their "marks". Lewontin et al. (1984/1996)
explain succinctly:
••. the power of the "norm", once established, is that
it is used to judge individuals who have been located
along its linear scale. Deviations from the norm are
regarded with alarm. Parents who are told that their
child is two standard deviations from the norm on some
behavioral scale are led to believe that he or she is
"abnormal" and should be adjusted in some way to
psychometry's Procrustean bed. Psychometry, above all,
is a tool of a conformist society that, for all its
professed concern with individuals, is in reality
mainly concerned to match them against others and to
attempt to adjust them to conformity. (p. 149)
Norms are established by validating what works in
differentiating those considered "normal" from those who are
not. The argument is circular. The process of standardized
testing establishes what is "normal" based on information
gathered on who are considered normal.
Although the classic text never say exactly who the
norming sample is, it is noted that "social class, race,
gender, and ethnicity can be relevant considerations" (Gage

& Berliner, 1991, p. 574) if there is a concern with equal
opportunity. It is stated that there is a "problem that many
African American, Chicanos, and Native Americans face with
norm referenced testing when the norms are based on distant
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but supposedly representative, peer groups" (Gage &
Berliner, 1991, p. 574). When this information is added to
the "problem" that a hypothetical student named "Lisa" is
having with her national percentile rank, then all the clues
point to the norm group. The norm group is male, Anglo, and
middle-class. It is important to note that although Gage and
Berliner (1991) regard social class, race, and gender to be
"relevant" considerations in discussions of equality, these
same characteristics become "irrelevant" when the interest
is in selecting "highly competent rather than mediocre" (p.
574) students.
The "objective" evaluation of students according to
scores produced through testing needs to be regarded as a
process that produces normalcy. This process also describes
deviance from the norm. As more tests are taken by students
their cumulative folder expands, and "more knowledge leads
to more specification" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 159).
There is developed a new visibility and a more minute
describability. The "examination is at the center of the
procedures that constitute the individual as both effect and
object of power, as effect and object of knowledge"
(Foucault, 1977/1995, p. 192).
There is a certain "alchemy" in this process. The
properties of a discipline's regime, i.e., its norms,
values, procedures, and so forth, become attributes of
persons. Rose (1989) expresses this well:
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The procedures of visualization, individualization and
inscription that characterize the mental sciences
reverse the direction and domination between human
individuals and the scientific and technical
imagination. They domesticate and discipline
subjectivity, transforming the intangible, changeable,
apparently free-willed conduct of people into
manipulable, coded, materialized, mathematized, twodimensional traces which may be utilized in any
procedure of calculation. The human individual has
become calculable and manageable. (p. 129)
Disciplines are ways of ordering differences. Through
their testing procedures they allow educators to categorize
all the complexity of students by reducing them to scores,
graphs, and tables. They present teachers with a way to
order the world and sooth the modernist anxiety that without
the organization they impose all will be chaos.
Gage and Berliner (1991) remind us: "All your life
you've been taking tests. They have brought you success or
failure,

joy or sorrow, a sense of justice done or outrage

suffered" (p. 569). That there is not more outrage is
surprising.
Summary
This chapter is entitled Disciplining the Discipline in
order to highlight the activity of placing the discursive
practices of the discipline under scrutiny. Utilizing the
process of critical reading and Foucault's methods of
critique it is possible to look at the modern science of
educational psychology differently. The practices of the
discipline, its disciplinary technologies, are usually
considered progressive, as a means of enabling students,
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i.e., used in the liberatory interest of education. However,
the limits of these technologies need to be recognized as
they are used to judge, construct, and normalize students as
subjects of a particular kind, docile, and useful.
The questioning of the discipline's practices is not
aimed at looking for answers or universal solutions. Rather,
the questioning is regarded as a way to engage the issues of
the discipline more deeply and complexly. The questioning
indicates a desire to interrogate "what what we do does" in
the real life experiences of children - so that we can think
about students and our own practice differently. A critique
of the discipline needs to become an important part of the
discipline.

CHAPTER VI
AT THIS JUNCTURE ..•
It seems to me ••• that the real political task in a
society such as ours is to criticize the working
of institutions which appear to be both neutral
and independent; to criticize them in such a
manner that the political violence which has
always exercised itself obscurely through them
will be unmasked, so that one can fight them.
(Foucault, quoted in Rabinow, 1983, p. 6)
This dissertation is a form of postmodern critique that
considers totalizing discourses and universal conclusions
problematic (Usher & Edwards, 1994). Therefore, it would be
contradictory to off er a set of final statements as a
universal vision for the future in this concluding chapter.
However, I would like to present a summary of some central
issues of the dissertation and discuss some implications for
the discipline of educational psychology as a feature of
teacher education. The chapter concludes with a critique and
an invitation for interrogations of this work as every
discourse is an incitement to discourse (Foucault, 1990).
Summary and Implications
Critigue of the Modernist Project
The current mainstream educational process in this
country is organized around the modernist project, i.e., it
celebrates reason and the individual subject, and has faith
in science to provide progress, certainty, order,
211
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efficiency, and control. The discipline of educational
psychology, based in a technical rationality, is concerned
with advancing these modern purposes.
The work of this dissertation offered an alternative
way of looking at modernity's project and the human science
of educational psychology in particular. As critique the
perspective maintained in the dissertation was a skeptical
stance regarding the discipline as a neutral body of
knowledge. This perspective was influenced by Michel
Foucault's concern with how modern societies control human
persons through the practices and knowledge claims of modern
sciences.
This work began with an uneasy reading of the discourse
of educational psychology as I was teaching introductory
courses to preservice teachers. I came to recognize myself,
in Freire's (1970/1990) terms, as both oppressed and
oppressor. I saw myself as oppressed because I had
internalized the rationale of the master narrative of the
discipline; I had assented to its hegemonic discourse with
its power to name and define persons as "objects" through
disciplinary technologies. It seems as though I had been
normalized and domesticated, made fit for the educational
system, i.e., docile and useful. At the same time I took on
the role of the oppressor by teaching the discipline as a
neutral body of knowledge and skills. I was critical and
reflective in this activity, although, from a position
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within the meaning-making system of the discipline. My
intent was to initiate preservice teachers into the
rationality and language of educational psychology. I was
complicitous in the system of domination (Foucault,
1977/1995) whereby my students would be made docile and
useful, and where they, in turn, would learn to normalize
their own students.
A shift in my perspective took place through an
intertextual reading and critical analysis as I struggled to
see connections with the discipline I was teaching, the
prevailing social order, and a community of resistance I was
encountering (e.g., Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991; Freire,
1970/1990; Giroux, 1981, 1988; Gordon, Miller, & Rollock,
1990; Harding, 1991; hooks, 1994; McLaren, 1989). The
discourse of educational psychology was subjected to a
"critical gaze", and the discourse's rationality, practices,
and effects were made problematic and interrogated.
This dissertation questioned elements of the
discipline's discourse that seem commonsense and taken-forgranted, taken as normative. It was hoped that by making the
familiar strange (Ball, 1990; Foucault, 1977/1995) these
everyday assumptions and practices could be more easily
questioned and changed. The questioning did not seek
generalizable and universal solutions to the crisis in
education. Rather, questioning was proposed as a way to open
a space where issues can be engaged in their social,
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political, and epistemological complexity.
Importance of Discourse
The importance of discourse has been emphasized
throughout this work. Recognizing that the discipline's
discourse needs to be taken seriously was a key point as the
discourse is so powerful in informing how we think about
students, teachers, and the teaching-learning process.
Discourse was also recognized as a social artifact (Gergen,
1985), the result of social negotiation, and the process
through which human persons are constituted. This
perspective subscribes to understanding that much of what we
have taken as "real" is imminently tied with our use of
language. Therefore, the human person as object/subject is
understood as inscribed by language rather than described
through scientific activity.
This productive aspect of discourse is a matter that
needed to be emphasized because the socially produced
knowledges of discourses are never neutral; knowledges of
discourses work in favor of some people over others as power
and knowledge are implicated in each other. Therefore,
discourses are sites of social struggle.
However, what I attempted to show was that, although
the discourse of educational psychology is powerful in the
multiple ways it constructs and differentiates students, it
is also vulnerable to counter-discourses that question,
resist, and contest the assumptions and knowledge claims of
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the discipline.
Critical discourse analysis as a research activity can
be disorienting and disrupting. Yet, it is an important
research enterprise because without this analysis social
sciences may become part of a "social silence" (Fine, 1992)
regarding society's "mechanisms of legitimation,
marginalization, and punishment" (Brown, 1992, p. 223).
Disrupting the dominant discourse is a kind of "talking
back" (hooks, 1989) that seems to be in contrast to a desire
for certainty and control typical of the modernist project.
Situated Knowledge and Standpoint Epistemology
The understanding that all knowledge is fashioned
through the interaction of persons in particular socially
situated positions with interests and biases is central to
the epistemology espoused by the perspective of this
dissertation. People are responsible for the knowledge they
construct. The possibility that knowledge could be
"objective" or disinterested eliminates knowledge
construction as a social and cultural activity, and it
exempts its constructors from responsibility for its
contents and/or effects. The claim of neutrality is
considered an illusion at best, or a "cloak" at worst, that
covers the vested interest of "elites" in protecting
positions of power and privilege as their worldview is
imposed as universal.
situated knowledge is always partial, shifting, and
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even distorted. The claim of a partial vision or perspective
is taken as a strength in that it is open and initiates,
rather than closes off perspectives (Haraway, 1988/1991).
Those who profess that only situated knowledges are possible
claim responsibility for what they see and recognize the
importance of learning "to see ••. from another point of view"
(Haraway, 1988/1991, p. 190). Reflexivity is desired as
there is a recognition of personal embeddedness in macro
tendencies (Harding, 1991) of society, i.e., the values,
meaning-making systems, power relations of the social world.

An effect of realizing that all knowledge is situated
is that it makes communication among perspectives primary.
Sharon Welch (1990) explains the difference of an "ethic of
control", i.e., power over, and an "ethic of risk", i.e.,
power with. The "ethic of risk" understands the need for
ethical conversations. Welch (1990) describes "communicative
ethics" as combining pluralism and social responsibility.
The goal is "mutual critique leading to a more adequate
understanding of what is just and how particular forms of
justice may be achieved" (p. 129).
An understanding of the discipline's knowledge claims
as situated, partial, and shifting calls for a more
reflexive stance from educational psychologists. Recognition
of situated knowledges also encourages ethical conversations
among those with multiple perspectives concerned with the
educational enterprise.
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Social Construction of Knowledge
The dissertation attempts to look at how the "truth" of
the discipline is constituted. The perspective espoused is
that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is the
result of social processes, i.e., knowledge is produced in
contexts by real people who have histories, biases, and are
embedded in power relations. Thus, that which is considered
the "truth" of the discipline is the product of social
negotiations.
This position and the discursive practices that result
may be considered "radical" in a sense; and yet not so
radical as might appear at first glance. This perspective is
coherent with the discipline of educational psychology's
contemporary psychological perspective (Anderson et al.,
1995), i.e., to understand the discipline from a social
constructionist position. Perhaps the "radical"
characteristic is in a social constructionist perspective
itself, as Anderson et al. (1995) propose:
••• the heart of a contemporary psychological
perspective is an image of learners as active and
social constructors of meaning, and an image of
learning as an act of construction through social
interaction in many contexts. (p. 145)
This dissertation exemplifies the disposition encouraged for
classroom teachers that can, and must, be applied to
understanding the formation of disciplinary knowledge as
well. Unless this position is taken seriously as applying to
the knowledge of the discipline it remains a static "fact"
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of learning that is told to preservice teachers, while the
discipline, as we know it, remains unchanged (Carter &
Doyle, 1996). If a social constructionist perspective is
taken seriously there are profound implications for how we
understand knowledge of the discipline.
The Importance of History
A significant ramification of this epistemology is an
interest in the historical formation of the discipline, the
social actors, and social and political contexts in which
the history of the discipline is embedded. This would be a
momentous shift for the discipline.
The discipline of educational psychology is presented
in classic texts as ahistorical; it seems that the
discipline's history has been suppressed as there are few
references to historical contexts or figures. A synchronic
aspect of the discipline is indicated in that its focus is
one moment in time, like a snapshot (Cherryholms, 1988).
This situation is typical of a positivist epistemology, but
it also has been taken to imply an "apparent lack of
interest in the history of [the] field" (Glover & Ronning,
1987, p. vii). Mainstream prescriptions for introductory
classes (see Anderson et al., 1995) contend that preservice
teachers do not need to understand "the history of
psychological ideas" (p. 145). However, Harding (1991)
asserts that there may be serious reasons why the history of
science is not taught to our young people, i.e., there is a
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fear that students would feel the enterprise is not worth
the effort if they knew the history. Harding (1991) asks:
What should we want students to know about the
scientific enterprise, its history, practices, and
goals? Would any of them go through the arduous
training necessary to become a scientist [or
educational psychologist] if they were told the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about this
institution and its present-day practices? (p. 31)
One example will provide a helpful illustration. What
would students of educational psychology think about some of
the discipline's central issues (e.g., nature-nurture
questions, normal curve, psycho-metric testing) if they knew
about the context and person who initiated them, namely,
Galton? Francis Galton (1822-1911) is described as "a strong
influence on what became American psychology ••. who was not a
psychologist at all, but a wealthy and somewhat eccentric
Briton" (Glover & Ronning, 1987, p. 19). Galton's thinking
was organized around a hereditarian view, and he "pursued
interests that led to the field of eugenics"n (p. 19).
Yet, Galton and his assumptions and practices had a great
influence on many educational psychologists who were to
follow him including J. McKeen Cattell and Edward E.
Thorndike.
Today, Galton "remains a central figure in the progress
of modern psychology" (Fancher, 1979, p. 294). Yet, when
Galton is mentioned, albeit in passing, in "classic" texts

79

Gal ton is considered the
movement (see Fancher, 1979).

"father"

of

the

eugenics
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(e.g., Gage & Berliner, 1991, p. 216) his position is
unproblematic and seemingly neutral even as his ideas
connected to eugenics can be found throughout the text and
talk of mainstream educational psychology. So much of the
discipline's legacy can be traced to Galton; his influence
does matter.
Robert

v.

Guthrie (1976), for example, included a

chapter in his book, Even the Rat Was White: A Historical
View of Psychology, that he entitled "The Past is Prologue".
It is distressing to read his reflections of twenty years
ago:
Some of the dubious research of the 1920's has lingered
nearly fifty years as a phantomlike apparition of
pseudointellectualism. Present-day proclamations
••• resemble the claims of biased 1920 educational
psychologists •••• These theories recur with an
appearance of "newness" enough to obscure the cobwebs
of antiquity and actually encourage a repeat of the
same defenses utilized decades ago. This is occurring
today in the arguments against the continued use of IQ
tests and the allegations of inherited mental deficits
in black and brown children •..• (p. 194)
That "not that much has changed" in the ensuing twenty years
is evidenced in the recent publication of The Bell Curve
(Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Twenty years from now this
quote may still be current. The discourse of educational
psychology and its practices support and construct the
conditions that made Guthrie's statement meaningful in the
70's and make his words meaningful today.
A comprehensive understanding of the discipline
requires an appreciation of the history especially when the
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history exposes undeniable propensities toward racism,
sexism, classism, and so forth. 80 What results in a failure
to confront this history is "social amnesia" (Giroux, 1981)
as the memory of the past has been concealed or silenced in
the interest of advancing disciplinary programs.
Intertextual Reading and Critical Literacy
It is not only the study of the discipline's most
influential figures and accomplishments that need to be
addressed and interrogated. The perspectives found in
resistance movements and literature add a needed viewpoint
to the study of educational psychology. Foucault's
genealogies direct attention to those records of resistance
that have not gained acceptance within the mainstream
discourse. Genealogies attend to subaltern perspectives and
knowledges, opening up a space where knowledge that has been
silenced or marginalized can be heard and taken
seriously. 81
Some important counter-discourses have been presented
in various chapters of this dissertation that allow a
reading against the mainstream text: the feminist critique
of science aims at disrupting some of the myths that have
been perpetuated regarding neutrality, objectivity, and the
8

°Foucault (1988) comments that the difference between a
real science and a pseudoscience is that "A real science
recognizes and accepts its own history without feeling
attacked" (p. 12).
Silenced and marginalized voices are not to
romantized, however. They, too, are subject to critique.
81

be
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primacy of scientific epistemology (Chapter II); Freire's
resistance to a transmission model or "banking" notion of
education and a call for critical literacy (Chapter III);
Giroux (1981, 1988) and Kincheloe's (1993) critique of
technical rationality, the dominant meaning-making system of
the discipline (Chapter IV); Everhart's (1983) critique of
prescriptive classroom management programs and his
recommendation of a socio-political understanding of
classroom life (Chapter V); Mensh and Mensh's (1991)
explication of the historical fabrication of the bell-shaped
curve that is represented in mainstream texts as "normal"
(Chapter V) .
These texts seek to question and disrupt the sometimes
unconscious assumptions, "neutrality", and smooth historical
"development" of educational psychology. Voices or
perspectives that pose questions need not be considered
"spoilers" to the discipline, as though all was well before
their arrival. Rather, alternative perspectives and
interrogations can be seen as opportunities to consider the
discipline more critically and with a recognition of the
greater social and political complexity of education as well
as educational psychology's implication in social and
political contexts. This intertextual reading is necessary
if teachers-students of educational psychology are to move
beyond a functional literacy to a critical literacy
concerning the discipline.
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Critigue of a Critigue
Among the many things I have learned in the work of
this research is an appreciation for the importance and
inevitability of critique of discourses. As Foucault
(1978/1990) has insisted, any discourse offers "a point of
resistance and a starting point for a proposing strategy"
(p. 10). I take responsibility for critiquing my own
discourse from my partial, shifting, particular position,
and I welcome critique from anyone who will take this
discourse seriously enough to offer one.
First, the breadth of the discourse of the discipline
of educational psychology is immense. Consequently, I was
able to barely "dust" a few areas of import. There is so
much that needs to be interrogated and contested, not for
the sake of science or in the interest of advancing the
discipline, but in the name of social justice.
The discourse of the discipline itself supports and
advances social cognitions that makes sense of oppressive
practices in such a way that they are frequently accepted as
tolerable. The discipline has not been able to address the
ways its own knowledge claims and practices are caught in
the web of meaning and power that masks oppression in
education. Critical discourse analysis is a process of
interrogation that disrupts these commonsense understanding
and everyday practices of the discipline.
Second, this work is more about posing questions and
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critique rather that offering solutions. This is not very
satisfying to a modernist perspective. It may even be an
irritant. However, questioning and critique as a way of
looking at the discipline has had profound influence on my
own practice as a teacher-learner. My hope is that in the
future I will be able to ask better questions.
I would like to end with a word about Paulo Freire who
died on May 2, 1997, as I was completing this final chapter.
I mourn the loss of Freire even as I celebrate his courage
and teaching. The words of Peterson and Tenorio (1997) have
expressed Freire's influence on my own educational
experience:
... for teachers ..• Freire leaves a profound legacy.
Steadfastly opposed to teaching as indoctrination, he
insisted that learning is inescapably political and
that educators should help students articulate their
own vision of social justice. He argued for a pedagogy
that draws on the lives of our students to engage them
in asking critical questions about the larger society.

(p. 2)
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LOYOLA LETTERHEAD
March 31, 1995
(Inside Address)
Dear •.• ,
There is general agreement that education in this country is
in need of reform. I believe that our discipline,
educational psychology, has been and may continue to make
significant contributions to the discussion of education and
its future direction.
I am a doctoral candidate at the Loyola University of
Chicago. My dissertation involves a study of the
representation of unprivileged youth as expressed through
the study of educational psychology.
I will employ
discourse analysis of the textbooks used in introductory
courses with pre-service teachers.
It is my intention to
provide useful information to our colleagues in the
educational psychology community as well as advancing the
possibilities of education's service to children who are
often characterized as unable to access our current
educational system.
Your assistance is important to me as I gather those texts
which are considered the most effective vehicles for
transmitting the discipline to newcomers to the field.
Your
name has been surfaced as the result of a sample selected
from APA Division 15 members. Familiarity with the
discipline and knowledge of the published texts are the
resources I need to tap. Please consider passing this
questionnaire to a colleague only if you feel that the
person is in a more suitable position to respond to this
very brief survey. You can imagine how grateful I am for
your response.
The confidentiality of your response is assured. The number
found on this questionnaire is an identification number
which facilitates mailing purposes only, allowing me too
indicate that you have returned your response. Your name
will never be placed on the questionnaire.
If anyone would like a summary of the results of this survey
please write "copy of results requested," as well as your
name and address, on the back of the return envelope. ·
Please do not put this information on the questionnaire
itself.
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Any questions you might have are welcomed.
to write or call me.
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Suzanne Gallagher
(312) 274-5069

Please feel free
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Please return to: Suzanne Gallagher
c/o Carol Harding
Loyola University of
Chicago, Mallinckrodt
1041 Ridge Road
Willmette, IL 60091
QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographic information
1) Where is educational psychology housed in your

institution?

(Circle one)
department/school of education
school/college of arts and sciences

2) Do you currently teach introductory educational
psychology courses, or have you taught these courses in the
last five years? (Circle one)
YES
NO
3) For how many years have you considered yourself a member
of the educational psychology community?
Textbook Information
1) Please indicate two texts you consider "classic" for an
introductory educational psychology course.
(Please provide as much information as you can.)
Title Author Publisher Edition -

Publication Date -

second recommendation:
Title Author Publisher Edition -

Publication Date (Over)
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2) Have you used the above texts for introductory courses in
educational psychology?
(Circle one)

YES

NO

3) If you do not use the above two texts, please list the
books you do use in your courses.
Title Author Publisher Edition -

Publication Date -

second choice:
Title Author Publisher Edition-

Publication Date -

Please check if you would like the results of this
survey.
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"CLASSIC" TEXTBOOKS - SURVEY RESULTS
Suzanne Gallagher
September, 1996
A random sample of members of APA Division 15
(Educational Psychology) received the survey. A return rate
of 63.3% was realized with 133 of 210 surveys returned. The
results are given in the following tables.
Table 1
survey Returns Tabulation
No. of Responses
Type of Surveys
Total returned
133
Nominating texts

84

Not nominating texts*
49
* Responses varied including: Do not teach educational
psychology (29 responses); Courses taught in modules and do
not use textbooks as such (7 responses); There are no classic
texts (2).
Table 2
Textbooks nominated as "classic" - traditional discourse of
the field.
Title/Publisher/Date***
Author**
Frequency
Woolfolk, A.

Educational Psychology
6th Ed., Allyn & Bacon (1995)

43

Gage, N.L. &
Berliner, D.

Education Psychology
5th Ed., Houghton Mifflin (1992)

32

Good, T.L. &
Brophy, J.

Contemporary Education Psychology
5th Ed., Longman (1995)

19

Slavin, R.

Educational Psychology:
Theory and Practice
4th Ed., Allyn and Bacon (1994)

9

Biehler, R.F. &
Snowman, J.

Psychology Applied to Teaching
6th Ed., Houghton Mifflin (1990)

8

Dembo, M.H.

Applying Educational Psychology
5th Ed., Longman (1994)

5

Sprinthall, N.A. & Educational Psychology:
A Developmental Approach
Sprinthall, R.C
5th Ed. McGraw Hill (1990)

5

** Fourteen other authors received less than five nominations.
*** Edition cited most.
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